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THE PATH TO PEACE

ESSAYS AND ADDRESSES
ON
PEACE AND ITS MAKING

THE PATH TO PEACE

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ON
PEACE AND ITS MAKING

BY
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1930

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TO

ARISTIDE BRIAND, MINISTER OF FRANCE

MASTER BUILDER OF THAT NEW WORLD OF NATIONS

WHOSE CORNERSTONE IS PEACE

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INTRODUCTION

Between June 28, 1919 and July 24, 1923, there were signed at Versailles and elsewhere thirteen treaties, conventions, declarations and protocols in settlement of issues arising out of the Great War. Whether the signatories realized it or not, every one of these documents looked backward, save only in the Covenant of the League of Nations. At Locarno on October 16, 1925, a treaty of mutual guaranty between Germany, Belgium, France, Great Britain and Italy was initialled, followed by arbitration conventions between Germany and Belgium, Germany and France, Germany and Poland, Germany and Czecho-Slovakia. These noteworthy documents looked forward. They marked a clearly defined turning-point in the history of the impressive movement from war as an institution to peace as an established and continuing state. The initiative in these new undertakings came from Dr. Stresemann speaking for the new German Reich, and it was quickly and eagerly responded to by M. Briand speaking on behalf of the people and the government of France. One thing more remained and that was the final, the universal and the public acknowledgment of the fact that war was no longer to be regarded as an appropriate

or a justifiable method of attempting to settle international differences, whether large or small.

Just this was accomplished under the leadership of M. Briand through the General Pact for the renunciation of war, signed in Paris, August 27, 1928. By the terms of this pact the high contracting parties condemn recourse to war for the solution of international controversies and renounce it as an instrument of national policy in their relations with one another. Further, the high contracting parties agree that the settlement or solution of all disputes or conflicts of whatever nature or of whatever origin they may be, which may arise among them, shall never be sought except by pacific means. When the word of the civilized world is given, nothing remains but to see that that word is kept. It is the function and the duty of public opinion to compel governments to keep their word as given in this epoch-marking declaration.

The slow-moving and reluctant opinion of those who persistently cling to the past and who continue to admire the worst side of human nature, continues to talk of neutrality, of self-defense, of security, of protection for commerce at sea and the like. These terms, however, no longer have any meaning, or at least they can no longer have the old meaning which has been attached to them. If a nation's pledge not to have recourse to war is not to be regarded as binding and is not to be relied upon, then there can be no such thing as security in this world. The old barbaric order must in that case be resumed, and peoples claiming to have

reached a certain stage of civilization must return to the practice of public butchery, slaughter and destruction until the whole globe is a desert.

Progress, happiness and satisfaction lie in the other direction. These are to be found in insisting upon the good faith, the intelligence and the high honor which are behind the Pact of Paris, and in requiring governments, despite the mischievous and well-organized minorities that so often control them, to shape their policies quickly, definitely and openly in accordance with the pledges so unanimously and so publicly given. Military and naval organizations are quickly to be reduced to the status of police, and the language of militarism is to be allowed to fall into prompt disuse. The almost limitless resources heretofore poured out in waste upon what it has been fashionable to call national insurance are now to be turned into those inviting directions where they will contribute to public health, to public comfort, to public satisfaction and to national prosperity and contentment.

That ultra-nationalistic temper and mode of thinking which has been forced to renounce international war as an instrument of public policy, is now turning with renewed zeal and vigor to international economic combat of various forms. It would be a sorry commentary on present-day human intelligence if the spirit of militarism, being cast out from one stronghold, were to find lodgment in another. The part which properly and wisely may be played by trade restrictions in the building of a nation or in meeting special and

temporary circumstances, is now well understood and generally agreed upon. This, however, is a matter quite different from an economic policy of permanent, ruthless and constantly mounting trade restrictions and embarrassments. These are, in the economic sphere, the analogue of huge armies and navies and of the war spirit in the strictly political sphere. Tariff duties framed solely in the national interest for reasonable and constructive protection to industry while industry is in the building, are something wholly different from tariff duties which are in effect prohibitory, framed by special interests for their own selfish benefit.

Richard Cobden was essentially right in his judgment of those policies which should increasingly govern international trade, although he was a full century ahead of public opinion and of general national development. It is a reasonably safe prediction that the next generation will see a constantly increasing respect for Cobden's principles and point of view and a steadily growing endeavor more largely to give them practical effect in public policy to the advantage of agriculture, of labor, of industry and of international relations.

Signs multiply that there will shortly be at least three great economic units operating and co-operating to stabilize national economic effort and international trade development. These are the United States of America, the coming economic union of the States of Europe, and the British Commonwealth of Nations. Nothing could be more short-sighted than to view these great organized units of industry and trade as primarily antag-

onistic each to the other. There is far better reason to believe that, as each finds itself safely and securely established on sound economic foundations, it will seek with the other two great units, as with the rest of the world, the largest possible measure of economic and financial interdependence. The development of the economic union of European states or that of the British Commonwealth of Nations is not in any wise to be regarded as finding its motive and its end in antagonism to the United States of America. On the contrary, the aim of each is to follow the example set by the United States of America and to apply the lessons, which the American people have learned through a century and a half, to their own present-day economic and social conditions.

The path to peace lies away from the dark and tangled forest of militarism and of national self-sufficiency and boastful pride wherever these exhibit themselves. It leads out toward the bright open highlands of international understanding, international co-operation and international accomplishment. In words which M. Briand has made famous: "One need not believe in peace blindly, but one must believe in it profoundly."

NICHOLAS MURRAY BUTLER

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY
IN THE CITY OF NEW YORK
September 1, 1930

I

NATION BUILDING—FOR WAR OR FOR PEACE?

An address delivered before the Illinois Manufacturers' Association, Chicago, Illinois, January 15, 1924

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NATION BUILDING—FOR WAR OR FOR PEACE?

The many and various problems that now vex and distress the whole world cannot be clearly understood unless seen in their relation to the age-long process of nation-building. These problems are all incident to the building of nations and to the fact that nations, when built, find themselves under the necessity of living together in mutual interdependence.

History records three different and distinct ideals of the world's political organization. The first of these is the ideal of a universal empire under one dominion. This was the vision before the great military captains of the ancient world and it was realized for centuries, so far as the western world was concerned, by the rule of the Roman Empire. The second is that which may be described as the ultra-nationalistic ideal of wholly separate, competing, and often warring states, each of which is dominated solely by self-interest and by a desire for territorial aggrandizement and material enrichment. This ideal, when attained, is at the cost of huge armaments on land, on sea, and in air. Industry, trade and commerce develop, as it were, on suffrance, and may be snuffed out in a moment like a candle by the stupidity of a government or the passion of a people. The third is the ideal of separate and distinct nations, each of which is guided and controlled by moral forces and which seeks, through co-operation with other

nations, to formulate rules of international law and conduct, to multiply the avenues and processes of travel, trade and commerce, and constantly to find ways and means of extending the rule of that spirit of justice and concord which is the only sure basis of international peace.

It is perhaps not easy to define a nation, or even to describe it. Normally, a nation must occupy territory which has reasonable geographic unity; it must control adequate economic resources for its support; and it must rest upon that unity of tradition, race or religion which binds men together in so many ways. The migrations of men across Asia and Europe have been caused by the search for national homes that should be geographic unities and that should possess adequate economic resources. The Hispanic peninsula beyond the Pyrenees is a typical geographic unity. So is Italy, bounded by the Alps on the north and on the other three sides by the Adriatic and Mediterranean Seas. The British Isles offer geographic unity, but not adequate economic support. This fact explains the history of the development of the British Empire and has made the British people a seafaring, a trading, and a manufacturing people who must import not only the greater part of the raw material of their manufactures, but the greater part of their food supply. The fact that Italy lacks coal and that Great Britain has coal to sell explains much of the trade relations and political sympathies that have so long existed between the British and the Italian peoples.

A large part of European history is to be explained by the roving and restless search of peoples for a geographic unity in which to dwell and which shall provide adequate economic support for a growing population.

Given geographic unity and adequate economic support, there remains the vitally important matter of unity of race or speech or tradition. This unity is never wholly gained, but many peoples approach it in large measure. Where this unity is seriously lacking, there arises the problem of minorities such as has distressed and still distresses the nations of Eastern and Southeastern Europe and which is represented among us by the negro problem in the Southern and Southeastern States. Out of these conditions come economic, social, and political difficulties which have to do, first, with the happiness or satisfaction of peoples themselves as regards their internal policy, and, second, with those incidents of international competition and friction which, unless adjusted, lead to international war. It is easy to offer illustrations of all these conditions and circumstances drawn from the history of the last one hundred years.

If a people in building their nation come under the domination of that political philosophy which teaches that a nation is an end in itself, that it has no other aim than increase of power, wealth, and population, then the nation so built must sooner or later be involved in wars of conquest against its neighbors. If, on the other hand, the people who build a nation are dominated by that philosophy which looks upon a nation, like an in-

dividual, as subject to moral laws and moral obligations, then the nation will not seek to aggrandize itself at the expense of its neighbors, but will endeavor to live with them in peace and steadily developing international relations of every sort. It is always true that a nation's foreign or international policy is built upon and is really a part of its internal policies and its dominating political ideals.

Differences between nations, like differences between individuals, will always arise. Such differences may be either composed by negotiation or by the intervention of a common friend or they may be settled by the impartial application of the rules of international law and conduct or by force of arms on the field of battle. In the last resort there is no method of settling controversies between nations save through the rule of justice or its alternative, the rule of force. To no less a person than Julius Cæsar is attributed the saying, Arms and laws do not flourish together. The rule of justice means a body of international law and a court to declare and to interpret it. The rule of force means war with all its horrors and devastations.

It still remains to be seen whether the fearful lessons of 1914 to 1918 have been fully learned by the modern world. If so, the outlook for international peace is assured. If not, one must tremble for the life of civilization itself, for it could not withstand another such shock as the last.

II

PRACTICABLE STEPS TOWARD PEACE

Introduction to the Annual Report of the Director of the Division of Intercourse and Education of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, April 20, 1925

PRACTICABLE STEPS TOWARD PEACE

Despite many and powerful expressions concerning peace in the abstract, that are, however, almost wholly sentimental in character, it is increasingly clear that peace is, as it was described some years ago, not an ideal at all but rather a state attendant upon the achievement of an ideal. "The ideal itself is human liberty, justice, and the honorable conduct of an orderly and humane society. Given this, a durable peace follows naturally as a matter of course. Without this, there is no peace, but only a rule of force until liberty and justice revolt against it in search of peace."[1] Certainly peace cannot be invoked to protect a denial of human liberty, or injustice, or dishonorable and minatory conduct on the part of any state. Therefore it is to conduct, both personal and national, that intelligent workers for international peace must first of all address themselves. The utterance of pious and impracticable sentiments, the perpetual adoption of resolutions, the preparation on paper of elaborate plans whereby peace may be secured and protected, together with what may fairly be described as posturing for peace, all belong to what may be called the futilitarian type of human phi-

[1]Nicholas Murray Butler, *A World in Ferment* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1918), p. 8.

losophy and human conduct. The same is true of the words and the conduct of those public men who persistently pronounce in favor of peace, but against taking part in any practicable plan for its advancement; in favor of the limitation of armaments, but against any agreement to that end which either their own or any other government would accept; in favor of the maintenance of an International Court of Justice, but only one which could not possibly be brought into being; in favor of the abandonment of war, while constantly continuing those public statements and acts which increase international friction, promote international misunderstanding, and put an effective brake upon real progress toward new forms of international co-operation.

In respect of the general problem of international peace, public opinion is now almost everywhere persistently in advance of the action of governments. Only in rare cases do existing governments fully represent and reflect either the noblest ambitions or the highest interests of their own people in the discussions which are going forward throughout the world. Appeal is constantly making to the lower and more selfish aspects of human nature, while those that are higher and finer are left to the contemplation of that hope deferred which maketh the heart sick.

Few proposals could be more futile than that merely to outlaw war. Such outlawry would only last until human passion broke down its fragile barrier. The neutrality of Belgium was amply protected by international law, and the invasion of the territory of that

country on August 4, 1914, was definitely and distinctly outlawed. Nevertheless it took place. Precisely the same thing will happen in the future, no matter what the provisions of international law may be, if the springs of personal and national conduct remain unchanged. Forms do not control facts. Laws must reflect, but cannot compel, public opinion. It is quite idle and meaningless to plan to purge human nature of its less admirable traits by the enactment of any statute, whether national or international. Since the advent of free government, it may be doubted whether any law affecting personal conduct has been, is, or can be enforced. If such laws are to be truly effective they must be, not enforced, but obeyed. They are only obeyed, and they only will be obeyed, when they reflect the overwhelming public opinion of those whom they directly affect. Once more, therefore, the path of progress leads to the door of conduct, both personal and national.

It is beyond the limits of practical education or practical statesmanship to convince public opinion that there is not, and never can be, any cause for which men should be ready to lay down their lives if need be. The history of human liberty and the story of the making of free governments offer too many illustrations to the contrary. What is practicable is so to instruct, to guide and to form public opinion that it will insist upon such national conduct and such public expressions on the part of representatives of governments as will promote international understanding and international co-operation,

as well as reduce to a minimum those incidents, those policies and those outgivings, whether on the platform, on the floor of parliaments or in the press, that constantly erect such effective and distressing obstacles to the progress of international concord and co-operation.

It is quite plain that public opinion is everywhere moving toward agreement upon a definition of what constitutes aggression in international relationships. Nowhere is it proposed that an outraged or invaded people should submit tamely to an outrage or invasion against which they are capable of defending themselves. When, however, judicial process, involving the rule of right reason, is established as an alternative to the immediate use of armed force, then it may prove to be possible to reach an acceptable definition of aggression by defining as aggressive those acts taken in defiance of the will, or against the interests, of any other government or its people, without first submitting the questions at issue to impartial judicial determination for inquiry and ascertainment of the facts and equities involved. This suggestion which has lately been brought forward in concrete form, has attracted favorable attention everywhere. It is now under the closest scrutiny with a view to determining whether it may not be accepted as the next step in the organization of the world for peace.

That there is nothing new under the sun is once again demonstrated by the fact that General Tasker H. Bliss has recently come upon a statement of this very principle in Thucydides' *History of the Peloponnesian*

War, where the great historian uses the following language:

> It is perfectly clear that they (the Corinthians) were in the wrong *because*, when they were challenged to submit the dispute about Epidamnus to a decision by arbitration, they preferred to prosecute their claims by war rather than by equity.—I. 34.

If a satisfactory definition of aggression can be worked out, then the next step is the extension of the authority and the upholding of the hands of a Permanent Court of International Justice. Had no Court been established under the authority of the Treaty of Versailles, the natural point of departure in the creation of such a Court would have been found in the action taken by the Second Peace Conference at The Hague, which adopted the following *Vœu* on October 16, 1907:[1]

> The Conference recommends to the signatory Powers the adoption of the annexed draft Convention for the creation of a Court of Arbitral Justice and putting it into force as soon as an agreement has been reached respecting the selection of the judges and the constitution of the Court.

It is a well-known fact that informal but very considerable progress had been made between that time and the outbreak of war in 1914 toward agreement between a number of the governments that had participated in the second Hague Conference upon a plan for the

[1]Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, *The Proceedings of the Hague Peace Conferences* (New York: 1920), vol. I, pp. 689–96.

selection of the members of such a Court. Since, however, a Court similar in kind to that contemplated in the *Vœu* of 1907 has been brought into being, pursuant to provisions contained in the Treaty of Versailles, and is now exercising jurisdiction from its seat at The Hague, it is obvious that the path of least resistance will be found in extending the authority and scope of jurisdiction of that Court. So recently as January 24, 1925, the President of the United States publicly declared: "I believe that the next step which we may well take is by way of participation in the Permanent Court of International Justice." No one who has followed unwaveringly the progress made in recent years toward the substitution of the rule of right for the rule of force in settling differences between nations, will dissent from this statement by the President.

With aggression defined and with the authority of a Permanent Court of International Justice everywhere recognized, it would still remain to agree upon a body of accepted international law and a code of rules of international conduct to which such Court might turn for guidance and for controlling principles in making its findings upon a proved or an agreed statement of facts. Probably the method adopted by the Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907 would be the best possible for arriving at such a statement of international law and rules of conduct, because it is the method already familiar to the nations concerned.

Underneath and behind all these undertakings there remains the task to instruct and to enlighten public

opinion so that it may not only guide but compel the action of governments and public officers in the direction of constructive progress. There must be present the moral conviction that a peace which rests upon liberty and justice is an ideal so lofty that no effort and no sacrifice may properly be spared in the task of securing its accomplishment. When this stage is reached it will not be necessary formally to limit armaments; they will atrophy from neglect and disuse.

It is from precisely this point of view that the work of the Division of Intercourse and Education of the Carnegie Endowment has, from the beginning, dealt with the problem of international peace. The Division has studiously refrained from mere sentimental expressions, and from participation in those futile acts which repel much more than they attract the support of right-minded men and women. The Division has devoted itself for fifteen years, and it will continue to devote itself, to the development among men and nations of the international mind. "The international mind is nothing else than that habit of thinking of foreign relations and business, and that habit of dealing with them, which regard the several nations of the civilized world as friendly and co-operating equals in aiding the progress of civilization, in developing commerce and industry and in spreading enlightenment and culture throughout the world."[1]

The work of the Division of Intercourse and Edu-

[1]Nicholas Murray Butler, *The International Mind* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1919), p. 102.

cation has substituted doing for talking and practice for preaching. To extend the hand of aid and sympathy to a stricken people, as in the case of Belgium or France or Serbia or Russia, is an act more influential in bringing about that international friendship and comprehension upon which permanent peace rests than a thousand declaratory resolutions in favor of peace. The multiplication of international contacts and the promotion of international interpenetration by means of which men and women of one land come to know more intimately the life, the language and the customs of another are ways and means of spreading the international mind. These methods are constantly and consistently followed by the Division, not only in one land but in many lands. The ideal of it all was admirably stated some twenty-five centuries ago by Aristophanes, when, at the very height of the Peloponnesian War, he wrote the passage which has been freely rendered in these words:

From the murmur and the subtlety of suspicion with which
we vex one another,
Give us rest.
Make a new beginning,
And mingle again the kindred of the nations in the alchemy
of Love,
And with some finer essence of forbearance
Temper our mind.—*Peace* 993–9.

It is not always easy to separate the stern realities of a political situation, whether national or international,

from the hopes and ambitions of those who are called, often wrongly, idealists. There is abundant evidence that the smaller nations of Europe hail the existing League of Nations as a satisfaction of their long expressed hopes. Public opinion in those countries is strongly favorable to the League of Nations and its work, and the smaller nations would regard any weakening of it, to say nothing of its destruction, as a portentous calamity. On the other hand, some of the larger nations, themselves members of the League, find difficulty in adjusting either their thinking or their acts to its methods and standards. Time and time alone will show what permanent progress can be made along the road that is now being travelled. Each year increases the probability that the existing League of Nations will prove a godsend to most, if not to all, of the nations of Europe.

Two facts which stand out as having a most important bearing upon the whole problem of the better organization of the world for international peace are, first, the feeling on the part of the French people that unless they are prepared to defend themselves by force of arms there is no effective guaranty of their national security; and, second, the obvious paralysis that has overtaken the government of the United States in all that concerns international policy and international co-operation.

The first of these questions can only be dealt with by finding some guaranty of national security which the French people will accept as satisfactory. That has

not yet been done. The question is in no small degree a psychological one. With the history of the last three hundred years before him and with economic and financial conditions and competitions as they are, it would be difficult for any fair-minded observer to fail to admit that the attitude of the French people has behind it a very large supporting body of truth and reality. Here then is a very real and fundamental problem which presses for solution.

The second question is one which gives concern not only to citizens of the United States but to the whole world. That position of leadership which had been won by the display of intellectual and moral courage and power and which was used during the generation preceding the outbreak of the World War to blaze new paths in the direction of international peace and the substitution of justice for force in settling differences between nations, has been lost through irresolution, futile and long-drawn-out debate, and infirmity of purpose. There is no longer any isolated nation in the world, nor can there be. Steam and the electric spark have destroyed that possibility. Ideas speak no single language and dwell within the confines of no national boundaries. Science is, by its very nature, international and has made itself the indispensable servant of man, whether for progress or for destruction. Whether that paralysis which is just now so marked in the government of the United States represents and reflects a like paralysis among the people, is a matter of hot dispute. Probably it does not; but, whether it does or not, it is a

basic fact to be reckoned with in planning new steps of advance away from war, away from the crushing burden of huge armaments, away from international rivalries, jealousies and intolerance, away from the exploitation of smaller and weaker peoples, and away from that morality of the jungle which enthrones interests and leaves both rights and duties to shift for themselves.

A constantly recurring difficulty which confronts every movement to improve international relations is the one which grows out of that ultra-legalistic spirit and method which so often appear in even the most delicate international negotiations. Whenever the head of a Foreign Office feels himself to be, or is felt to be, acting for his government as an attorney for a client, then the danger-signal should be hoisted. International relations cannot be conducted on the basis of litigation, however inchoate. They must be conducted on the basis of friendly co-operation between two moral equals whose common aim is so to settle outstanding controversies as to benefit both nations immediately concerned and to promote that spirit which makes for peace throughout the world. There is a psychology of diplomacy and a psychology of international relations that are far more important and far more certain in their practical effects than either legal methods or legal principles. Consideration will often secure what demand fails to get.

It is, moreover, of first importance for every nation to realize that under modern conditions there are but

few so-called domestic questions that have not an international aspect and an international relationship. What a nation may wish to do to promote its own foreign trade or to protect the quality of its citizenship is certainly, in origin and chief incidence, a domestic question, but since in practical operation such policies may affect the interests and possibly touch the pride of other peoples, it is of high importance that these facts be not overlooked in every step that relates to the formulation and execution of such policies. The bare and blunt assertion of the sovereign right to pursue a policy, that right being backed by national force, is without exception the most harmful and inconsiderate method of procedure.

III

THE HUMANE WORK OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

A statement made to the New York *Times*
September 20, 1925

THE HUMANE WORK OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

The most helpful way to approach the organization and operations of the League of Nations established by the Treaty of Versailles, is to look upon it as the latest, the most wide-reaching, and by far the most hopeful of the many endeavors to secure human co-operation for the advancement of the highest human ends. In this particular instance the co-operating units are organized States, but the impulse behind the movement is none the less human, nor is its aim.

From the very beginning the covenant of the League of Nations, which forms Part I of the Treaty of Versailles, has been gravely misunderstood by a large portion of the population of the United States, and misinterpreted to them. It is expressly set out that the subscribing States agree to the covenant of the League of Nations "in order to promote international co-operation and to achieve international peace and security."

This has been a boasted and eagerly pursued aim of the Government of the United States from the very beginning of the nation's history. Washington, Hamilton, Jefferson, the Adamses, Madison, Clay, Webster, Seward, Fish, Blaine, McKinley, Hay, Roosevelt, Root, Taft and Wilson had each in turn been engaged in advancing this noble cause in official capacity. In our State documents and in the correspondence of our pub-

lic men are to be found illustrations by the hundred of our profound interest in these matters, and, time and time again, formal declarations by the Congress of the United States have given definite and specific support to them.

In the light of these facts Americans must not think their neighbors in other lands peculiar if they are surprised when they see that an enterprise of this description is well and solidly launched and that the Government of the United States has no part in it whatever. There can be no use now in thrashing over old straw or in trying to affix blame or responsibility upon this political leader or that. The simple fact is that the people of the United States, in two successive Presidential elections at which this cause was presented to them as an issue, have voted overwhelmingly against those candidates and groups who would have us join the League of Nations.

So far as the United States is concerned that matter is, for the present, a closed issue. But this is none the less mystifying to the European or the Asiatic or the South African, who continues to be nonplussed when he is informed that an issue of this stupendous magnitude has fallen into the cauldron of party politics. He rubs his eyes and looks across the Atlantic to see whether the Americans are real people or only a name. He inquires anxiously what has become of our established national traditions, policies and ideals.

It may be urged with some force that the root of the difficulty lies in the work of that man who translated

the phrase *La Société des Nations* in the English version. That the rendering is not a happy or an accurate one seems obvious; but, in addition, it stirred up, and enabled demagogues to stir up, memories of all sorts of leagues of lust and blood and crime and conquest, as these have come into being for a thousand years and more. If the English translator had rendered the phrase *La Société des Nations* by the words The Associated Nations, a quite different effect might have been produced upon public opinion in the United States. This rendering of the French phrase is accurate, significant, and has the advantage of recalling at once the relationship in which the American Government considered itself to stand to the Allies while hostilities were in progress during the Great War. Time and time again in history great events and important changes have hung upon a single word, and who dare say that in 1919, when the Government of the United States was on the very verge of accepting the Covenant of the League of Nations with a few carefully drawn reservations, it would not actually have joined the Associated Nations on the same terms? Perhaps!

Much of the discussion and debate on this whole subject that have taken place in the United States has been quite below that level of intelligence, comprehension and sincerity which the people have every right to expect from their public servants, more particularly in reference to a matter of so great importance. Few things could be less in the public interest than to turn loose upon the discussion of an important and carefully

worded document a legislator who, with the mind of a mere member of the bar rather than that of a true lawyer, proceeds, with all the ferocity of a prosecuting attorney, to tear words, punctuations, sentences into shreds before his astonished and often delighted hearers. This may be magnificent, but it is not honorable or becoming public debate.

The League of Nations has now been in existence for six years, and the range and character of its accomplishments are certainly extraordinary. These have not included, as yet, some of the more spectacular results that are in view, but they have been, none the less, amazingly human, amazingly numerous and amazingly successful. It may very well be that the shortest line of approach to the establishment of national security, with resulting sharp limitation of armament, will be found to be not the most direct line, but one which will proceed in roundabout ways and through the multiplication of kindly and helpful acts of international co-operation which of themselves carry conviction of the sincerity and high-mindedness of the nations which participate in them.

Take, for example, the field of public health. No one nation, however effective or meticulous its system of quarantine and inspection, can stamp out a disease like typhus when it becomes epidemic in Eastern Europe or in Asia. The subdivision of the Secretariat of the League which has to do with health, directed by a most competent and devoted Polish physician, has undertaken to deal with typhus and other epidemics as and when they appear. From Geneva for Eastern Europe

and from Singapore for Asia, this body of scientific and high-minded workers is engaged in stamping out at its origin the cause of one of the most destructive of human pestilences. Human lives are saved, human families are preserved, communities are made and kept fit for permanent residence and the general level of civilization is raised in a way that could not be done save through international co-operation.

This is but one of many illustrations that might be given of this very striking aspect of the League's work. It fascinates the visitor to Geneva to see the skill and accuracy with which the records are kept, the use of modern graphic methods in recording and in portraying statistics, and the practical steps taken to establish, and keep established, close and effective contacts with representatives and correspondents of the League in many lands. It is surely not possible to say that the people of the United States have no interest in such work as this.

Another undertaking is that which has to do with the so-called mandate system, a wholly new and most striking departure in international public law. For hundreds of years those stronger and more highly developed nations which came to have control over less advanced peoples, often in a distant hemisphere and with access to great wealth of natural resources, have dealt with them as they would. Under such conditions, however high-minded any Government or its colonial department might be, there were many temptations to political and economic abuses of one sort or another to

which distance both offered invitation and gave protection. At the Paris conference of 1919 the various powers, having stripped the German Empire of its colonies, divided these up among different mandatories. Similar action was taken at the San Remo conference of 1920 in regard to those possessions in Asia of which Turkey had been deprived. The principle of the mandate system is that the people of the territory affected are neither given their independence on the one hand nor annexed by a stronger power on the other. They are, rather, placed in the position of a minor or a ward in civil law, whose affairs are to be managed by a trustee until he is able and competent to manage them for himself.

There are several interesting points to be observed in connection with the mandate system. In the first place, it represents a long advance over the old notion of simple conquest and exploitation of the weak by the strong, of those in a lower state of civilization by those in a higher. In the second place, it recognizes the fact that nations, like human beings, must pass through a period of schooling in self-government and that they can gain most from a kindly and well-disposed schoolmaster. Without going too much into detail, it may be pointed out that the mandate system has been applied to Palestine, to Syria and Lebanon, to Tanganyika, to Togoland and Cameroons, to Ruanda and Urundi, to Southwest Africa, to the Pacific Islands, to German New Guinea and to Nauru.

A visitor to Geneva could witness the extraordinary

spectacle of, say, a British Under Secretary for Colonial Affairs and at least a dozen important British colonial and administrators gathered there to explain to the Mandate Commission of the League any points in the administration of their mandates which might seem to require information or discussion. Twenty-five years ago this would have been unthinkable. We should have heard every sort of outcry against the invasion of sovereignty involved in calling upon a great civilized power like Great Britain to tell what it was doing in some distant part of the world with some dependent people who had come under its care.

None the less, this principle is now firmly embedded in international public law, and the advance which it represents is literally stupendous. Honestly and intelligently administered, the mandate system will make impossible those thousand and one forms of cruelty, greed and exploitation which have too often marked what is ironically described as the progress of civilization. It is hardly possible to say that the people of the United States have no interest in such work as this.

A third matter of large importance has to do with the protection of racial and religious minorities in Europe. When the Covenant of the League of Nations was drafted no mention of this topic was made. Treaties subsequently entered into, however, have placed upon the League responsibility for the protection of these minorities. The minorities problem is acute in countries like Transylvania, Hungary and Poland. It is plain that the administration of so delicate a matter as

this is difficult in the extreme. Nothing could be easier than so to exercise the power confided to the League as to bring down upon it the wrath of more nations than one.

Where abuses exist they are usually due to arbitrary administration by an individual, and the Government concerned is usually quite ready to deal with the matter on the basis of authoritative private representations from Geneva. Any public discussion of such a matter, however, would often be fatal. One may wonder whether the protection of minorities can ever be completely effective as against the wrongheadedness and determined injustice of a racial or religious majority. This may be one of the ills that flesh is heir to.

The League has disposed once for all of secret diplomacy with its infinite possibilities of evil. For the United States secret diplomacy has always been impossible by reason of the constitutional provision which requires that a treaty be submitted to the Senate for ratification. Few things are more certain than that if ninety-six Senators know of the existence of anything, everybody knows it. In many other countries no similar provision has prevailed, but now, by the terms of Article XVIII of the Covenant of the League, every treaty or international engagement entered into by any member of the League must be forthwith registered with the Secretariat, and as soon as possible published by it. Moreover, no such treaty or international engagement is binding until it has been so registered.

Under this provision there has been registered up to

July last something like 950 treaties or international agreements, and by this time the 1,000 mark has almost certainly been reached. Every one of these documents is public property and may be inspected and studied by any interested person at the office of the Secretariat. All treaties that have been made with the United States since 1919 are so registered, unless perchance there may be a few such treaties entered into between the United States and some one of the pitifully small number of Governments not represented in the League.

It would be a grave error to suppose that there is no co-operation between the United States and the League. To be sure there has been no co-operation on the part of the Government, but Americans operating in the field of liberty as distinguished from the field of government have co-operated in many ways and are now eagerly co-operating in carrying forward the work of the League. In some respects their position is anomalous and exposes them to unfriendly criticism, but those Americans who have been chosen by the Secretariat for their character and capacity to do important pieces of public work are not so easily disturbed. There are perhaps in all a score of such persons working in the various departments at Geneva that have to do with public health, with the mandates, with the protection of minorities, with problems of transportation and with matters relating to safety at sea.

The best answer to those cynics who insist upon telling us that human nature is not capable of making per-

manent progress away from the criminal folly and economic suicide of war, is the history of the doings day by day of these companies of devoted, thoroughly trained and high-minded men who are carrying on the work of the League in various parts of the world. It is deplorable that the people of the United States do not hear more of this patient, constructive and always humanitarian work, and less of the technical political discussions that are carried on from time to time. Few things could appeal more strongly or more directly to American public opinion than the work which the League is actually doing, and if the American people understood what that work was they would not be content at having no part in it.

Assuming that the American Government will continue to refuse to join the League, even under the reservations of 1919, what can that Government do to mark its knowledge of the existence of one of the greatest public agencies of all time and its sympathy with the objects of the League?

First, it can and should provide for the legation at Berne an additional diplomatic officer with the rank of Minister and assign him to residence at Geneva for the purpose of keeping in close touch with the work of the League, of reporting upon this work from time to time to the Department of State and of serving as the medium by which the Department of State could communicate statedly with the League.

Second, it can and should provide that all treaties and international agreements entered into by it shall be reg-

istered with the League in practical conformity with the provisions of Article XVIII heretofore cited. This act would mark our Government's formal approval of the steps taken to put an end to secret diplomacy, as well as to establish one certain and complete bureau of registration for all valid treaties.

Third, it can and should find ways and means to strengthen the hands of those Americans who are from time to time selected by the Secretariat of the League for work upon its various commissions. There is no reason why what has, in several cases, been done with more or less secrecy should not be done openly and of record.

Fourth, it can and should assist the American people to get full, accurate and impartial information regarding the many-sided humane efforts of this extraordinary development in human association.

SCHOOL OF

IV

THE PACTS OF LOCARNO

An address delivered at the Service of Thanksgiving for the signing of the Treaties of Locarno and in the interest of international peace, at the Cathedral of St. John the Divine, New York, December 13, 1925.

THE PACTS OF LOCARNO

The public opinion of the world has come a long way in the two years last past. The lessons of the Great War have finally been learned, and at Locarno those lessons have been written into the international law of mankind. The agreements at Locarno, now made treaties, differ from so many of their predecessors that were prophetic only, in that they represent and reflect by far the major part of the public opinion of the nations signatory thereto. They are agreements and treaties not alone between governments but between peoples.

They are the most important happenings in the public life of Europe since the Treaty of Westphalia nearly three hundred years ago. That Treaty brought to an end religious wars and legalized religious persecutions, established freedom of thought and freedom of worship, and set the nations of modern Europe on their feet, each to go its way in the long process of nation building. These have had conflicts and wars without number, culminating in the Great War, the greatest that history has ever recorded, and, please God, the greatest that history will ever record.

It is twenty-seven years almost to the day since that Czar of Russia for whom a tragic and cruel fate was, all unknown, waiting in the distance, summoned the nations of the world to conference at The Hague, in order to

consider the questions growing out of competitive armaments, out of new and strange and cruel instruments of destruction, out of the lack of necessary machinery for the establishment of arbitration and judicial process among the nations.

From that day to this, the great argument has gone forward and finally it has come to this:

The nations of the world, particularly the nations of Old Europe, ask for security, then for judicial process, and then for disarmament. They have at Locarno taken the longest step forward that can possibly be conceived toward the establishment and protection of security and toward the introduction of judicial process as an alternative to armed force. What of the Government and the people of the United States?

There are two memories which crowd in upon me at this hour. During the summer of 1910 I was privileged to sit under the roof of one of the historic buildings at The Hague. The room was fitted up as any court room might be. Precisely at 10 o'clock the Crier with his familiar "Oyez, Oyez," announced the coming of the court. Counsel and the small company of auditors rose while five judges entered, as they may be seen to do any day in an American court house. One was an Austrian, one a Hollander, one an Argentine, one a Canadian, and one an American. The presiding judge, without further formality, bowed to counsel on the left with the simple formula, "Counsel may proceed." Sir William Robson, Attorney-General of England, who was surrounded by his juniors, arose in his place and

continued his argument in the Newfoundland Fisheries case, which involved a century-old dispute between Great Britain and the United States. A few days later Elihu Root, chief counsel for the United States, presented his argument in similar fashion to the court. Here, it seemed to me, was one of the most notable scenes in modern history. Two great governments which for a full hundred years had been in conflict over a question which, however trivial, in fact seemed of great importance to those who were directly affected by it, had agreed to submit their case to arbitrament by a court. Nothing was heard of reservations as to matters of national interest or national honor, but the facts and the law were stated and left to tell their own story. In due time the court rendered its decision and the Newfoundland Fisheries case passed forever from the list of those causes which might excite ill feeling, international friction and possibly even lead to international war.

Thirteen years later, in the summer of 1923, it was again my good fortune to be at The Hague and to sit in the Court Room of the Peace Palace, built by the generous gift of Andrew Carnegie. The Court Room was crowded, for a principle of large importance was to be decided by the Permanent Court of International Justice. Slowly and with great dignity the judges filed to their places, among them judges representing the citizenship of Holland, of France, of England, of Spain, of Cuba, of Japan, of Great Britain and of the United States.

The presiding judge began to read his opinion precisely as the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States may often be heard to do at Washington. Diplomats and students of international law hung on the words of the court, for an important principle was being decided in a case that involved Finland and Russia. In substance the court declined to give an opinion when one of the parties litigant had refused to appear and make an argument. It was then settled that a sovereign state could not be haled into that court without its consent or against its will.

What is there in these two incidents to stir alarm in the most timorous American breast? What is there here to frighten any man or any nation whose cause is just and reasonable and who does not either seek a quarrel or show willingness to drift into one?

Why should this great congregation be assembled to-day and why should ten thousand other meetings be going forward in all parts of the United States to urge that our government shall associate itself with the Permanent Court of International Justice and with the principles for which it stands? Was not the suggestion itself of American origin? Did not the American delegation of the first Hague Peace Conference in 1899 save that conference from rack and ruin by proposing and securing the adoption of a Permanent Court of International Arbitration? Did not the American Secretary of State instruct the American delegation to the second Hague Peace Conference in 1907 to do all possible to transform the Permanent Court of Interna-

tional Arbitration into a Permanent Court of International Justice? Was not this done by the second Hague Peace Conference in respect to everything except the mode of selecting the judges, and had not that one remaining question been almost solved by diplomatic negotiations between nine powers before the outbreak of the Great War? Why, then, should we still be urging the Senate of the United States, supposedly a body representative of American public opinion, to take a step to which both great political parties are formally committed with the approval of nine-tenths of the people of the United States in its every part? This is the declaration which the National Convention of the Republican Party adopted at Cleveland in 1924:

The Republican Party reaffirms its stand for agreement among the nations to prevent war and observe peace. As an immediate step in this direction, we endorse the Permanent Court of International Justice and favor the adherence of the United States to this tribunal as recommended by President Coolidge.

This is the declaration which the National Convention of the Democratic Party adopted at New York in 1924:

It is of supreme importance to civilization and to mankind that America be placed and kept on the right side of the greatest moral question of all time, and therefore the Democratic Party renews its declaration of confidence in the ideal of world peace, the League of Nations, and the World Court of Justice

as together constituting the supreme effort of statesmanship and religious conviction of our time to organize the world for peace.

What then is the dissent and who are the dissentients? We are told that they are the Irreconcilables. Irreconcilable to what? Surely, it cannot be to established American policy, to American good faith, to American honor and to American interest! Such objections as have been urged do not rise to the height of rational argument. If the other great nations wish to choose their share of the court's membership through the agency of the League of Nations, to which we do not belong, certainly that need be no concern of ours. The court is quite as independent of the League of Nations as our own Supreme Court is independent of the President. The simple fact is that a very small group of the office-holding class, placed by accident and legislative seniority in a position where custom permits them to play a very large part in the disposition of such questions, are defying the will and betraying the interests of the American people. They are doing all in their power to make sure that we do not regain any part of that moral leadership in the modern world which we won and held from McKinley to Wilson, and which we then let slip through our fingers. Is it possible that public opinion is powerless in the United States when an international policy involving a great moral question is at stake? Is a small group of office-holders to be permitted indefinitely to defy public opinion and to

hide itself behind the rules and conventions and courtesies of a legislative body which the people have erected to do their will?

When Cicero arose in the Roman Senate to expose the conspiracy of Catiline, these are the words with which his immortal oration opened: "How much farther, Catiline, will you carry your abuse of our forbearance? How much longer will your reckless temper baffle our restraint? What bounds will you set to this display of your uncontrolled audacity?" Those words are two thousand years old.

The time has come for the Government at Washington to produce a Cicero.

V

THE STATE AS MORAL PERSON

English version of an article published in the first issue of *L'Esprit International*, Paris, January, 1927

THE STATE AS MORAL PERSON

The problems which arise in relation to the association of sovereign and independent nations for the achievement of a common end, the promotion of a joint interest or the better establishment of international peace, have each its own historical and psychological background. A solution of these problems is notably advanced when it is recognized that in reaching such solution the historical and psychological background of a given problem have a large part to play.

Some two thousand years ago a vigorous political effort was made in the name and by the authority of the Roman Empire to bring the civilized world under a single dominion. That notable effort and the measure of success which attended it constitute one of the outstanding events in the history of the human race. Following the breakup of the Roman Empire, the revival of learning in Europe and the discovery of new and unsuspected lands across the seas, there came into human history a powerful series of influences making not for unity but for diversity. This diversity oftentimes brought in its train sharp competition, many times accompanied by armed conflict. It resulted in the building of a great group of modern nations, some large and some small, each separate and independent, as well as in putting the aspiration toward nation-building into

the heart of many other dependent groups, some of which remain even now unsatisfied.

It is now plain to see that the dream of the Roman Empire is impossible of fulfillment. There can be no single political dominion in the civilized world. The alternative must be, if never-ending political and economic competition with resulting armed conflict is to be avoided, such measure of association or federation among these sovereign and independent nations, or among different groups of these, as will bring a reasonable measure of unity to supplement this diversity and enable these nations to co-operate together vigorously and effectively to promote the higher satisfactions of mankind as well as the peace and good order of the world.

Just so soon as any association among sovereign nations is proposed, it is urged that thereby the sovereignty of a co-operating or associated nation will be limited, and consequent injury done to national pride, to national honor or to national interest. The notion of sovereignty and its narrow legalistic interpretation obviously lies at the bottom of this difficulty.

It will probably be agreed that the doctrine of sovereignty as we know it took its rise during the fourteenth century and as a consequent upon the development at that time of the new states that were emerging from that chaos that had marked the centuries immediately following the disappearance of the Roman Empire. Both the word *sovereignty* and the conception itself are primarily French, and the idea which lies behind the

word has been exhaustively examined by jurists and writers on jurisprudence from Bodin to Dupuis and Duguit. Every implication of the legal theory of sovereignty has been so elaborately discussed that there is little, if anything more, to be said.

There is, however, one important aspect of the matter which invites farther exposition. For what end or purpose does a nation exist? Has it any aim or ideal beyond its own aggrandizement and the prosperity of its citizens? If so, what? Has it any duty toward the general concerns of the human race or toward the care of the backward and dependent peoples or toward the promotion of the health, the good order and the peace of the world? In short, has a sovereign nation a moral personality or is it without any moral instincts and obligations whatsoever? This is the point to press. The analogy between the state in a society of states and the individual in a society of individuals is complete. The individual human being, endowed with health, strength, prosperity and high intelligence, is not living his full and complete life if he lives hermit-like to himself alone. Rather it is in association with his fellows that he finds opportunity to use his strength and his advantages and to gain new strength and new advantages, very real, if intangible, through so doing. In short, the individual human being enriches his nature, strengthens his moral life and adds to his own worth by that form of social and political association and service which is found in close and intimate contact with his fellow men. Truly, man is, as Aristotle so long ago said, a political

animal. He is not truly man unless and until he finds himself to be a member of a social and political group.

Precisely the same considerations apply to the life and activity of nations. When two or more sovereign states agree together to promote some common and noble end, they do not limit their sovereignties; they rather enrich them. By this co-operation and association each sovereign state reveals the fact that it has a moral consciousness and a moral purpose. It makes it plain that it cannot, and will not, live for itself alone, but will do all that lies in its power to promote the common interest of mankind. This does not limit sovereignty; it increases the value of sovereignty by ennobling it. To form a good habit is, whether for an individual or a state, to use responsible freedom to choose the better and to avoid the worse. Slowly this conception of states as moral personalities is growing among men. Each state justly glories in its historic past, in its racial history, in its language, its literature and its science, in its art and its architecture, in its industry, its trade and its commerce, and it would be glad to spread the influence of each of these over as wide a part of the earth's surface as possible. It can do so in but one of two ways: by conflict or by co-operation; by war or by peace. Which of the two is the rational, the moral method of national development and national expression?

There is now added to the other forces making for international association and co-operation the strong pressure of economic interest. Few indeed of modern

nations are or can hope to be economically self-sufficient. Even the United States of America, extending as it does from the Atlantic Ocean to the Pacific and from Canada to Mexico, with a variety of climate and of product unequalled under any single sovereignty elsewhere, is dependent upon other parts of the world for such essentials of social and economic life as sugar, rubber, sisal and other less important products. Foreign trade is an integral part of the economic life of every people. The modern nation must supply its economic needs either by international association and international trade or by a series of victorious wars that would extend its national boundaries from the tropics to the cold regions of the north. The latter alternative is unthinkable. Therefore, we may expect the appearance without much delay of new international economic agreements or even economic federations, the effect of which will be to provide a group of contiguous nations with all the elements of a satisfactory and sufficient economic life. This of itself would be a long advance on the road toward more perfect and complete international association.

What the modern state fears from international association is some control over or influence upon its own form of government and its own domestic institutions. It will remain for experience to show that this fear is groundless and that nations which manifest the ordinary moral habits and conform to the well established moral principles have nothing to fear from the interference of their neighbors or of the more distant nations associated with them in a common international organization. The

argument to press now and always is not the legal argument at all but the moral argument. The state is and has a moral personality, and that moral personality is enriched and developed by association with other nations for fine and lofty purposes. It is important to press this argument home, not only upon the statesmen and jurists but upon the intelligent public opinion of the civilized nations, for it is upon that intelligent public opinion that the acts of government must finally rest. It is increasingly clear that genuine progress in the development of international relations can only be made if the emphasis of our thinking be shifted, as Max Huber has suggested, from *Gemeinschaft* to *Gemeinwesen.*

VI

THE WILL TO PEACE

An address delivered at the League of Nations Non-Partisan Association dinner in celebration of the Seventh Birthday of the League of Nations, Hotel Astor, New York, January 10, 1927.

THE WILL TO PEACE

My concern is for my country, for its good repute today and in history, for its influence and for its moral leadership in these great days of twentieth century democracy.

Toward the close of the summer holiday, I sat with an interested congregation in a little church by the sea and listened to a very striking sermon. Its opening sentences were somewhat like this: "The reason why Christianity no longer makes appeal to men is that they are too prosperous. They have discovered a new god, Comfort, and they are so concerned with worshipping him that they have no time for the God of their fathers." Then the preacher went on to say that the modern American ideal of life seemed to be to put a comfortable baby into a comfortable crib to be watched over by a comfortable nurse until it was able to go to a comfortable school; then to send it to a comfortable college, where comfortable teachers would see that it did not work too hard; to find its way into a comfortable profession, to marry a wife with a comfortable fortune; to spend twenty or thirty comfortable years, and finally to pass through a comfortable opiate to a comfortable

grave. It was a very striking picture, and not without its lessons for some of us.

As a people we seem just now not to be able to grasp the fact that it is given to us to stand at one of the turning points of human history and to watch the great procession of the ages as it changes its line of march and alters its objective. One wonders whether when Ancient Greece was passing, the leaders of Greek thought and letters knew that it was passing. When the Roman Empire was tottering to its fall, did the men of light and leading really understand that a stupendous change was going on? Did the men of the Renaissance have any conception of the period through which they lived and to which they made such powerful contribution? Did the political philosophers of England and France of the 17th and 18th Centuries realize that they were teaching ideas and thoughts that were to make a new political and social and economic world? Do we know—do we realize—that the long process of nation-building that has been going on in the western world now for more than a thousand years has come to a substantial end, and that those nations—built many of them on strong and firm foundations, others still in the first flush of youth—are seeking, some of them in the darkness, for ways and means to clasp hands together to make a new form of human unity, of human co-operation, of expression of human effort, that shall destroy no nation but enrich them all?

He must be blind and deaf who cannot see and hear the signs of the times. Locarno, from being only the

name of a little town by a mountain lake, has become a significant symbol that will take its place in the long list of names that mark the progress of man's march, first toward liberty, then toward that fine and noble and lofty use of liberty which is human co-operation and international peace.

This is not the place, this is not the time, to recount details, many of which are so familiar to you all. But when we speak of Locarno, we must never forget what three sterling personalities, three true leaders of men, did there for their countries and for the world, and what they did to place us all everlastingly in their debt. If you will let your mind run back twelve years to those dreadful days of 1914–15, does it not seem unthinkable that the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of France and Germany and Great Britain should in that short time be sitting together around a table, talking as friends and comrades and companions, in a sincere and, thank God, a successful effort to bring their nations into association and into harmony?

M. Briand is easily one of the most remarkable personalities of our time, if not *the* most remarkable. You must remember that France and Germany, and even Great Britain, have their stoutly recalcitrant elements which have to be dragged by main force up to any council table where peace and international association are to be considered and discussed. Aristide Briand, eight times Prime Minister of France, walked no pathway of roses when he went to Locarno, and he took in his hand his own political reputation and future and, as many

think, the security of the Government of France. M. Briand is not only a most accomplished orator with astounding power of eloquence and skill in presentation of argument and of fact, but a fascinatingly subtle personality with a temperament of so great charm that it disarms while it seduces. M. Briand brings you to his side with a smile, with a shrewd and kindly word, and then with a formula, the kind of formula that the French mind loves—simple, brief, clear, precise—he states his problem. Argument is made almost impossible.

Doctor Stresemann has become Monsieur Briand's warm personal friend. Tell me, if you please, whether anything so astonishing as that could have been foreseen in 1914? Doctor Stresemann has his own ultra-nationalists to deal with. They have no overweening desire to build on the foundations that the present offers. They keep pointing day by day to the occupation of the Rhineland, to the Silesian partition, to the Polish corridor, and they say to Doctor Stresemann and his parliamentary supporters, "How can you ask us to sit down with France and Great Britain, and proceed to formulate new policies of co-operation on the basis that those things are to remain *faits accomplis*." But Doctor Stresemann shrugs his somewhat square Prussian shoulders, raises his fine head and smiles, and goes to Locarno.

Let me tell you a story of Locarno that will illustrate far better than any words of mine could what the spirit of Locarno was and what these men were able to accomplish there. Last March the question of the admis-

sion of Germany to the Council of the League was at issue, and the word had come that Brazil was to use its legal power of veto to prevent the necessary unanimous consent. The night before the decision was to be taken, Monsieur Briand and Doctor Stresemann were closeted together in a small room, smoking vigorously and discussing how to meet the situation that had developed. Outside was an anxious group of fifty representatives of the world's newspaper press waiting for some indication of what France and Germany were going to do at this great crisis.

M. Briand said: "Dr. Stresemann, I do not see what we can do. Brazil has the power, if she chooses to exercise it, and it appears that she does. I do not see what we can do, do you?"

Dr. Stresemann replied, "No, I do not; we have come to an impasse. Brazil blocks the way, and we can apparently do nothing." "I will tell you what to do," said M. Briand, "Let us go to bed. Let us sleep over it, and perhaps something will come to us in our dreams and we shall get light." Dr. Stresemann said, "Splendid!" The door was thrown open. Briand and Stresemann went out to face the waiting newspaper men, arm in arm. Briand took his cigar from his mouth and he said, "Gentlemen, I have pleasure in saying to you that Germany and France are in absolute agreement as to the next steps to be taken."

That was telegraphed from Japan to Chili, and the world was gratified beyond expression at the obvious cooperation and rapprochement between Germany and

France! That story was told me by Dr. Stresemann himself.

What I wish to emphasize is two things: First, the element of leadership that exists, and second, the cordial trust and confidence between men who traditionally represent long-standing bitter enmities. I submit that the association between these three men—M. Briand, Dr. Stresemann and Sir Austen Chamberlain—with their friendly understanding, their intimate personal touch, their complete confidence, is the key to an understanding of what is going on in western Europe. Their countries, delighted, have risen to their support, and each man is stronger to-day with the public opinion of his nation than he ever was before in his long parliamentary career.

Locarno means much more than a series of treaties. Locarno is a spirit, a point of view, a determination that, come what will, the old order shall not be restored. What I wish to see is that my country shall share that spirit and that determination.

Unhappily, the policies as to international affairs—or perhaps the lack of policies—that have been pursued by our government since the Armistice, have made this nation of ours a dangerous derelict adrift on the high seas of international intercourse, and lying straight across the path of every ship that sails laden with the precious cargo of international friendship and concord.

Has not the time come, is it not already late in the afternoon, for our people to rouse themselves from their lethargy, dulled by what Iago called the drowsy syrups

of a material prosperity, possibly temporary, into a sullen and cynical indifference to those great causes, those great appeals, those noble ideals, which in other days stirred the soul of Americans, and which our fathers sent Franklin and Adams and Jefferson overseas to explain to the Old World from which we sprang? Surely we make a sorry spectacle to ourselves, to the on-looking and mystified world, and to the historian who some day will tell the story of it all.

When Jefferson put his pen to the Declaration of Independence, what was it that gave distinction and unique character to his preamble? It was his "decent respect for the opinions of mankind." We were not isolated and aloof then. We were not isolated and aloof when Washington sent Jay to negotiate that great treaty with Britain. We were not isolated and aloof when Jefferson pursued the Barbary pirates that were preying upon the world's commerce. We were not isolated and aloof when Henry Clay's voice from the floor of the House of Representatives made that appeal which called South American nations into being. We were not isolated and aloof when we offered welcome and distinction to Louis Kossuth, the Hungarian revolutionary. We were not isolated and aloof when Secretary Blaine penned his first call for a Pan-American Conference. We were not isolated and aloof when John Hay wrote his note as to the open door in China. We were not isolated and aloof when Mr. McKinley and Secretary Hay sent that great delegation to the first Hague Conference, and when that delegation saved the Conference from disaster by invent-

ing and carrying to completion the Court of International Arbitration. We were not isolated and aloof when Mr. Secretary Root wrote his truly notable instructions to our delegates to the second Hague Conference instructing them as representatives of the Government of the United States to leave no stone unturned to bring into being a permanent Court of International Justice, and distinguishing, as he so well knows how to do, between the possibility and duty of international association and co-operation in respect of common ends, and the avoidance of interference with the internal policies and concerns of any nation. We were not isolated and aloof then, and we were not isolated and aloof when the awful blow fell in 1914, when the world staggered. We were not isolated and aloof in France and Belgium and on the seas. We were not isolated and aloof when the time came for the great settlement.

And in the months of June, July and August, 1919, the representatives of our two great political parties were so nearly at one that the tragedy which followed is multiplied many times in its sadness and its horror. A little bending here, a little yielding there—a change of this phrase or a change of that—and the history of these last years would have been strangely and splendidly different.

We are now confronted with a practical situation. A great many of our people seem to be satisfied to sit toying with their taboos and their totems and counting their comforting coins. One of their taboos is that somewhere there is concealed an American tradition that we never

have anything to do with anybody. Where it came from I do not know. The phrase, ascribed to Washington, on which it usually is based, Washington never saw. He died before it was written. It was used by Thomas Jefferson in his first inaugural, and it had no more reference to the sort of thing of which we are now speaking than it would have to equipment of a Polar exploration expedition. Our entire tradition, our entire historic development, has been absolutely the opposite. Why, it was only the other day that this isolated nation and aloof, was, through hundreds of boards of aldermen, scores of legislatures, and I think the Congress itself, passing resolutions calling for the dismemberment of the British Empire! That was at a time when the Irish vote was important. What would they think if the Common Council of the City of Prague, for example, should pass a resolution demanding that the City of New York, refusing to be downtrodden and oppressed by the upper part of the State, should set up a separate government?

No, the tradition, the history, is exactly the opposite. The only way in which damage of this kind can be repaired is by the slow process of the re-education of public opinion. There is no possible use in trying to pass statutes, acts, resolutions—meaningless words all of them—unless public sentiment and public opinion support and practically compel them. From this day on with Locarno's name upon our lips and its symbol and significance in our hearts, the appeal should be in season and out of season, to our American people to leave off

talking about things that do not matter; to stop this chatter about a prosperity which never can be more than a means to an end, and to set ourselves to the great task of rebuilding our intellectual and moral leadership and taking hold of these situations, to the world's betterment, and to our own best interests. Why, every anthill is prosperous!

I have no hesitation in meeting our adversaries on the field of interest. Only I prefer to appeal from that interest which is the stomach and the pocket to that interest which is the head and the heart. The nations of the world, excepting ourselves and Soviet Russia and one or two more, have established the League of Nations. Before the campaign of 1920, I signed with thirty or forty men of my party a statement that we believed that the election of the candidate whom we favored would lead to our support of that movement, and we based it upon his own words, in which he said "call it society, call it league, call it association, call it what you will, we are concerned not with the form but with the substance." And what I signed in October, 1920, I honor with my signature now.

If times have changed, those of us with convictions have not changed; but the facts are now wholly different, and the problems must be approached by new methods. We are now ready and should be ready by formal treaty or engagement, to accept as our own the Locarno definition of aggression, and we should then be ready to say that if war breaks out in this world by aggression on the part of any power signatory to that

definition, we shall recognize no neutrality right on the part of our citizens to participate in that war by providing materials with which to carry it on.

> New occasions teach new duties,
> Time makes ancient good uncouth,

said Lowell. Some of our old and precious doctrines, excellent in the eighteenth century and well down into the nineteenth, have been legislated by fact into the realm of the morally impossible. Surely it should require no treaty, it should require no formal engagement, to keep the Amercan people from being drawn, by reason of an attachment to a doctrine of neutrality that is now outworn, into even indirect participation in a war of aggression. We may define aggression as an act in defiance of the will or against the interest of another government or people without first submitting the issue to the impartial examination of a competent authority to determine what the facts may be and what are the equities involved. If that definition of aggression be accepted—and I know of none better—then for us to say that under the terms of a legal doctrine now quite out of harmony with modern progress, we demand for our citizens the right to participate indirectly in such a war by furnishing munitions and supplies to the aggressive belligerent, is a grotesque travesty on our common sense. We must quickly and publicly take the contrary stand.

If we were to do that, clouds that still rest over the head and heart of Europe would quickly roll away.

Believe me, they are afraid that in an aggressive war among themselves, arms and destructive implements would be obtained from this neutral country.

In an aggressive war there can no longer be neutrality. We must stand with the nation that keeps its word, and we must not side, even indirectly, with a nation that, through temper, through ambition, through wrong feeling, or for any one of a hundred reasons, violates its pledge and proceeds once again to bring down upon us such an avalanche as 1914 let loose.

From the standpoint of security, western Europe is content. There are problems in the central and eastern portions, grave problems. There are nations not schooled in self-government, with no long background of order and economic prosperity behind them, with a great many inherited and traditional animosities which the stronger and the older peoples must help hold quietly in check while instructing them in the art of peaceful co-operation and self-development.

For myself I believe that the key to the elimination of the Balkan problem is to be found in an economic union of those peoples. Let them begin to work together in economic co-operation and let that economic co-operation be successful, and we shall have come a long way from conditions that have disturbed Europe, and through Europe the world, for a hundred years.

In the northeast of Europe there are new nations in the making. They were torn suddenly from the side of an old historic empire. They are feeling their way, trying to come to national self-consciousness and to arrive

at and protect national independence, to participate in these international conferences as equals, to do their part, to give their counsel, to get their benefit. We have no immediate contact with them, to be sure, but our concern is that through any of them there may not be lighted once more the torch of fire that shall reach inflammable material lying loose in that section of the world.

But if I were the foreign minister of a Balkan state or the foreign minister of one of the new nations in Northeastern Europe I should be disposed to ask my country's diplomatic representative in Washington to suggest that the processes of arbitration and judicial settlement need not be confined in their operation to European nations. That could hardly be deemed an act of intrusion, but it would suggest something which, to the best of my knowledge, has been largely overlooked up to the moment in certain high places.

One thing more: There could be no more inappropriate moment than this to talk about enlarging our naval forces. It makes no difference whether the ratio ought to be 5-5-3 or 5-5-3.9 or 5-4-3.2, this is not the time to talk about it. There is such a thing as a psychological moment, and now when the eyes of the world are fixed on what is to follow Locarno, how that is to be made permanent and built into the institutional and intellectual life of Europe, what could be more distressing, what more disheartening than to find the American Republic concerned, not with Locarno, but with the pre-war psychology of armaments?

It suggests once more the recurring question which it is so difficult satisfactorily to answer: Can men learn?

Abraham Lincoln, in his great debate with Douglas, used words about public sentiment which have come ringing down the decades since they were spoken. "Public sentiment," said Lincoln, "is everything. With public sentiment nothing can fail; without it, nothing can succeed." Public sentiment reached from the platform, from the press, through the personal contacts of men and women with mind and vision and heart and feeling, public sentiment is the objective upon which those of us must move in our concern for our country's fame and repute, for her highest interest and for her place in history as a builder.

To the public sentiment of the American people I would say to-night, using words that have come across the ages, "Choose you this day whom ye will serve"—the pagan idols of destruction and desolation and war, or the God of righteousness and progress and peace!

VII

M. BRIAND'S INVITATION TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE

A letter written to the New York *Times*
April 25, 1927

M. BRIAND'S INVITATION TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE

Is it possible that the American people failed to hear the extraordinarily important message addressed to them through The Associated Press on April 6 by M. Briand, Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Government of the French Republic? If not, what answer do they propose to make, and how long will they permit M. Briand to be kept waiting for that answer?

On April 6, 1927, the tenth anniversary of the formal entry of the United States into the World War, the Foreign Minister of France made a public proposal to the American people that is quite without parallel in our history. He formally and openly proposed a treaty between the United States and France that would definitely renounce war as a remedy for real or fancied wrongs as between France and the United States. This is a proposal to "outlaw" war that has every merit of practicability and practicality. For some reason which it is hard to understand, the importance of this notable declaration appears not to have been understood, much less appreciated, in the United States.

This epoch-marking offer was not made confidentially through ordinary diplomatic channels, but was contained in a public declaration and appeal to the people of the United States in a formal statement given to The Associated Press. "France is willing," says M. Briand

in that statement, "publicly to engage itself with the United States to put war as between the two countries outside the pale of the law."

Any one who knows what is the practice of the French Government in respect to public Ministerial declarations of any kind will realize that this is no irresponsible or merely rhetorical appeal. M. Briand deals here not with general theories of world peace or with plans that can only be brought to pass in a distant future; he proposes a definite step to be taken at once, and he is still waiting for evidence of understanding on the part of the American people. No French Minister ever speaks in terms like these unless he has previously gained the full support of the Cabinet of which he is a member. It is French governmental practice not to make pronouncement on an important question of public policy until that pronouncement has been accepted by the Government of the day. When a French Minister makes a declaration of policy such as this, it is the Government of France which is speaking.

Why should not the American people hasten to use every means at their command to assure the Government of France that they have heard, that they do understand, and that they will act in accordance with this progressive and constructive policy? The adhesion and co-operation of other powers would, of course, be secured later on, but the first thing is to act, and unless the American people are both physically and morally deaf, they will hear and will act quickly.

One who reads M. Briand's statement will see how

clearly he sees the limitations under which the present negotiations for disarmament are being carried on. Those limitations arise chiefly from questions of procedure or method, and yet they reflect the great fundamental differences which every such negotiation must face. Disarmament, as M. Briand truly says, can only follow from the existence of a will to peace among the nations of the civilized world. Let France and America, he cries, demonstrate that, as between themselves at least, that will exists and will be finally and formally recorded in public act.

Here is a translation of the full text of the vitally important paragraph in M. Briand's statement of April 6:

For those whose lives are devoted to securing this living reality of a policy of peace the United States and France already appear before the world as morally in full agreement. If there were need for those two great democracies to give high testimony to their desire for peace and to furnish to other peoples an example more solemn, still France would be willing to subscribe publicly with the United States to any mutual engagement tending to outlaw war, to use an American expression, as between these two countries. The renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy is a conception already familiar to the signatories to the Covenant of the League of Nations and of the Treaties of Locarno. Every engagement entered into in this spirit by the United States toward another nation such as France would contribute greatly in the eyes of the world to broaden and strengthen the foundations on which the international policy of peace is being erected. These two great friendly nations, equally devoted to the cause of peace,

would furnish to the world the best illustration of the truth that the immediate end to be attained is not so much disarmament as the practical application of peace itself.

The fact that this statement is addressed to the American public instead of formally to the Government at Washington rather increases than lessens its importance. The method adopted by M. Briand is fitting and proper in these democratic days to ascertain whether the will to peace really exists among the people of the United States and the people of France with reference to their mutual relations. The appeal was primarily not to governmental action, but first of all to those moral forces which, when roused, stir and compel governmental action.

This question is now squarely before the people of the United States. If those moral forces to which M. Briand makes appeal do not really exist among us, or, if existing, they cannot secure such direction of our policies as shall realize these ideals, then in international relations we shall have reached a stage which no American who understands his country's traditions and who realizes his country's ideals can look upon without shame and sorrow.

M. Briand's mind is thoroughly practical. He does not ask the Government of the United States to accept the Covenant of the League of Nations; he does not ask the Government of the United States to accept the principles of the Pact of Locarno; he does not ask the Government of the United States to adhere to the pro-

tocol for the establishment of a Permanent Court of International Justice. All that he asks is that the people of the United States shall take their own way to express the fact that in no case will they employ war to enforce their policies with reference to France.

We have been celebrating, and finally and justly celebrating, the tenth anniversary of the entry of the United States into the World War. Where and how could we find a more fitting tribute to the memory of those whose lives were given in that stupendous struggle than by making a solemn compact with that nation most severely stricken by that war, for the formal and definite renunciation of war itself as an instrument of policy?

M. Briand, speaking the voice and expressing the soul of France, has called out to us across the ocean. What answer is he to hear? What evidence is he to have that these noble words have been heard and understood?

VIII

THE PATH TO PEACE

An address delivered at the Parrish Art Museum,
Southampton, L. I., September 4, 1927

THE PATH TO PEACE

The one problem which in importance surpasses every other, whether national or international, is how the civilized peoples may hereafter live and work together without resort to international war and without its constant threat. Despite the awful lessons of the years 1914–18 there still are those in high place who plainly have learned nothing. They still use the old jargon of a generation ago and still repeat the now meaningless phrases about national security, commerce protection, and armaments as a means of preventing war. The time for all this sort of thing has gone by. Should another great war come—which may God forbid—civilization would be hopelessly wrecked, and perhaps destroyed. In that case, some thousands of years hence our successors on this planet might be digging in the sands and forests to discover traces of our existence and evidence of our interests and occupations as we now dig in Yucatan, in Egypt, and in Mesopotamia.

Should such another great war come, the costly battleship and the submarine would be as much out of date as the bow and arrow or the shield and spear. Poisonous gases would be spread over whole populations and huge bombs dropped from the air to wipe out in an hour the industry and achievement of generations. In such a war there would be no non-combatants. Every man, woman and child would be in instant danger.

Every factory and every farm would participate directly in the contest until the hour of its destruction came.

The picture is much too horrible to contemplate and yet it is a true picture.

How is all this to be avoided? Which way lies the Path to Peace? To answer this question justly one must understand and weigh the great social, economic and political forces which are and have been at work in the world.

For more than a thousand years, indeed since the fall of the Roman Empire, the western world has been engaged in nation-building. What we call nations were not known in antiquity. Their unit was the city-state and its dependencies. The Roman Empire was the first and most stupendous attempt to bring the whole civilized world under a single rule. It failed because the task was beyond the power of human genius and because the end in itself was neither wise nor beneficent. Following that failure, there began in Europe the process of nation-building which is still going on. Groups of like-minded men having a common tradition, speaking a common language and feeling a general community of interest, sought to find and to make for themselves permanent homes and to build governments. Each successful attempt of this kind became a nation.

Consciously or unconsciously the process of nation-building aimed to achieve three ends: first, a substantial ethnic unity; second, to occupy a geographic unity which gave complete or relative security; and third, to

gain economic independence, that is, to control directly the essentials of economic life and industry.

From each of these three endeavors there have resulted wars without number, and to-day the international problem and many national problems may best be stated in terms of one or all of these three endeavors.

Ethnic unity, which involves similarity of race, a common language, and, often a common religious belief, can never be perfectly attained, but in many nations it has been so largely reached as to give general satisfaction and contentment. Where it has not been reached, as, for example, in several states of eastern and southeastern Europe, we have the difficult problem of minorities. These minorities may be racial or linguistic or religious, and if they are sufficiently large, very grave problems follow in their train. We Americans generally overlook the fact that, with our more than ten million colored citizens, we ourselves have a minorities problem of great magnitude and difficulty. The League of Nations is now bringing to bear its prestige and authority to help solve the minorities problems in eastern and southeastern Europe without either persecution or conflict.

Similarly, countless wars have followed in the train of the effort of a people to occupy a geographic unity with a view to securing the protection that is given by the sea, by high mountains or by great rivers. The Italian peninsula is an ideal geographic unity. So is the Iberian peninsula occupied by Spain and Portugal. The British Isles are an obvious geographic unity, and

so are Norway and Sweden. In the history of the United States we see clearly the operation of this instinctive urge toward geographic unity. It led to the exploration and settlement of the West, to the acquisition of Florida, to the Louisiana Purchase, to the settlement of the Oregon boundary and to the addition by war or purchase of territory in the southwest and on the Pacific coast. Questions of this kind still exist and play a large part in the political history of Europe. Perhaps more of these questions are raised by the Treaty of Versailles than were solved by that document. A pressing problem of the moment is how to deal with matters of this kind without armed conflict.

The third quest, that for national economic independence, has become more and more hopeless as man's wants have multiplied and as the luxuries of life have become first comforts and then necessities. Even the vast territory of the United States, stretching from ocean to ocean and from Canada to the Gulf of Mexico, with its varying climates and its great variety of products, does not by any means provide all the raw materials needed for the daily life of our people. We consume 70% of the world's supply of rubber and on continental America we produce none. Coffee, sugar, silk, wool, wood-pulp and sisal must be imported in immense quantities in order to meet our daily needs. Even oil, of which we are so great a producer, is an article of import. If all this be true of the United States, what must be the case with the restricted territory of European states having a substantially uniform

climate and a narrow variety of natural products? Is not the lesson plain? Complete economic satisfaction and independence is an impossible ideal. The life of the world must depend on the trade of the world, and it follows that we must bend every energy so to organize and so to develop commerce as to promote international friendship and association rather than international discord and conflict. It is of gravest importance that the search for raw materials, such as copper, oil, nitrates, potash and the like, be not so conducted as to provoke or invite international conflict. This is a task for true statesmanship, and it is for public opinion to watch and to compel the action of governments.

These, then, are the controlling forces which have to be dealt with in seeking the Path to Peace. What practical steps can be taken?

Literally immense advance was made when the League of Nations was brought into existence and when the Permanent Court of International Justice was later established. Whatever improvements may be effected in the statutes governing the organization and functions of these two bodies, they represent in striking form the working of the Will to Peace and make it easier than ever before to build up the Habit of Peace. As year by year the custom grows of settling difficult international questions by discussion or by judicial action, and as year by year the custom grows of nations working in association to promote common interests that look to the strengthening and improvement of civilization and the satisfactions of men, the spectre of war will pass more

and more into the background. So long as passion, greed, pride and lust of power find place in the hearts of men, just so long will armed conflict between them remain a possibility. As the Will to Peace continues to manifest itself and to build up the Habit of Peace that possibility will grow steadily less and less.

There is still a most important practical step to be taken, and it is one which the government of the United States should take as promptly as may be upon the reassembling of the Congress in December next. American public opinion as manifested by numberless representative voices and through the public press, has supported, almost with unanimity, the proposal to accept at once and heartily the invitation formally and publicly extended to the American people by M. Briand on April 6 last, to renounce war, so far as France and the United States are concerned, as an instrument of public policy. The importance and far-reaching effect of such action can hardly be overestimated. Public opinion in Great Britain, in Germany, in Italy and in Japan would unquestionably support like agreements between each of those countries and the United States. It can hardly be doubted that similar agreements between these nations themselves would speedily follow, where they are not already in existence through the Pacts of Locarno. Given these agreements freely and sincerely made between the governments of peoples that have a like stable and progressive social, economic and political order, and any such cataclysm as that of 1914 would be practically impossible.

The action proposed is something quite different from that advocated by those who would outlaw war. War cannot be outlawed, if by that is meant disposed of and prevented by resolution or denunciation. Words have no such power as that would imply. On the other hand, war may and can be renounced between like-minded and advanced peoples as an instrument of public policy. This means that in considering their common interests and their points of difference they shall deliberately declare that they do not under any circumstances contemplate war as a means of settling these. In this way they accept and adopt the Will to Peace in order to establish the Habit of Peace. They vastly diminish the possibility of war by refusing to look upon it as under any circumstances inevitable. Given this state of affairs over a reasonable period of time and the question of limitation of armaments settles itself. Modern populations will not long go on taxing themselves to build up huge naval and military armaments when these are found by experience to be merely ornamental. The United States, Great Britain and Germany have standing armies of wholly insignificant size. France has recently limited the period of military service to a single year, and just as soon as the French people gain a feeling of greater security they will do much more.

The first step, then, is for the nations named, France and the United States leading the way, to renounce war as an instrument of public policy.

The second step is for the United States to accept the definition of aggressor as that nation which, having

agreed to submit international differences to conciliation, arbitration or judicial process, begins hostilities without having done so. Heretofore there has been no accepted definition of an aggressor. Practically every war, at least for a hundred years, has been a war of defense in the minds and explanations of those who made the first attack. It is now possible, however, to define an aggressor in terms that every one can understand.

There is a third step of great importance which involves moving a long way forward. That is for the governments named to agree among themselves that in case of an aggressive war, no one of them will, under guise of neutrality, permit its nationals to give aid and comfort to the aggressor. The moment that this principle is written into international law any extensive or long-continued war becomes practically impossible so long as the contracting nations remain true to their declared policies and ideals. War has become a most expensive luxury. It cannot be conducted, even on a small scale or within a restricted area, without huge supplies of money, oil, coal, steel, copper and other fundamentals of industrial life. If there be a war of aggression, and if the nations named decline to permit their nationals, under the guise of neutrality, to give aid and comfort to that aggressor, then the aggression will expire by its own limitation within a very brief period of time.

To provide the necessary machinery for conciliation, mediation, arbitration and judicial process is simple

enough. Indeed many existing treaties contain admirable provisions covering these points. To give these the importance which is their due, however, and to bring them to the place which they should occupy in the public mind, the three steps already outlined must first be taken. War must be renounced as an instrument of public policy; the definition of an aggressor nation must be generally accepted; and the contracting powers must refuse to permit their nationals, under the guise of neutrality, to give aid and comfort to the aggressor nation in carrying on its aggression.

This path lies straight before us. It is a path which American public opinion can require its government speedily to tread. It is the Path to Peace.

In every nation there are irreconcilables who continue to repeat the old worn-out formulas and to resist any serious and practical steps to get rid of war and to co-operate with other nations to build the noble institutions of peace. Whatever their words and their professions, their acts make them the friends of war and the enemies of peace. It is the plain and solemn duty of large-minded and truly patriotic men to hold up the hands of M. Briand, of Dr. Stresemann, of Sir Austen Chamberlain, of M. Benes and of those like them in many lands who are patiently, wisely, courageously seeking to walk in the Path to Peace.

IX

BUILDING THE INTERNATIONAL MIND

An address delivered under the auspices of the Foundation for the Advancement of the Social Sciences of the University of Denver, Denver, Colorado, December 12, 1927

BUILDING THE INTERNATIONAL MIND

This greeting and this splendid and kindly welcome touch me very deeply, and tempt me to a personal word. It is many, many years—more than I like to count—since I first came to Colorado to climb its peaks, to explore its high places, to cross its passes, to see its great mining camps, to tramp over its magnificent territory, and to make friends that I value more than I have words to express. Those days seem long ago. They were the days when a very different generation represented Colorado and guided its public life. Those were the days—and even earlier—when Senator Hill and Mr. Stapleton were managing the old *Republican;* when the sagacious and large-minded Senator Teller was playing a great part in the life of the nation; when Senator Wolcott, of magnificent mien and oratory, was captivating great audiences in all parts of the United States; when Georgetown and Ouray were busy mining camps; when Aaron Gove and William H. Smiley were making the schools of Denver the best on the continent; and when there was gathered here a host of engineers, lawyers, physicians, men of affairs and captains of industry who were laying the foundations of this city and building this commonwealth.

I cannot face this audience without thinking of those days and those names and those faces. And there come

to my lips the lines which Eugene Field wrote a generation ago:

> For in these wondrous twenty years has come a mighty change,
> An' most uv them old pioneers have passed acrost the range,
> Way out into the silver land beyond the peaks uv snow,—
> The land uv rest an' sunshine, where all good miners go.

To-night as I look upon you I have in my mind those names, and I think of those men with gratitude for their friendship and with affection for their memory.

But we are here to discuss not yesterday but to-morrow. We are here to give a few moments of our time to a consideration of that problem which takes precedence of all others in the life of our nation, in the life of every nation: to wit, how can the nations of the earth live happily and helpfully together, each devoting its energies to the improvement and the greater satisfaction of its own people, and finding ways and means to carry on their international relations and to settle their international difficulties by means of peace and order and without recourse to international war?

It cannot be that in thirteen short years we have forgotten what happened on the first day of August, 1914. It was my fortune to be on that day in Europe, and I can testify that every normal and ordinary activity of life stopped as quickly and as completely as if an electric current which sustained it had been broken. Great Britain, which for 200 years had been building a great commerce and industry and overseas trade, found itself brought within a few weeks to the very verge of starva-

tion. Germany which had created an industrial system quite without rival, found that it went for naught, except in so far as its energies could be turned to preparation for carrying on the combat. France which by stages had been for 500 years taking a place of leadership in the intellectual and esthetic life of the world, found its very existence as a nation threatened and within a half dozen weeks an enemy pounding at the gates of its capital.

We are accustomed to measure the losses and disasters of war in terms of human life. Great and terrible and appalling as those losses were, they still fall short, far short, of telling us the whole story. Who can describe or measure or count the millions of broken hearts, the shattered homes or sorrowing widows or dependent children, the ravaged buildings, the destroyed railways and bridges and canals, the overturned monuments of beauty and of historical significance! Who can tell the story, even if he has seen it with his own eyes, as some of us did in 1919! Any one who could seriously contemplate not doing everything in the power of himself and his people to prevent that ever happening again is surely a fit subject for a mad house!

But if we are so to act as individuals and nations as to prevent such another happening, we must give time and thought to the facts that are at issue. We must find a way to understand the conditions of the problem and to know why it is that wars have come, and how human ingenuity may exert itself to remove those causes, so far as may be.

Wars are carried on between nations; therefore we

must first of all turn our attention to the nation. What is it? How does it come to be? What is it trying to do? Permit me in a few moments to give swift and cursory answer to those questions.

In the first place a nation is a relatively modern institution. The ancient world knew nothing of nations, as we conceive the term. The unit of political organization in the ancient world was the city-state. The city, Athens, Sparta, Thebes, Carthage, Rome, was the state. It had colonies and dependencies, to be sure, but the city was the heart, the head, the centre of it all.

Then out of the city-state there came the magnificent conception of a single world empire under the dominion of Rome, one of the greatest, most remarkable and most influential ideals that has ever seized hold of the human mind. The Roman empire was an attempt, and a conscious attempt, to bring the civilized world under one law, under one system of administration, extending from the Red Sea to the north, from the limits of known settled country on the east to the edge of the Atlantic. There was to be full allowance for difference of language, of religion, of local institution, but the Roman Empire was to be one. That led to her building roads over mountains that had been impassable, and across plains that had been trackless, to the discovery of mines over-seas, to the building up of shipping, commerce, trade, and to the extension of an administrative rule which laid the bases for the civilization which is yours and mine.

But finally that great fabric broke and fell. It broke

and fell because it had attempted something beyond the power of the human mind and human political capacity. The world could not then and the world cannot now be brought under one single political, legal and administrative dominion. The differences between peoples are too great; their traditions, their religions, their languages, their occupations, their inheritances, their interests, are all so very varied that to bring them together into a single unity as the Roman Empire proposed is an absolutely hopeless undertaking.

When the Roman Empire broke and fell, then nations as we know them began to be. Now what I want to bear in upon you is this, that from the fall of the Roman Empire until this moment the history of the world has been the history of nation-building, and that the wars of the world have been incidents and accompaniments of that process.

Men of like minds, like speech, like religion, like inheritance, gather themselves together in groups and begin to build their simple little governments. Then they extend themselves over persons like-minded to themselves. When these groups grow from small to large, and begin to be conscious of their unity, then a nation has begun to be. In that process of nation-building, men have consciously or unconsciously tried to do three things, and as they have tried to do those things they have fought each other with great bitterness for a thousand years.

The first thing they tried to do in building a nation was to arrive at what is called ethnic unity, to try to

bring together all the people of one race, one speech, one faith, one tradition; and they will fight and quarrel and invade time after time in order to bring that about.

It is probably impossible for any group to achieve complete ethnic unity. The Scandinavian peoples approach it in very high degree. So do the people of Holland. The French do so more or less, rather more than less. The British, of course, are an amalgam of Saxon and Angle and Dane and Gaul and Celt and Norman, and in Great Britain and the Dominions the traces of all those elements are visible in their public life and policy to-day. We in this country have never attempted ethnic unity. We have rather prided ourselves on being what we call a melting-pot, and we have assumed and do assume that our institutions, Anglo-Saxon in origin and basis, can be adapted to those who come from any part of the world which has the tradition of European civilization and belongs to it.

These ethnic units as they develop overcome their antagonisms and find ways and means of living together with decreasing friction and diminishing war. Where 500 years ago there would be war between two adjoining nations every five years, there may be one every hundred years now. But—and to this I call your particular attention—in this part of the nation-building process you come upon a new problem and one which is making much trouble in the world to-day. That is known as the problem of minorities. The minorities problem exists in a nation wherever there is a very considerable group of those who have other language or other re-

ligion or other tradition or other background. There is a very serious minorities problem in Poland. There are very serious minorities problems in the Balkan states. There is a very serious minorities problem in Czechoslovakia. It is going to test statesmanship for the next 25 or 50 years to deal with these minorities problems in a spirit of sympathy, justice and understanding, to avoid persecution, to the end that they may not lead either to civil strife or to international war.

We Americans sometimes forget that we have the greatest minorities problem in history in ten million colored citizens who are domiciled in the United States. That constitutes a minorities problem, which, like the minorities problems in Europe will only be solved by kindness, sympathy, understanding and generous recognition of those fundamental human traits which exist without regard to color, to faith or to position in this world.

Therefore I point you to the fact that in the process of nation-building the attempt to develop ethnic unity has been very productive of war, and we must always be on our guard against a question of that kind so presenting itself as to tempt and invite war.

Then, in the second place, a nation in endeavoring to bring itself to a state where it would be, attempts to achieve geographical unity and security. Here again is to be found the origin and cause of endless wars. A nation is not content, and naturally so, to have a boundary which means nothing for protection. It seeks to find a territory which is limited by the ocean, by a broad

river, by high and impassable mountains, with the notion —at one time valid but steadily becoming less so—that the nation with a territory of that kind brings with it security. As nations have tried to add this bit of territory and that in order to reach the ocean or a great river or an impassable mountain, they have plunged the world into endless wars.

The peninsula of Italy is the ideal geographic unity, bounded on almost every side by the water; and then on the north, northeast and northwest by the practically impassable Alps. The Iberian peninsula, occupied by Spain and Portugal, is another. The British Isles are another. Scandinavia is another. The reason why France has been the subject of wars for a thousand years is because while on the south it has security in the Pyrenees and the Mediterranean, on the north and east it has nothing. Consequently it has been invaded time and time again, and time and time again it has endeavored to find a way to get security against these attacks.

You can see the working of the urge for geographic unity in our own history most admirably illustrated. It is that instinctive urge that led to the exploration and settlement of the west. It led to the acquisition of Florida, to the Louisiana purchase, to the settlement of the Oregon boundary, to the addition by war and purchase of territory in the southwest. Our people were not content—without thinking much about it philosophically or historically—they were not content until they had found that substantial highly developed geographic unity which now exists. There are problems of that kind

left in the world, and I am sorry to say that the Treaty of Versailles created about as many of those problems as it solved. There are difficulties presented to us by that treaty with which it is going to take a long time to deal. There are what I conceive to be inequities that must be remedied; and the problem before our statesmanship is, can we remedy those difficulties by discussion, by peaceable consideration and debate, or if necessary by judicial determination; or must we again for such reasons face the horrible disaster of international war?

You are familiar, I am sure, with the Pacts of Locarno, and you know that in those remarkable documents the nations which we have particularly in mind on the east have agreed that they will attempt to settle their difficulties by processes of conciliation, mediation, arbitration and judicial determination. That is an immense advance, and if we can get the nations of the world into the habit of thinking that, if there are these geographical problems still undetermined—and sometimes they are bound up with the problems of minorities, as they are in Hungary, as they are in Czechoslovakia, as they are in Poland—they should be solved by means that appeal to civilized man, then we have made a long step forward.

A nation in trying to build itself has always had a third end in view, and that we now see to have been a hopeless end from the beginning. Nation after nation has tried to make itself economically independent, so to occupy its territory and so to develop its resources that it could live to itself alone. That we now see to be an

absolutely futile undertaking, unless the wants of men are very limited. Unless its civilization is on a very low plane, there is no possibility of a nation being anything approaching economically independent. But the attempt to bring about economic independence has led to wars without number. Going out and seeking elsewhere some natural resource, some raw material, some fundamental article of consumption, and the attempt to get it by force in order that the nation making the attempt should be enriched at the expense of the people where the resource lay—that policy has been the cause of another great series of wars. But now we discover that that is impossible. Men have given that up, and they have settled down to the development of international trade and international commerce, with a view not to becoming economically independent of the rest of the world, but with a view to satisfying their economic wants peacefully and profitably.

But there is a point of danger for the generation to come. It is in the satisfaction and attempt to satisfy these economic wants that there now lies the greatest danger of international friction and international conflict. Do you realize how dependent we all are? We were told here this evening of the world-wide distribution of some of the products of this city and state; but do you realize how immensely interdependent we are? Take our own country, which is unparalleled in its geographical location, in its extent and in its diversity of climate and resources. One would certainly suppose that a people which occupied territory stretching from

Canada to the Gulf and from the Atlantic to the Pacific, from the winter climate of wheat to the summer climate of sugar and tobacco—one would suppose that there everything could be found.

I suppose there are few articles of more universal consumption than the beverages tea and coffee and cocoa. They are on every table every day. They all have to be imported! Sugar and its products, the material for paper making, even metals, ferrous and nonferrous; even animal products, edible and nonedible—despite our production, we are enormous importers. We even import hides and leather and furs. We import vegetable products, and the things that one would naturally suppose we produce here completely to our satisfaction are very large articles of overseas commerce, and they penetrate all the way to the Rocky Mountains, both from the Pacific coast and from the Atlantic.

One hardly realizes how helpless is a great metropolitan community, like the city of New York, were it not for its contacts and its commerce. In the metropolitan community, counting all settlements about the mouth of the Hudson river, there are some 10,000,000 of people, nearly one-tenth of the population of the nation. They do not get over five per cent of what they consume from what may be called their neighborhood. They could not live a week if commerce were cut off by war. The average haul of the fruit and vegetables consumed in the city of New York is 1,500 miles. That is just about as far as from Denver to Pittsburgh or Buffalo on the east or to San Francisco on the west; and

that is the distance that the fruit and vegetables consumed by that one-tenth of our population has to come every day.

New York gets onions from Spain. It gets butter from Siberia. It gets eggs from China. It gets cheese from Palestine and Syria. Pork and beans is supposed to be a good New England dish—but the pork may come from Argentine and the beans from New Zealand! It is inconceivable how intimate and how interdependent all these lines of trade have become, and to-day this question of economic interdependence, trade, lies at the basis of most questions out of which may grow international friction and international war.

The situation to-day then is this: The process of nation-building has been substantially completed. That which has been going on for 1,500 years seems to have come to an end. The boundaries of the greater nations are satisfactorily established, because you must remember that that boundary which has given most trouble for 200 years, the part that the river Rhine should play as a boundary between Germany on the east and France on the west, has been settled at Locarno, and the status quo is accepted. In the east of Europe and in the southeast the situation is as I have described it a few moments ago. The boundaries are not generally acceptable, and must, I say frankly, sooner or later be revised. But the question is, can we not bring about that revision by peaceful discussion and arrangement and through the avoidance of war?

The nation-building process is complete. Here is

this problem of ethnic unity, with all its complications. Here are a few problems of geographic unity, some of them created by the treaty of Versailles, such as the attachment to Italy of country that had belonged to Austria for 600 years, and whose population speaks only German, making a new problem and a very real one. And then here is the problem of economic interdependence. Out of the latter grows a question which is very acute at this moment in more countries than one. The large and rich and powerful countries, the United States, Great Britain, and France, in particular, are reaching out in the search for raw material and natural resources. Here it is oil; here it is copper; here it is nitrates; here it is potash; here it is wheat, timber, but always something.

Now the moment that process begins, and it has begun and is well under way, there is always the gravest danger of friction, leading perhaps even to conflict; and I say to you, ladies and gentlemen, with the utmost emphasis, that that is the particular point on which public opinion should express itself so clearly, so constantly and so forcibly that our government at least will walk the path of peace rather than the path of conflict in carrying out these economic inquiries and undertakings.

Such being the situation as I conceive it, we now come face to face with this question: what sort of constructive policy can the people and government of the United States pursue in order to recognize these realities, these facts, these historic conditions, and at the same time guide public opinion toward the peaceful settlement of

international disputes and toward the avoidance of another holocaust known as war?

It is very difficult for our country to pursue a constructive foreign policy and we ought to recognize that fact frankly. The difficulty is to be found in the structure of the government itself and in the distribution of its functions. A French, a German or a British Foreign Secretary sits in the cabinet, which is the executive; speaks with the authority of the cabinet, and when he negotiates and when he makes a treaty it is made. Our situation is entirely different. The difficulties which confront us were set out in admirable form in a series of lectures, afterward published in a volume, delivered by the present Mr. Justice Sutherland of the United States Supreme Court, when he was Senator from Utah. He delivered those lectures at Columbia University on one of the foundations there and he took as his subject, The Constitution and World Affairs. He showed very plainly what the difficulties are and how we should attempt to overcome them.

A most important provison was made in the organization of our government when it was provided that the President may, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, make treaties, provided that two-thirds of the Senators present concur. It would have been quite impossible in such a government as ours to give unlimited power to the executive in making treaties which may be political in significance or of vast national importance because of the questions with which they deal. But the moment that two-thirds of the Senate must concur, there

is an obligation on the Senate not to raise questions of party politics, not to raise questions of merely personal ambition, but always and everywhere to lift the discussion of foreign relations to the highest possible plane, and to endeavor by all means in their power to cooperate with the executive, and the executive with the Senate, to the end that we may present a united front in dealing with the other nations of the world.

That used to be our policy; it was so for many years. Unfortunately in later years a quite different situation has developed, and at the present moment it is far more difficult than the average American realizes for the President and Secretary of State, however minded, to go forward with an important negotiation of such a kind as I am describing, for fear that when it is brought into the Senate the two-thirds vote may be lacking, and the whole undertaking be overthrown and a worse situation created than that which originally existed. That situation puts upon the Senate, I say, a new and powerful obligation to arise above partisanship and above personalities in dealing with these great questions of foreign relations and foreign policy.

Then there is another embarrassment which often we here at home do not realize. It is established constitutional law that a treaty repeals a statute of contrary nature to which it is subsequent, and that a statute repeals an earlier treaty so far as that treaty affects domestic conditions. Now think of that a moment, because that condition exists nowhere else in the world. The President and the Secretary of State and the Senate

enter into an arrangement under the Constitution with a government—let us say, in order to give no possible offense, of Paraguay. Having done so, somebody in the Congress is able to procure the passage of a bill dealing with something relating to Paraguay that contradicts the treaty. That bill, properly enacted and signed, becomes substantive law, and the treaty, without any discussion with Paraguay on our part, without any consideration, without any act of politeness or explanation, is overturned! Therefore, we are under another very grave obligation, and that is to show the very best of good manners in dealing with questions of this kind when they arise. It will not do, Mr. Chairman, for us just to exercise blindly and brusquely our legal power in that respect. We must find ways and means to take the other parties into our confidence, to talk with them, to explain the situation, and at least to have them understand in order that they know what it is all about.

I remember very well having explained that provision of our law some twenty years ago to the last German Emperor. He was very much surprised, and calling for the chief of his civil cabinet, he asked me to repeat the statement. I repeated it very carefully and very precisely, and when I had finished the Emperor turned to this official and said, "Tell them at the Foreign office never to make another treaty with the United States; that provision of their public law makes a treaty with them useless."

With all due respect to ourselves, you can, I think, see how a foreign government could easily take that

point of view. But I speak of this because it is one more illustration of the necessity for good manners, for kindliness, for sympathy, for understanding, for, as I said speaking in another place earlier to-day, one-half of foreign relations is a matter of psychology; the other half is diplomacy and law. But a half of it is psychology and consists in building up a relationship of understanding, of friendliness, of kindliness.

We began our foreign policy on a very high plane. The very best men in America drew our first treaties and represented us abroad. If you will turn to the first treaty that we ever made, our treaty of February 6, 1778, with France, you will find a preamble that is well worth reading to-day. John Quincy Adams fifty years later, when he was Secretary of State, said of that preamble, that it stood in the same relation to our foreign policy that the Declaration of Independence stood to our domestic institutions. He added that never before in history had any nation so clearly, so briefly and so progressively written into a treaty the true principles that should control our dealings with another nation in everything that related to commerce and industry and trade. We have had a great succession of master-builders of our foreign policy. John Quincy Adams, and Daniel Webster and William H. Seward and Hamilton Fish and Elihu Root—those are men chiefly standing out as having put our national policy on the highest plane in words and as having substantiated their words by their acts.

We come now to the conclusion of it all. These be-

ing the historic conditions, these being our domestic situations, what can we do?

I earnestly hope that every person within the sound of my voice will take pains to read the joint resolution introduced into the Senate by Senator Capper, give it support and call upon Senators and Representatives in Congress to have it acted upon without delay. For in that joint resolution Senator Capper proposes to grasp the hand that M. Briand held out to us last April, and to say, Yes, we are ready as a people, with you and with other like-minded nations, to renounce war as an instrument of public policy.

Do not mistake what that means. That does not mean that there will never be another war. Human nature will have something to say about that, perhaps—although possibly the less it has to say the better; but what it means is this—and this is why it is so practical and so important—what it means is this, that in our dealings with France, with Great Britain, with Germany, with Italy and with Japan we put war out of our minds as an eventuality. We say to them that we will discuss our problems; and we will agree now to settle them as civilized people, somehow, without fighting. We may settle them by the ordinary methods of diplomacy; we may settle them by mediation, by conciliation, by arbitration. We may settle them by judicial process. But settle peaceably we agree here and now to do. The psychological effect of that on ourselves and on the rest of the world would be simply incalculable!

Do you realize that when a nation talks about security it always has in mind war? Somewhere in the back of its mind or down in its heart is war; the fear that somebody will somehow, in some way, attack it. Whenever a country says that it must have armaments as big as somebody else, or bigger, no matter what it may say, no matter what pacific professions it may make, in the back of its head there is the notion of war. What we are trying to do, ladies and gentlemen, is to get that notion out of the backs of the heads of governments. It is out of the backs of the heads of peoples now. No *people* wants to fight. As our ambassador to Great Britain pointed out in a notable address at Harvard University last June, governments manœuvre people into positions where they feel they have to fight. And the time has come for public opinion, for the people, to express itself in terms that can be heard all around the world.

There is talk of internationalism, of its dangers, of its follies, of its wickedness. When people talk of internationalism they usually have in mind the internationalism that is one form of extreme socialistic teaching which sees all boundaries done away with, all governments levelled or unified, and all those conditions and traditions which lie at the basis of national feeling, national pride and patriotism, abolished. But the true international mind is something very, very different from that. The true international mind is built upon patriotism; it is built upon national feeling; it is built upon national pride. But it wishes to express all those

in terms not of force but of service; in terms not of gain but of the highest moral purpose and action. It regards a nation as having a personality, a mind, a soul, a character; and the international mind is jealous of that conception of a nation. It is jealous of the national mind and soul and character, and it wants them to be so great and so splendid and so fine in character and in caliber that they will be notable in history throughout the ages.

How are we going to be judged a thousand years from now? Athens played its part and has taken its place forever on a high pinnacle of historic fame. Rome did the same. The British commonwealth of nations that has succeeded the British empire has done the same. The Latin peoples have done the same. The Teutonic peoples are still in process, as are we. What is to be our place in history? No one dare attempt to measure the limit either of our material size or of our material possessions. No one dare attempt to put limits to our economic, our industrial, capacity and achievement. But what will all that amount to if when weighed by those who come after us in the scales of high principle and purpose and achievement we fall in any respect short? Please remember that Thomas Jefferson when he put his pen to the immortal preamble of the Declaration of Independence gave as one reason for the writing of it "a decent respect to the opinions of mankind." George Washington never failed to teach that lesson. None of the great fathers ever faltered in following in his footsteps, and all through the trying struggle of the Civil War, Abraham Lincoln was patiently putting our cause

in such fashion as to appeal to the judgment of the civilized world. Here we are 60 years after Lincoln, with this perfectly stupendous revolution that has gone on all about us. Here we are with this family of nations gathering together, many of them new, to deal with these problems by consultation and in peace. Here is this process of nation-building come to the point which I have attempted to describe. Where is our influence to be thrown? Are we to realize or are we not that our voice is potent, that our example is compelling, that our influence can be, if it will, overwhelming? Do we realize that when a question comes up arising from minorities or from the struggle for geographic unity, or from some item having to do with economic interdependence, our voice, our example, our counsel, our urgency, should be on the side of that patient, earnest, brave body of men who are insisting that civilization shall never again be subjected to what happened thirteen years ago?

Remember that the next war, of which some men talk so lightly, will be something to stagger the imagination. There will be no trenches and no cannon; there will be no battleships and no cruisers; there will be poison gas and deadly fumes dropped from the air to destroy whole cities in an instant, taking the lives of thousands of innocent men, women and children, dealing destruction in a fashion too diabolical to describe or even to conceive. The imagination of even a Gustave Doré would be staggered by the picture which one would attempt to draw of the next war.

So, my friends, with this view, so inadequately presented, with this picture in our minds, and I venture to hope in our hearts, have we not as Americans, every one of us, a stern, a quick and a solemn duty to perform, that before it is too late, before new complications arise and new difficulties present themselves, we take the outstretched hand of the Foreign Minister of France, and the hands ready to follow from the nations I have named, and to say in this year of grace, 1927, that the American people, looking you five nations straight in the face as equals, on the same plane of civilization—the American people and their government publicly agree with you to renounce war as an instrument of public policy?

X

THE OPPORTUNITY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE

An address delivered under the auspices of the Foreign Policy Association of Chicago, Chicago, Illinois, December 31, 1927

THE OPPORTUNITY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE

Let me waste no words in getting to the heart of the subject. The proposal to substitute methods of conciliation, arbitration and judicial process for war is, so far as the United States is concerned, in very much the same situation as the weather in Mark Twain's famous remark. You remember that Mark Twain said of the weather in Connecticut that every one complained about it, but that nobody ever did anything about it. That is the situation in respect to ourselves and our foreign policy at the present time.

From the foundation of our government down to 1916, from the time of Washington and Jefferson to that of Wilson, we had as a nation an unbroken record of leadership in all that relates to the strengthening of international relations, to the building up of international trade and to the establishment of international peace. We have now become, as a government, through sheer paralysis one of the chief obstacles that now exists in the world to these movements. It is not our conscious fault, for no American, whatever his party or his faith, could have wished it so; but it is the result of conditions that have come upon us, and it is time for us to begin to study how to remedy the situation.

Our foreign relations began on a very high plane. That was partly because of the character of the men who

conducted them, partly because of the temper of the young nation. You may imagine that when Benjamin Franklin and John Adams and Thomas Jefferson were drafting treaties and guiding foreign policy, a very high standard of achievement was reached. We have never written treaties on a higher plane, if so high, as our very first treaties with France, with Prussia and with Great Britain. If you will take pains to go back and read today our first treaty ever made with a foreign people, the Treaty of Amity and Commerce with France signed in 1778, followed by the treaty with Prussia in 1782, or the treaty which established peace with Great Britain at the end of the War of Independence in 1782 also, you will find them cast in a mold, with a breadth of view and vision and genius and temper and sympathy and understanding, that has never been surpassed in our later history.

And in our dealings with the nations to the south of us we reached high-water mark in the treaty which ended the war of 1846 with Mexico. That treaty of Guadaloupe Hidalgo is another treaty which might have been written 50 years hence, so far as it rests upon the soundest moral, political and social principles for the establishment and control of the international order.

We have come to a full stop. This went on from 1778 to 1916. Now we are in a situation which is the unhappy result of partisan difference, of personal dispute and ambition, neither of which should ever be permitted to disturb the course of international policy. Surely, gentlemen, our own relations with the other

great peoples of the world ought not to be the subject of partisan difference or personal struggle or political ambition. But if in August, 1919, President Wilson had not shown so cordial a dislike to Senator Lodge and if Senator Lodge had not so cordially hated President Wilson, an agreement could have been reached for the continuance of our policy of leadership, and the condition of the world to-day might have been very, very different.

But it was not to be. Men fell apart; they made groups; they became partisans of a point of view or of a person. From that day to this we have been in effect paralyzed and as a government incompetent to go forward, simply dealing with the business of the day or the week as it comes to the desk of the Department of State or to the table of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate. We are in the position that the Executive dare not to take too much initiative lest the government appear to be committed to something which the Senate will not approve. The Senate does not agree with the Executive; often it does not even agree with itself. In consequence we are committed and have been committed to years of useless, futile rhetoric and talk and nothing being done.

What are we going to do about it? There is an earnest group who say to us to-day, Let us outlaw war; let us pass a law declaring war to be outlawed. Suppose we do; and then suppose that war refused to be outlawed. Who is going to arrest it and bring it to the examining magistrate? Who is going to commit it for

trial? Who is going to indict it? Who is going to constitute the jury, and the judge? And if war is convicted, who is going to be the sheriff to inflict the punishment; and where is the penitentiary in which it is to be confined?

No, words have no such power as that. You cannot outlaw war by passing resolutions against it. The deep, lasting emotions, good, bad or indifferent, of human nature and of the human heart cannot be dealt with in any such cavalier fashion as that. That proposal is mere rhetoric, and will get us absolutely nowhere unless perhaps it be placed as an obstacle in the way of the adoption of propositions that are immediate and practical and susceptible of application to the affairs and the international relations of to-morrow.

The present situation is that the nations of the earth, except the United States and Mexico and Russia, have become members of the League of Nations, with its seat at Geneva. Our people and our government have decided not to do so, and at the moment that is not a practical question for debate. Indeed there are very many earnest workers in the cause of peace who believe that, circumstances being as they are, it is just as well that our government is not a member of the League; although I think they all believe that we should cooperate with it whenever practical; that we should hold up its hands; that we should strengthen its authority, and that we should be very happy to applaud its steadily growing measure of success. You must remember, that Europe has come a long, long way since 1914. If you

could go to Geneva and see what the Secretariat of the League has to do in regard to matters that have no relation whatever to politics, you would see what a vast change has come over the administration of a common business. It is no longer possible for a plague to break out in some remote part of the world and pass unimpeded from nation to nation and from people to people carrying with it destruction and death. At Singapore there is a reporting station where every case of one of those terrible scourges which breaks out, whether in Australia, in the South Seas, in the East Indies, China, Japan, India, or where you will, is immediately reported, so that the entire health force may be mobilized to combat it and stamp it out.

Then think what is being done for the backward and dependent peoples merely by the invention of the system of mandates. No longer can a power, however important, however large, however rich, exploit a poor and backward people, rich in raw material, lying off at a distance, unseen and unreported upon. I have myself been in Geneva and have seen the Under Secretary for Colonial Affairs of the British government standing at the foot of a table and gladly answering questions from representatives of a dozen European countries as to how in a particular mandate in Africa this problem was solved, how this matter was attended to, how this difficulty was surmounted. That was a very splendid and a very inspiring sight. We owe the League the fullest share of co-operation in all these great humanitarian and social undertakings, so numerous and so complex

that I have not time to enter upon their enumeration, much less their description.

There are three men to whom this generation should lift its hat in universal honor; the three men who, taking their political lives in their hands, brought about the agreements of Locarno, and so far as declarations of public policy can do it, have expelled war from central and western Europe, which has been one of its chief seats for nearly 2,000 years. Each of those men has his nationalists and his superpatriots at home to combat. There is no path of roses for the French Minister of Foreign Affairs or for the German Minister of Foreign Affairs or for the British Secretary of Foreign Affairs who starts to build closer and better relations with his neighbors. They too have their critics, their opponents and their obstacles. But I say to you that this generation of ours, particularly in America, should raise its hat in grateful honor to Briand and Stresemann and Austen Chamberlain.

For the moment we have lost our moral and our intellectual leadership in the cause which we promoted for 150 years. Were it not for our commanding position economically we should have lost much of our habitual authority in the world. What are we going to do about it as a government?

At this moment there is opportunity, gentlemen, for a specific act, such as rarely comes to a government or a people, that fits exactly into this picture.

All Europe is anxious about security and disarmament. They feel security to be a problem in a way

which we never have, because hostile armies have been tramping over their territory time and again for a thousand years. They are anxious to disarm; they have largely disarmed. Germany has no army; England has practically none; France has only 45 per cent of what it had in 1914, and it has reduced its term of service from three years to one. Smaller nations, excepting the new ones in eastern Europe, are in the same category. But they are all anxious about security. How shall that best be gained?

M. Briand is a great psychologist as well as a great statesman; and you will remember perhaps that on the sixth day of last April, the tenth anniversary of the entry of our government into the great war, he publicly made to our people a proposal by summoning the Associated Press representatives in Paris and reading to them a formal statement, not to the government, but to the American people, that France was ready to join with us in renouncing war as an instrument of public policy. The Congress was not in session. No official answer was made or perhaps could have been made. The press of the country spoke in warm commendation; organized bodies of all sorts and kinds applauded this suggestion. And now Senator Capper of Kansas has given us an opportunity to make reply in terms so simple, so direct, so convincing that a child can understand, and without in any way running counter to any of our prejudices or traditions, or raising any of those disputed questions which brought us to grief in the summer of 1919. Senator Capper has introduced into the Senate of the

United States a joint resolution declaratory of public policy. This is not a law in the sense of a statute, impinging and immediately binding upon our citizenship; it is a declaration of policy like the Declaration of Independence itself. And it is simple, short and direct. I see that it is set forth on the paper which has been placed in the hands of those who are present here to-day. Let me say a few words about it.

This declaration of policy consists of three parts; "By treaty with France and other like-minded nations formally to renounce war as an instrument of public policy and to adjust and settle its international disputes by mediation, arbitration and conciliation;" "By treaty with France" means the acceptance, open and public and avowed, of M. Briand's invitation. "Other like-minded nations" means that we are ready to do the same thing with any nation that will take the same position, and I violate no confidence in saying that Great Britain, Germany, Italy and Japan are ready to-morrow to sign such an agreement with us if we are ready to make it!

What possible objection can there be to that? We renounce war as an instrument of policy. Senator Capper does not say there will never be any war. That would be foolish. We renounce it as an instrument of policy when we sit down with France and other like-minded nations in a dispute over a tariff; over, if you please, a colony; over any of the things which arise in the daily life of nations. We do not think of war; we do not have it in the back of our heads. We do not have any army or navy policy based upon war with that

nation. We are not thinking about security in our relations to France and other like-minded nations, still less are we thinking in terms of war.

We like-minded people, civilized on a like plane, have come to a decision that we can settle our differences like honorable gentlemen, face to face; and if the solution is not satisfactory, then by that resort to judicial process which lies at the very basis of our orderly civilization. All that we ask is that we shall treat France and Great Britain and Germany and Italy and Japan precisely as for 115 years we have treated our neighbor the Dominion of Canada.

What possible objection can there be to that? I confess my ingenuity was not adequate to suggest any. But two have been suggested from Washington—which is where I should expect objections to come from.

It is urged that inasmuch as the Congress has the power to declare war, the Congress cannot make such a declaration as this because it would limit its constitutional authority to declare war. Now I submit that argument as simply as I can, in order that you may get its full effect: Because the Congress of the United States has power to declare war, it is constitutionally unable to do anything to promote peace! Surely the great purposes of the American people have some higher limits than mere war.

When that provision was written into the constitution we had already told three nations that we were not going to go to war. We had already told them this, and the very same sentence which says Congress shall have

the power to declare war also says that it shall have the power to issue letters of marque and reprisal, that is, to send out privateers to prey on the sea-borne commerce of the world; but do they dare do it? Would they ever dream of doing it? Did not all the civilized powers except ourselves join 70 years ago in the Declaration of Paris whereby privateering was abolished, and did not we ourselves accept that principle at the time of the Spanish war? What then, becomes of the argument? It is really too silly for words—that because the Congress has the power to declare war it can do nothing of this kind or really of any other kind, to promote peace! May that argument rest in peace!

Then it has been suggested by a legalistically minded person that one Congress cannot bind another Congress. Therefore, if the Seventieth Congress should adopt the Capper resolution, the Seventy-first Congress might repeal it. That is important if true, because logically that would affect every statute passed by any legislative body in the land. Why pass any law, or make any declaration, because the next session of the same body can repeal or amend it?

The fact of the matter is this: The Congress of the United States is supposed to represent the American public opinion. If American public opinion, as I believe it does, supports and demands this declaration of policy by this government, then it holds until American public opinion changes. When American public opinion changes, we shall go to war with somebody, and then any of our brethren who are historically minded

may rise in their places and ask what we said on the platform and in the press on August 4, 1914, when the German government said that the treaty to preserve the neutrality of Belgium was "a scrap of paper." What is sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander; we too can treat a treaty as "a scrap of paper," if we will.

But my faith in the American people leads me to a different conclusion. My faith in the American people leads me to believe that if, conscientiously and carefully, with their eyes open, they take this very practical step with respect to nations on the same plane with ourselves which are responsible and mean to keep their word, that our word will be kept, and that it will be a long, long time before any war breaks out between the nations that join in making this declaration of renunciation in 1927.

Then the Capper resolution defines an aggressor nation, and that is one of the most important steps to be taken in walking the path to peace. Up to this time there has never been an aggressor nation! Any nation which began war always did it in self-defense; it took the initiative because somebody else was going to attack it; and it is a military maxim that the best defense is offense—so all wars have been defensive wars. They are arguing now in the magazines and the press, and it is perfectly safe prediction they will still be arguing a hundred years from now, as to who was responsible for the war of 1914. I do not think they have mentioned the United States yet, but we may be drawn into the controversy as the years pass. But here is a definition of an aggressor nation which is so simple, so easy to under-

stand and so practical that it tells its own story. No more formal declaration is needed than to accept the definition of an aggressor nation as one which having agreed to submit international differences to conciliation, arbitration or judicial settlement begins hostilities without having done so. If the nation has agreed to submit its differences, or any of them, and does not keep its word, but begins an attack on its neighbor without having submitted these differences to those agencies, it automatically becomes an aggressor. Somebody quickly tells us that foreign offices are so clever that they can state their case in such a way as to make it almost impossible to determine whether they had agreed to submit an issue to conciliation, arbitration or judicial settlement or not. But if a nation has made an all-inclusive committal, well and good. If it has made a committal such as we used to make, excluding certain things, well and good. It is only a question of keeping its word, whatever the terms. Having promised, you keep your word, or become an aggressor nation. That has been put in the Locarno conventions, and you must remember that it is now the law of Europe, for all nations west of the Vistula. They have accepted that definition, and we remain, together with Japan, the important powers that are still to declare ourselves satisfied with it.

What harm does it do to be an aggressor nation? In the first place, and most important, it would bring down upon such nation the moral opprobrium of the civilized world. Some practical gentlemen think that moral opprobrium does not matter. It is more powerful in

this world of ours than any other single force. There is no nation—I care not what—that could break its word and stand up in the face of the public opinion of these advanced nations without being broken with shame and self-contempt and self-humiliation.

It is a long generation since Bismarck used his famous phrase of which we heard so much during the late war. He said, speaking to the Reichstag in about 1878, "In the next war, it will be the imponderables that count," not the things you see and weigh and measure, but the imponderables, the judgments of men, the feelings of men, the approval and disapproval of men. And, Mr. Chairman, if there is any thing more certain than another, it is that the prediction of Bismarck was fulfilled and that the last war was won by the weight of imponderables. And they will win every time in a world like ours! It is the imponderables that count! Let us see the nation—that is, of the nations that are advanced, civilized, cultivated, and with grand traditions—that will stand up even before its own public opinion and break its word to the world and so become an aggressor nation.

Then the Capper resolution contains another paragraph: "By treaty with France and other like-minded nations to declare that the nationals of the contracting governments should not be protected by their governments in giving aid and comfort to an aggressor nation." That is also covered by Congressman Burton's proposed resolution, which is in the form of a statute, which would be an appropriate statute to be adopted

following the adoption of the Capper resolution declaring public policy.

What that means is this, that if there is an aggressive war we are not going to be drawn into a position of protecting our nationals who through greed for gain want to help the aggressor.

A gentleman recently said to me in Washington: "Do you know that if that had been our policy in 1914, we should have lost $700,000,000 worth of business?" Then I replied, "Do I understand that $700,000,000 is your price?" How much do you lose or gain before you do an agressive thing, and engage in war, or whatever you have agreed to refrain from doing?

That is all there is to the Capper joint resolution. Senator Capper said when he gave it to the public that he proposed to test the sincerity of the American people in their talk about peace. You can not get a word in favor of war out of any public man; but you can get very few acts in favor of peace. Talk, rhetoric, ponderous declarations of intentions and belief and faith and high purpose and all the rest of it, but acts—not if they can help it!

M. Briand is a man who has borne the burden and the heat of the day, who has taken his political life in his hands, but who when the curtain falls will be seen to have been the chief factor in the promotion of peace in our generation. He holds out his hand to America and says, "Cannot you who away back in 1778 made this fine declaration with us—can you not now in 1927 under these circumstances make it again?"

Do that and let us see a great war break out! When all those nations, the United States, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Great Britain, accept this principle—and most of the others have accepted it at Locarno—how is an aggressor going to carry on a war? Where is it going to get its munitions? Where is it going to get its food supplies? Where is it going to get its raw material? And war would have to be something very different from that through which we have just come, if these nations make this declaration and keep their word.

Here is the first chance that has come to us since the war to do, without partisanship, without personal conflict, an act by way of a declaration of policy which is in accord with all our professions, which is sustained by all our precedents, and which if done puts us back where we belong, without any political complications whatever, as leaders in the great procession along the path of peace.

Read, if you will, John Hay's instructions to our delegation to the First Hague Conference, in 1899, the Chairman of our delegation being Andrew D. White, of New York. Read, if you will, the still more important instructions written by Elihu Root to our delegation to the Second Hague Conference, in 1907, of which the Chairman was Joseph H. Choate, of New York. Read the statute of the United States passed by the Congress in August, 1916, making it a law of this country that we shall settle our disputes in this way; and then tell me what objection there can possibly be to this asked-for declaration, at this psychological moment,

when the world is waiting to know where we stand in fact, and not merely in rhetoric. What objection can there be?

Every American, in my judgment, who cares for his country's fame and reputation and influence, should make his Senators and Representatives now understand that this Capper joint resolution is sustained by the overwhelming body of public opinion, and that if and when adopted American public opinion proposes to see that we keep our word.

XI

AMERICA AND FRANCE, 1778–1928

An address delivered at the banquet to celebrate the sesquicentennial anniversary of the signing of the Treaty of Amity and Commerce and the Treaty of Alliance between France and the United States, under the auspices of the France America Society, La Federation de L'Alliance Française and the American Society of the French Legion of Honor, New York, February 6, 1928

AMERICA AND FRANCE, 1778–1928

What new word can be found on this significant and memorable anniversary to sound again the note of friendship, of appreciation, of understanding that has been struck for one hundred and fifty years by orators, poets and men of state on either side of the Atlantic? All eulogy has been exhausted, all figures of speech have been drawn, and it would seem that we must almost stand silent in the presence of the occurrences and the promises of which this is the anniversary.

This very morning, His Excellency, the Ambassador of France, put his signature to a new treaty between his government and ours, bearing the date February 6, and being, as we firmly believe, not the end but the beginning of a significant series of undertakings to promote the peace, the justice and the good order of the world.

But my mind turns, standing in your presence on this anniversary, to that extraordinary personality who was the first American to interpret our people to the older civilization of Europe and an interpreter who for skill and many-sidedness and patience and wisdom and persuasiveness and charm has never been equalled in all these years. I was about to say Benjamin Franklin of Pennsylvania, but I remember the mischievous toast of Mr. Evarts on the occasion of the banquet at the opening of the Centennial Exposition in Philadelphia when he offered the health of the two greatest representatives

of Pennsylvania—Benjamin Franklin of Massachusetts and Albert Gallatin of Switzerland. But wherever he came from, it was that extraordinary man who had so much to do with these things with his combination of worldly wisdom, practical sense, philosophy and persuasiveness. One of the most striking pictures that our colonial history offers is that of Benjamin Franklin standing before the House of Commons in Committee of the Whole and calmly answering questions as to the incidence and operation of the Stamp Act. Can you imagine that taking place in this twentieth century? It required a Franklin, who had so won the confidence and who had so charmed those to whom he was sent that they would summon him to argue in public against their official cause. I remember, as you do, the tribute paid him by Mr. Jefferson when sent to succeed Franklin as our chief diplomatic representative in Europe. Some one spoke to him of coming to replace Franklin. "No," Mr. Jefferson said, "no one can replace him; I am only his successor." A charming tribute of a great man to a great personality!

If the truth were known, Benjamin Franklin, our first and chief interpreter to Europe, might be brought back from his place in high heaven to very great advantage. The American people need interpretation, interpretation of what is best and finest and soundest in their thinking, in their conduct, in their ideals, and no one has ever done it so well as Benjamin Franklin. Tonight is the night to think of him, to pay tribute to him

and to raise our glasses in honor of the man who more than any one else made possible things these which we celebrate.

I remembered that somewhere or other John Quincy Adams had had something to say about that treaty and I set myself the task of finding out what it was.

I wrote out here a few sentences about this treaty which I think will give us all an even greater respect for the document, the date of which is now one hundred and fifty years gone. This is what Mr. John Quincy Adams said about it when, himself Secretary of State nearly half a century later, he was writing to an American diplomat: "I recommend to your particular attention the Preamble and first four articles of the first Treaty of Amity and Commerce between the United States and France, concluded on the sixth of February, 1778. The Preamble," said Mr. Adams, "is believed to be the first instance on the diplomatic record of nations, upon which the true principles of all fair commercial negotiations between independent states were laid down and proclaimed to the world. The Preamble was to the foundation of our commercial intercourse with the rest of mankind what the Declaration of Independence was to that of our internal government. The two instruments were parts of one and the same system, matured by long and anxious deliberation of the founders of this Union and the ever memorable Congress of 1776; and as the Declaration of Independence was the foundation of all our municipal

institutions, the Preamble to the Treaty with France laid the cornerstone for all our subsequent transactions of intercourse with foreign nations. Its principles should be, therefore, deeply impressed upon the mind of every statesman and negotiator of this Union, and the first four articles of the treaty with France contain the practical exposition of those principles which may serve as models for insertion in the projected treaty or in any that we may hereafter negotiate."

This is the opinion, sober and considerate, of a Secretary of State, himself a statesman of first rank, of competence and experience, concerning the document which is the first object of this celebration; but, how long it takes to get anything done! My favorite argument for belief in immortality is that it takes so long to get anything done here on earth. There must be time somewhere to finish these things that are undertaken. We are asking, public opinion is asking, that these modern, civilized nations shall unite together to renounce war as an instrument of policy. But this is what we said one hundred and fifty years ago: "There shall be a firm, inviolable and universal peace"—and to all intents and purposes, we have not budged an inch, except to develop an opinion that this declaration is unconstitutional.

The chief object of these celebrations is not to look backward; it is to look forward. Their highest purpose is not reminiscence but inspiration. Here for one hundred and fifty years the same fundamental political principles have been playing upon the minds of two

widely separated and very different peoples. In Europe, that fine liberal philosophy of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries took hold of the spirit and the life of a people which, Frankish in origin, had become permeated with that historic civilization and temperament which is Latin, with its suppleness, with its vivacity, with its accuracy, with its imagination, with its precision, with its politeness; and across the Atlantic those same principles had taken hold of the life and social order of a people predominantly Anglo-Saxon, not confined to a relatively narrow territory of uniform climate and product but able to spread out and expand over a continent, to offer invitation to men of every clime and every color and every race and yet bent on welding them together into a people that should be subject to and able to reveal that fundamental, liberal, political philosophy.

Side by side for one hundred and fifty years, separated by nearly four thousand miles of sea and across a barrier of language, those two peoples have gone their way, responding each in its kind, each according to circumstance, each modified and moved by local political, social, economic and geographic conditions, but each remaining true to the democratic ideal, and each moving forward under the impulse to express this liberal, political philosophy.

That is the fundamental bond between America and France. We do not speak the same language. We have a different background of tradition in many ways, but we are bearers in this modern world, under these

strangely different conditions, of one and the same inspiration toward a social and political ideal. We have come a long way. We have accomplished much, each of its kind, but believe me, we have a long, long way to go. France has possessions, achievements, characteristics which we perhaps may never fully acquire. We ourselves have achievements, possessions, characteristics which it will take the Latin mind, democratic and liberal though it be, a long time perhaps to understand. But the task is a joint and several task; it is year by year, in season and out of season, to strengthen and multiply these bonds and ties and understandings, and when the anniversaries come, as time brings them, to look back for a moment only for the purpose of looking forward, only for the purpose of building, only for the purpose of getting new determination, really to accomplish and to write, not only into the law of the world—for that would be meaningless—but to write into the hearts and minds and convictions of men which give law all its vitality, to write there the purpose, to consecrate to the work of to-morrow the fortunate memories and experiences of yesterday.

XII

GOOD-FELLOWSHIP AND PEACE

An address delivered at the twenty-fifth anniversary of the
founding of the Pilgrims of the United States,
New York, February 9, 1928

GOOD-FELLOWSHIP AND PEACE

A quarter century is short indeed in the life of man but it is long enough to play havoc with the lives of men. Of the little circle which gathered at the Carlton Hotel in London on July 11, 1902, to form an Anglo-American club to be known as the Pilgrims, not many survive. Fortunately, the secretary of that first group not only survives but, in full and fine vigor and activity, represents both his constituency in the House of Commons and the Pilgrims of Great Britain at this board to-night—Sir Harry Brittain. Shortly thereafter, on January 13, 1903, the American branch of this society, known as the Pilgrims of the United States, was organized through a meeting held at the Waldorf-Astoria in the city of New York. Bishop Potter, august, charming, eloquent, presided and became first president of the Pilgrims. Of the group then chosen to nominate officers and prepare plans of organization, several are happily still with us. Other names, other reputations, other services then linked with theirs, have gone on the last long journey. At this hour of reminiscence we salute their names and honor their memories.

The declared object of the society was "the promotion of the sentiment of brotherhood among the nations, and especially the cultivation of good fellowship between citizens of the United States and its dependencies and subjects of the British Empire." In the interval

the world has been in veritable revolution and the purpose of the society needs cultivation now, wise, sympathetic, statesmanlike, even more than it did then. The British Empire has passed by natural and splendid evolution into the British Commonwealth of Nations. The brotherhood of man has been strained as never before since the days of the Tower of Babel when the language of men was confounded that they might not understand one another's speech. A war of colossal proportions has split the nations asunder and ravished their resources, economic and ethical, intellectual and institutional alike. The steadily flowing stream of democratic opinion and democratic principle to which the world had been accustomed for three hundred years has been rudely checked. Boulders in its path have diverted and roughened its course and unsuspected waterfalls have caused it to plunge to almost incredible depths. Surely at this day and hour if ever there was need of a stalwart, high-minded and determined company bound together by solemn pledge to promote the sentiment of brotherhood among the nations and especially the cultivation of good fellowship between the English-speaking peoples, that moment is now.

This is not to be done by giving utterance to conventional platitudes, however beautifully phrased or however sincere. This is not even to be done by expression of the pious wish that the Pilgrim Fathers might have avoided Plymouth Rock and ended their journey only on the shores of Lake Michigan at the mouth of the Chicago River. It is only to be done by the sympa-

thetic understanding of another's point of view, by that knowledge which comes from observation, from study and from reflection, and by that true statesmanship which, steadily looking to to-morrow and beyond, avoids stumbling over the obstacles which loom so large in the path of the politican whose eye and whose ear are on the ground, only one step in advance of his feet.

In responsible places throughout the world the ablest and the most far-sighted of men are laboring to lay a foundation of international relationship upon which the Pilgrims and other groups like-minded with them may build. In Great Britain itself and throughout the Dominions overseas, in France, in Belgium, in Holland, in Scandinavia, in Germany, in Czechoslovakia, in Poland, in Austria, in particular, there are men in high place and powerful forces working for the reconciliation of peoples and to lay the foundation of a durable international order whose cornerstone shall be peace. These men, heroes of our century and warriors of the finest and noblest type, require, and should instantly have, not only our appreciation, our approval, our consent, but our firm and unwavering support. If after two hundred and fifty years of steadily growing friction and recurring war, the people of France and of Germany can be pledged to the support of the pacts of Locarno, surely anything is possible that will promote the peace and happiness of the world. All hail to M. Briand and Dr. Stresemann who have led their people so far along the path to peace!

The first part of the great task is to teach men to

think in terms of peace and not in terms of war. The Free State of Ireland has anticipated what should be the policy of every civilized nation in that it has no Secretary of War and no Secretary of the Navy but a Minister of Defense. Professional preference and professional pride will shortly have to bend to the insistent demand of enlightened and progressive public opinion that that mode of expression which reflects a mode of thought be adopted in the organization of the government of the United States. A people that thinks of conflict in terms of defense only is more than half way down the road to permanent peace.

The next step is to give other peoples credit for the same sincerity and disinterestedness that we claim for ourselves. That means that we may and should formally agree with them to renounce war as an instrument of policy. The significance of that far-reaching statement would be that in entering upon an international discussion or in attempting to settle an international difference, we should be in exactly the same frame of mind as is an individual in like circumstances when engaged in discussion or even controversy with his fellow citizen. Friendly study and discussion, modes of conciliation, formal arbitration or precise judicial settlement are the various modes by which civilized beings settle their individual differences. Civilized nations have come to a point where, if their governments will only let them, they are ready to do the same. In many parts of the world, particularly I am sure both in the United States and in Great Britain, public opinion is in advance of

governmental action. The two peoples have far more in common as to their sentiments and their ideals than the formal statements of their governments suggest or reveal.

The recent and still continuing correspondence between our government and that of the French Republic indicates with definiteness and precision just what are the next problems to be tackled in order to move farther along the path to peace. The nations of the earth, ourselves and one or two more excepted, have organized in the League of Nations an association to carry on international business by discussion and calm consideration and to suppress and punish aggressive war should it occur. This is a reason why no nation that is a member of the League of Nations can at the moment sign an agreement to renounce war an an instrument of public policy unless war be understood to mean aggressive war. This is defined to be the act of a nation which, having formally pledged itself to settle its international disputes by conversation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement or other peaceful means, attempts to force its will by war without having kept its pledge. Surely, there can be little difficulty in identifying aggressive war when the definition is so clear and so explicit as that. If no pledge has been given, then no pledge can be broken, but if a pledge has been given and is broken, then the aggressor is plainly in view of all men. Therefore, in our formal treaty arrangements with Great Britain we cannot ask that government, any more than we can fairly ask the French government, to undertake

an obligation which conflicts with an existing obligation of the highest importance and with which we, being outside the League of Nations, have nothing to do. Therefore it is of the essence that if we are sincere, serious and practical, we will agree to do the thing which can be done and which other civilized nations, members of the League, are ready to do, namely, renounce war as an instrument of public policy and accept the definition of aggressor.

Next, and of highest importance, is a question which must not be allowed to drift into the whirlpool of danger while there is plenty of time to rescue it and make it safe. That is the question of the so-called freedom of the seas and the law of blockade. Here is the crux, carefully and sedulously concealed from general public view by recent journalistic and oratorical outgivings and outbursts, some of them highly preposterous, on both sides of the Atlantic. This is not the time or the place to review the work of the Washington Conference of 1921 on limitation of armaments or the failure of the Geneva Conference of last Summer. When milk has been spilled, tears serve no useful purpose. It ought, however, to be of some interest to American public opinion that since the breakdown of the Geneva Conference the British government has announced that it cuts its naval building programme in half, while our American orators and advocates announce that they desire to multiply our programme nearly four times. Lo, the poor taxpayer! Rather an expensive amusement based upon proposals which are

so remote from actualities as to suggest new and strange uses for the power of human imagination!

The fact of the matter is that all that relates to freedom of the seas and the law of blockade must now be overhauled in the light of the experiences of the last generation. It is idle to repeat formulas that rest upon conditions a century old. The Great War had not been in existence thirty days when the whole world saw that a new era had begun in all that relates to the sea and its commerce in time of war. Among other things the Great War proved conclusively that in a contest of those colossal proportions there were no neutrals. If Paraguay goes to war with Siam, many nations may be neutral in the old and established sense, but if the world should ever again become engulfed in another titanic struggle, there would be and could be no neutrals. Suppose then that the government of the United States were to say to Great Britain, to France, to Italy, to Germany and to Japan, "If you find yourselves under obligation, either as members of the League of Nations or as signatories of the Pact of Locarno, to establish a blockade against an aggressor nation as defined, we shall accept your good faith and shall ourselves respect that blockade, with the proviso that no such blockade shall be effected against any nation on the Western hemisphere." If this were done, the last support of the group who constantly urge large naval armaments, whether here or in Great Britain, would be removed. We should then be ready to build navies of peace instead of navies of war. The battleship, the destroyer,

the submarine could be not only limited but wholly renounced by international agreement, and navies of peace consisting of as many cruisers of say eight or ten thousand tons, as a nation might think it needed for its own police-work, would carry the flags of peace-loving and war-renouncing nations to the uttermost parts of the earth as symbols of the new and happy order that had come to be established among men.

Statesmanship foresees difficulties and removes them. It does not wait for misapprehension, misunderstanding and pseudo-patriotism to do their deadly work. Our northern boundary offers the ideal toward which enlightened public opinion in every land is moving with new rapidity. Between ourselves and our splendid neighbors on the north there runs an imaginary line, and the possibility of difference between us is quite as imaginary as that line itself. There are no soldiers, no guns, no forts, and the permitted gunboat on the Lakes would stir to laughter even the most timid of bootleggers. For more than a century the Rush-Bagot Agreement has protected the United States from invasion by Canada and Canada from conquest by the United States. Good will and full understanding are the most complete of armaments for defense. There are there alone will the nations of the future find their security.

The first twenty-five years of our history are celebrated to-night. We recall with affection and delight our presidents, Bishop Potter, William Butler Duncan, Joseph H. Choate and Chauncey M. Depew—long

may he be spared to us!—true and eloquent voices of that real America which makes itself heard from time to time above the clamor of the trouble-maker, the sarcasm of the cynic, and the aimless ill-will of them that seek only some new and distressing sensation. The Pilgrims of the United States offer greeting on this anniversary night to the Pilgrims of Great Britain, and promise them another quarter century, and then more, of that glad and happy understanding and co-operation that have brought joy to us all and gain to our several peoples to whom the world increasingly looks for leadership.

XIII

THE OUTLOOK FOR PEACE

An address delivered at the annual meeting of the Trustees of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, D. C., May 10, 1928

THE OUTLOOK FOR PEACE

Even the most cynical and skeptical observer of movements of public opinion must grant that there is a strong and steady tendency forward to the upbuilding of those institutions of international conference, international association, and international co-operation that will steadily lessen the danger of resort to international war, at least on any such world-wide scale as was the case in 1914-1918. It is becoming increasingly plain that almost everywhere, particularly among the more powerful nations, public opinion on this point is in advance of the action and formal commitments of their governments. This is strikingly true in the United States and it appears to be true in Great Britain, in France and in Italy. Both in Germany and in Japan ruling public opinion and governmental policy are more closely in harmony and each is marked by a strong peace-loving and peace-building tendency.

It must not be forgotten that Germany is wholly disarmed both on land and on sea, that Great Britain has no army of any consequence, that the United States has none, and that France has greatly reduced both the period of compulsory military service and the number of men with the colors. Even in the newer countries of eastern and southeastern Europe, where armies of considerable size have appeared to be a sort of necessary inheritance, public opinion is beginning very strongly to

question both the wisdom and the cost of these unnecessary luxuries. If a reasonable way were found to deal with the situation that exists in Russia, a major portion of the disquiet in eastern and southeastern Europe would quickly disappear. Such a way would be found, undoubtedly, and that speedily, if the present rulers of Russia would refrain from organizing and stimulating anti-governmental propaganda in other countries. In view of our established political practice, we could hardly question the right of Russia to govern itself as it will, provided it surrenders its notion of a world-wide economic and political revolution to be conducted from Moscow.

Of course the Scandinavian countries are committed to the most advanced forms of peaceful co-operation. The Latin American countries, particularly those on the South American Continent, are steadily moving in the same direction. Japan has since the Great War completely changed its point of view in looking out over the rest of the world and can be counted upon to co-operate to the full in any movement to advance international peace.

It is a paradox but a truth that, despite the overwhelming sentiment of the people of the United States, the Government of the United States has for some years past been a chief obstacle to every movement to make war unlikely and to advance the cause of international peace. Our public officials, and particularly our Senators, are greatly in love with formulas, declarations and rhetorical flourishes, but when they come to close

quarters with practical action they are so concerned with exceptions, reservations and provisos that their nominally good intentions disappear in the smoke of unreality.

But literally enormous progress has just now been made through the recent action of the Department of State, taken after informal conferences with members of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate. What has happened in this respect since April 6, 1927, when M. Briand first made his public appeal to the people of the United States to join France in the renunciation of war as an instrument of public policy is one more illustration of the power of public opinion. For months there was no governmental recognition of any kind of M. Briand's epoch-making appeal. It soon became evident, however, that American public opinion was deeply concerned over this matter and would hold to strict accountability any administration which failed to move quickly and practically in the direction of such policies as would diminish the likelihood of international war. The correspondence which followed is now a matter of public knowledge and it is justifiable to hope that before many months have passed there may be formal agreement on the part of the United States, France, Great Britain, Germany, Italy and Japan to renounce war as an instrument of public policy in their dealings with each other. When this action shall have been taken the liberal conviction and sentiment of the world may well cry Hallelujah!

It is most unfortunate that the phrase "outlawry of war" has been applied to the proposals now pending.

Renunciation of war as a public policy by governments which have it in their power to declare war is one thing, and a very practicable thing. On the other hand, to outlaw war—meaning to pass a resolution declaring it a crime and not to be countenanced—is a mere empty gesture and can have no real significance whatever. What is now proposed is, fortunately, the renunciation of war as an instrument of public policy.

There are several other things which the Government of the United States may do and should do in order to resume our traditional national policy and to satisfy enlightened and progressive public opinion:

In the first place, we should bring to an end the preposterous agitation that has existed heretofore, both here and in Great Britain, for increased naval armaments, by leading the way to a revision of the laws of neutrality as these affect sea-borne commerce. The only possible excuse that is left for a huge naval expenditure is that of protecting a nation's commerce in time of war. It is no longer a difficult matter to protect this commerce by law, thereby making unnecessary battleships, submarines, destroyers and all their ilk, and enabling us to confine our naval vessels to cruisers to be used for police purposes, and which may truly be described as a navy of peace. All the militaristic naval gentlemen and all the representatives of the big armament makers are, of course, violently opposed to this humane proposal; but, despite their outcries, public opinion is about ready to demand it.

A syndicated article has been going about through the press indicating that our Government shall enter into no

agreements of any kind, but should retain complete "freedom of action" and "command the world's respect with flying machines, submarines, fast cruisers and a mercantile fleet bigger and better than any other." This is the pestiferous barbarism of a bygone age and should have no place in the thinking or the conduct of the American people at this time in the world's history.

In the second place, the Congress should adopt the joint resolution introduced by Senator Capper in December last, which accepts a perfectly practicable definition of "aggressive war" and indicates our attitude toward such aggressive war. No constructive criticism has been offered by anybody of the Capper resolution. Should a declaration be made by the Congress, then our national legislative power would have given all possible support to our treaty-making power in affirming and announcing our national policy against war.

In the third place, since all the nations of the earth, except ourselves and Russia and Mexico, are banded together in the League of Nations, which is the most impressive development of international co-operation in all history, we should make it our steady policy to co-operate with the League of Nations in its humane and progressive acts. This we have recently begun to do, but we should co-operate, not tardily and grudgingly but willingly and helpfully. Were these things done, the perplexity which now hangs over Europe and South America because of the constant contradictions between our professions and our acts would be removed and the movement to renounce war as an instrument of national

policy and to build those institutions of conference, conciliation, arbitration and judicial action, that are ready to take the place of war, would make a long stride forward.

Finally, we might easily remove the only possible ground for unfriendly feeling toward us on the part of the people of Japan by a very slight change in the language of our existing immigration law, which, while not increasing the number of Japanese who may now be admitted each year, would touch the pride of the Japanese people by placing them on the same plane with other foreign countries in respect of immigration. If aliens of the Japanese race were admissible as quota immigrants, it would not increase the present quota for Japan. One hundred would still be the maximum number of natives of that country that could be charged to such quota during a single year, but the form of the action on our part would greatly please the Japanese people. They can be counted on to be our enthusiastic and generous associates in every constructive international movement.

XIV

THE GREAT HOPE

An address delivered at the Armistice Anniversary Service in
St. Paul's Chapel, Columbia University,
November 12, 1928

THE GREAT HOPE

To-day, ten years after the ending of the Great War, we stand between a great memory and a great hope. The great memory is of undaunted courage, of unselfish sacrifice and of supreme devotion to an ideal. No matter who planned the Great War or who blundered into it, tens of millions of human beings quickly and bravely did what they conceived to be their duty.

> Was there a man dismay'd?
> Not tho' the soldier knew
> Some one had blunder'd.
> Theirs not to make reply,
> Theirs not to reason why.
> Theirs but to do and die.

Tens of millions of homes were blasted with sorrow and with grief, and tens of millions of women and children were left to make their way in the world as best they could alone.

The great hope is of a world that has learned the supreme lesson that civilization has to teach, the lesson that might cannot and does not make right, that reasonableness and not brute force reaches the goal of justice, and that war between nations is now as much out of date as the torture-chamber and the scalping-knife.

The world is longing for leadership toward the light. It gazes steadily toward the horizon and eagerly hails each new form that rises with the star of a lofty ideal.

Wilson, Masaryk, Briand, Stresemann, Chamberlain, have in turn or together revealed the stature of world-statesmen. "My conception of a statesman," said Disraeli in a famous speech, "is of one who represents a great idea, an idea which may lead him to power, an idea with which he may identify himself, an idea which he may and can impress on the mind and conscience of a nation." Whether the idea be one that leads quickly to power or not, is of much less consequence than that it be an idea which should lead to power and some day will.

The idea which we are trying to grasp and to realize is that a nation is a moral person with responsibility for its conduct toward others and with duties that always and everywhere accompany its rights. There are no sovereign nations save in the empty phrases of the law. The moral order is sovereign, but no civilized nation can be. "Am I my brother's keeper?" was the insolent answer of Cain to the Lord's searching question; and his punishment followed apace—"A fugitive and a vagabond shalt thou be in the earth." Truly indeed did Cain reply, "My punishment is greater than I can bear."

To-day that same fearful punishment awaits the nation that will not rise to its moral obligation as its brother's keeper. To appeal in support of a doctrine of moral isolation and selfishness to the text of Washington's Farewell Address and of Jefferson's First Inaugural, against the whole purport of their teachings and their lives, is as rational and as convincing as it would be to support by their authority the claims of the rush-light and the stage-coach as instrumentalities of civiliza-

tion against those of the electric current and the airship of this new and undreamt of day. No American would be quicker than they to assert that we are our brother's keepers and that our obligations everywhere and always go hand in hand with our advantages, our achievements, and our acquisitions.

August 27, 1928, opens a new era in the world's history, an era quite as revolutionary as that which opened on October 12, 1492, and of far greater moral consequence. On that day the civilized world through its organized governments formally and solemnly condemned recourse to war for the solution of international controversies, and the several governments renounced war as an instrument of national policy in their relations with one another. They farther agreed that the settlement or solution of all disputes or conflicts of whatever nature or of whatever origin which may arise among them shall never be sought except by pacific means. This declaration, applauded from Pole to Pole and the whole world round, is of so stupendous importance that it is even now most imperfectly understood. In his haste the Psalmist said, "All men are liars." Unless all men and all governments are liars, national policies must and will without delay be adjusted to the new international life that has been so gratefully brought into being. Gone is the fear for national security; gone is the argument for compulsory military service and huge standing armies; gone is the plea for the protection of sea-borne commerce and a navy as powerful as any in the world; gone is the haste to build bombing

planes and to store up huge supplies of poison gas to suffocate the combatant and the non-combatant alike; gone is the whole gospel of preparedness for a war which is promised never to be fought—gone are all these, unless all men and all governments are liars!

The contracting nations are now called upon to prove their sincerity and their truthfulness. This is to be done not by more words but by acts promptly taken and supported by a nation's intelligence and a nation's conscience.

We are concerned directly and first of all with the supporting policies of our own government to give full effect to the Pact of Paris which rests not upon the artificial agreements of government, but upon the moral conviction and determination of self-governing peoples who bend governments to their will. Its weight and its value in fixing national ideals and in shaping national policies cannot be over-estimated. To public opinion in our own and other lands I offer with great earnestness these nine policies. Each one of the nine is quickly and easily possible and practicable if the government of the United States is prepared to reflect to the full our national sincerity and our national faith.

They are:

1. Substitute for Departments or Ministries of War, Navy and Aviation a single Department or Ministry of National Defense, with sub-divisions for the Army, the Navy, and the Air Forces. The Irish Free State, the Dominion of Canada, Australia, Japan, Germany, Hol-

land, Belgium, and Czechoslovakia have already led the way in substituting a Minister of Defense for the conventional Minister of War, and in France M. Painlevé, Minister of War, has suggested that the same step be taken. The economic gain by taking this action would be considerable, the administrative gain would be still greater and the psychological gain would be greatest of all. There is no longer room for the word War in the permanent organization of any government signatory to the Pact of Paris or giving its adherence thereto.

2. Abolish compulsory military service and reduce the armies of the world to police forces and skeletons of an emergency organization as is now the case in Great Britain, Germany, and the United States. The last word on army organization and use in a peace-loving democracy was spoken by Elihu Root in his five classic reports as Secretary of War, followed in like spirit by the late Viscount Haldane when Secretary of State for War in the Government of Great Britain. These statesmen have pointed the way.

3. Get rid of battleships, destroyers, submarines, and like instruments for the destruction of life and property, and maintain navies of peace. These will doubtless consist of cruisers of an agreed number, tonnage and equipment for purposes of police and relief work, and for sea patrol. Competitive navy building is a provocative scandal. This question in its practical aspects has now come down to a rivalry between Great Britain and the United States. This rivalry is based not in the least on hostility or on genuine national needs, if the Pact of

Paris be lived up to, but simply on professional vanity. The development of the United States navy in its modern form began during the administration of President Cleveland, under the patronage and stimulus of Secretary Whitney. The movement for a larger navy was hastened by the obvious lessons of the Spanish American War which came at a time when the whole world was heavily armed and in military mood. Since that time conditions have wholly changed, and the Pact of Paris makes continuing naval rivalry and competitive navy building not only ridiculous but wicked. The British Admiralty, which has so long administered the greatest navy in the world, does not for reasons of pride wish to see any other navy outstrip it in strength. The Navy Department at Washington, guided by its group of ambitious admirals, feels that in the annual naval lists as published the navy of the United States should rank either at the top or with the highest. These servants of our people appear determined to make it certain that to the government of Great Britain will fall the honor and the glory of giving the signal to cease from naval competition. "Our policy in naval building is to go slow," said the Prime Minister within a fortnight. "We have no intention of building in competition with the United States of America."

The time has come for public opinion and constructive statesmanship to put a stop to the influence of the so-called naval experts and to do for the navies of the world what the governments of Germany, Great Britain and the United States have done for their respective

national armies. To insist upon naval expansion now, with the ink on the Pact of Paris hardly dry, would be worse than a travesty. It would be the most complete confession of national insincerity.

4. Develop speedily a controlling body of international law and a code of international conduct. The more closely these follow the evolution of the common law of England, doubtless the sounder and the safer they will be, but much material is now ready to be cast in code or statutory form.

5. Strengthen the authority of the Permanent Court of International Justice at The Hague, as well as that of the Permanent Court of Arbitration there, and build up other institutions for conciliation and arbitration, as needed, for use when the ordinary processes of diplomacy halt or fail.

6. Increase the prestige and uphold the authority of the League of Nations, which is now an established institution, a fully recognized and indispensable instrument of international intercourse and international association.

7. Move toward the quick carrying out of the plan projected by Secretary Blaine nearly half a century ago, to bring the governments of the American continent into stated and formal co-operation, without dictation or overlordship on the part of any one of them.

8. Develop, in co-operation with the League of Nations or otherwise, a plan for safeguarding the peoples of the Orient and for protecting them from exploitation by any people, government, or private interest while

they are adjusting their social, economic and political organization to present-day conditions.

9. Maintain and multiply those contacts, intellectual, moral and spiritual, which so greatly promote international sympathy and understanding, and which at the same time advance national pride and satisfaction. Science, literature, the fine arts, together with visits by representative and guiding personalities, are the most potent instruments with which to develop and to safeguard the International Mind.

All this the Pact of Paris suggests and makes possible. It is a Programme of Peace for the constructive statesmanship of to-day and to-morrow.

The link between the great memory and the great hope is the remembrance of those members of this academic family, symbolized by the gold stars on yonder flag, who went out from this University to give all that they had and who made the great sacrifice. There are no words more fitting to discover and to emphasize the true significance of that link than those which Alfred Noyes has written for this anniversary:

They have no pact to sign—our peaceful dead.
Pacts are for trembling hands and heads grown gray.
Ten million graves record what youth has said,
And cannot now un-say.

They have no pact to sign—our quiet dead
Whose eyes in that eternal peace are drowned.
Age doubts and wakes, and asks if night be fled;
But youth sleeps sound.

They have no pact to sign—our faithful dead.
Theirs is a deeper pledge, unseen, unheard,
Sealed in the dark, unwritten, sealed with red;
And they will keep their word.

They have no pact to sign—our happy dead.
But if, O God, if WE should sign in vain,
With dreadful eyes, out of each narrow bed,
Our dead will rise again.

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XV

THE WORLD'S NEW OUTLOOK

An address delivered at the dinner in honor of the visiting members of the Institut de Droit International, New York, October 18, 1929

THE WORLD'S NEW OUTLOOK

The whole world is thinking what the prophet Jeremiah so long ago denominated thoughts of peace. The heavy and suffocating atmosphere of war has been cleared by the swiftly-moving and health-giving breezes of peace. The mind of the world has been turned from a backward-looking and a forward-fearing mind to a forward-looking and a backward-fearing mind. War has lost its glamour, and now stands stripped and naked in all its horrid ugliness and barbarity. Let the carper and the caviller spend an evening with "Journey's End," or a few fascinated hours with the gripping pages of "Im Westen Nichts Neues," which has absorbed the attention of millions of readers in twenty lands, and learn something of the reality of war as it is seen at close quarters by those unfortunates who are called upon to do the fighting.

A world that turns from war to peace turns of necessity from brute force to good manners, to high morals and to law. The future, therefore, belongs to you and to those like-minded with yourselves who work to frame law and to establish it on the firm foundations of public conviction and public confidence.

This revolutionary psychological change began preparing while the great war was still in progress. It was halted for a time by after-war unhappiness, after-war problems and after-war perplexities, but when M.

Briand, Dr. Stresemann and Sir Austen Chamberlain had their momentous meeting at Locarno four years ago, the beginning of the end of the old order was not only indicated but clearly in sight. There remained the carefully stimulated naval rivalry between the two great branches of the English-speaking family. Trouble-makers, hired, we hear, and playing upon the credulous ignorance of public men and public opinion, did what they could to make the era of international war and its dark and costly shadows last a little longer; but that particular method of annoying and damaging the public and of striking at the interests of both Great Britain and America has now been laughed off the stage—and off the front page as well.

Following Locarno comes Washington. The Prime Minister and the President, face to face and in kindly confidence, have crowded into four days of personal conversation and understanding forty ordinary years of formal diplomatic procedure, of official correspondence and of technical bargaining. Briand and Stresemann and Chamberlain, together with their associates at Locarno, and Ramsay MacDonald and Hoover at Washington, have done the business for which the world was waiting with bated breath. Public opinion will do the rest. That government or that governmental agency which attempts to stand in the way of those official acts that are needed to transform these new convictions and these new understandings into law, will be broken on the wheel. Let there be no doubt of that. These are not arrangements which affect alone two nations or any

small group of nations. They are arrangements which strike the note of leadership throughout the world and which invite, and indeed compel, universal assent and co-operation.

A daily newspaper of consequence and of large circulation, the Chicago *Daily Tribune,* has with thoughtful kindness seized this occasion to point its many readers to a map showing how completely the Atlantic and the Gulf coasts of the United States are encircled by a series of fortified naval bases under the control of the British Navy. Under so stupendous and so imminent a threat, distant Chicago may perhaps enjoy unbroken sleep, but surely only for such time as it may take the invading forces to traverse the unfortified Hudson, the unprotected Erie Canal and the undefended Lakes. But must not the people of Portland and Boston, of Providence and New Haven, of New York and Philadelphia, of Norfolk and Charleston, of Savannah and Jacksonville, of Miami and Key West, of Pensacola and Mobile, of New Orleans and Galveston toss fearfully in their beds and shake in their boots? How terrible a picture is this! The only American who would appear to be reasonably safe is the senior senator from Alabama; for not even a Papal Bull could o'erleap so stout and so menacing an encirclement! What a pity that a journal so minded could not turn our attention to a real danger! Why not be practical in these serious matters?

Tell it not in Gath, publish it not in the streets of Askelon, lest the daughters of the Philistines rejoice, but Mother Earth is at this moment in a grievous dan-

ger against which, I fear, that not even the gospel of preparedness can surely defend us. Her pathway in life is wholly surrounded by that of Mars carrying every weapon of destructive war and ready for battle to the death should their two paths ever meet. Beyond sits Jupiter, sardonically looking down upon Mother Earth and carrying some useful moons to hurl upon her when the moment comes. The one safe neighbor is Neptune for whom distance lends enchantment to the view. He waves his trident and laughs at Mother Earth's predicament. Here, then, is surely something real to fear. In its presence why conjure up imaginary and ridiculous difficulty? No, gentlemen, a sense of humor and common sense have not taken possession of all our fellow Americans.

But, says the cynic, human nature does not change. To him I answer that human nature does change, has always changed, is changing now, and that its changes are recorded and manifested in what we call the advance of civilization.

Let me point you to an amazing contrast in the recent history of international business. Just a little more than seventy years ago, on a bright summer's day, there went out from Geneva one of the chief personalities of Europe, bearing a false name, armed with a false passport and in disguise. He was no less a person than Count Cavour, Prime Minister of the Government of the Kingdom of Piedmont. He made his way secretly, on tiptoe as it were, to the village of Plombières in the Vosges. Arriving there at the height of the gay season,

he took no lodgings in a fashionable and frequented hotel, but sought rooms in a small chemist's shop. There and then he waited amid the paraphernalia of blue and red and green bottles until a summons came. By dark and without observation he was escorted into the presence of a powerful reigning monarch, Napoleon III, Emperor of the French. They did not confer together, these two men of high place and vast responsibility; they conspired as to how they might bring about a great war. The Emperor told the Prime Minister that France would whole-heartedly support Piedmont in a war with Austria provided a reasonable *casus belli* could be found which would attract to France the sympathy of all Europe in such a struggle. Truly it would require the pen of a Machiavelli or a Saint Simon to do justice to this scene. Here was no legislative debate. Here was no popular appeal and no popular mandate, merely two high-placed and powerful dictators, with all the arms and apparatus of two governments, together with the peace of Europe, in their four hands. And this was only seventy-one years ago!

Two generations later, a short time as human history goes, a Prime Minister of State, who wields the vast and responsible authority accorded to him by a great people living under free and democratic government, starts across the sea. He wears no disguise, he bears no false name, he carries no false passport. His own countrymen acclaim his going. The daily press of the world records his every act and word. In six days' time he comes to the hospitable and welcoming shores of another

land. The enthusiasm of genuine affection and confidence is showered upon him both for himself and on behalf of the great people for whom he has come to speak. Public officials salute him, public courtesy surrounds him and public respect both greets and follows him. He goes to no upper story of a chemist's shop, but to the White House, and then as personal guest of the President of the United States to a simple cabin in the foothills of the Blue Ridge, that there quiet and undisturbed they may speak together of the great issues and the little ones which divide peoples and which bind peoples together. This, gentlemen, is no conspiracy to organize war. It is a conference to organize peace. Public confidence has succeeded in displacing secrecy, conference has routed conspiracy and the authority of free peoples and their public opinion is underneath, behind and all about what the Prime Minister and the President have said and done. Their conference ended, they unite in a frank, full and dignified statement to the public, and the public applauds from the Atlantic to the Pacific, from Canada to the Gulf, and from one end of the vast British Commonwealth of Nations to the other the whole world round.

Look on that picture of 1858 and then on this of 1929. From Plombières to Washington and the Blue Ridge, from conspiracy to conference, from personal despotism to free democracy, and dare to tell us that human nature does not change!

XVI

RENUNCIATION OF WAR AS AN INSTRUMENT OF NATIONAL POLICY

Introduction to the Report of the Director of the Division of Intercourse and Education of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, April 1, 1929

RENUNCIATION OF WAR AS AN INSTRUMENT OF NATIONAL POLICY

The year that has passed is marked by public and formal action taken jointly and severally by all the nations of the civilized world to renounce war as an instrument of national policy. It is plain that most of the public men who have taken part in this act, like the vast majority of the individuals who applaud or comment upon it, are without any understanding whatever of the revolutionary character of what has been done. Public opinion, so often instinctively right and yet so unable to give rational account of its instincts, has required this course to be taken. The declaration contained in the Pact of Paris signed August 27, 1928, and ratified by the Senate of the United States with but one dissenting vote on January 15, 1929, brings to an end an era in the world's history which has existed since time began and opens another era of wholly different character and outlook.

From time immemorial it has not only been respectable but honorable to talk of war, to prepare for war, to carry on war, and to be victorious in war. The war habit was first explained and defended on its own account, and half-savage man used it partly to give expression to his emotions and partly to impose his will on others. Later

in the history of civilization war was explained and defended in terms of national need, national ethnic unity, national geographic security, and national economic self-dependence. When the process of nation-building began in western Europe, war was the natural and almost necessary instrument of policy, whether for offense or for defense. As time went on, war came under the ban of better instructed and more enlightened public opinion, and excuses for it were substituted for praise of it. These excuses were found in the cause of liberty, in the cause of religion, and in the cause of human relief from cruel and despotic overlordship. Lord Acton once pointed out with biting irony that liberty had been the cause of more wars than any other one thing save religion.

Still later, as the minds of men became yet more enlightened and their moral standards higher, the argument for war was driven to its last resting place, which was self-defense. This seemed so reasonable as likely to be permanent, but is it not plain that there can be no self-defense unless there is first offense? There must be something overt in the form of attack against which to defend oneself. If now the whole world renounces war, that is, forcible attack, as an instrument of national policy, then self-defense, too, as an argument for war goes the way of all flesh.

The strength of the Pact of Paris is to be found in that characteristic which cynics and legalists have pointed to as its weakness. It is no mere formal legal contact with prescribed sanctions and pains and penalties. It is

something far higher and stronger than that. It is a declaration of public purpose made on moral grounds by those responsible and self-determining agents which have heretofore chosen otherwise than they now declare it their intention to do. Those who describe this moral act as merely a gesture must be ready to describe truth, honor, chastity, righteousness, in the same terms.

Honest acceptance of the Pact of Paris requires that the nations signatory thereto shall quickly reshape their domestic policies in order that these may conform to the new principle of national action and the new foundation of international relationship. The old terms and the old ways of thinking are gone, we hope and trust forever. Self-defense loses its traditional meaning and becomes a term to describe police oversight and regulation. Neutrality disappears, since no nation signatory to the Pact of Paris can be neutral, that is, indifferent, when that solemn Pact is broken by any other signatory. Each nation must then choose between directly or indirectly supporting the pledge-breaker and directly refusing to support that pledge-breaker. To say that such choice will violate neutrality is plain nonsense. It might as reasonably be said that one violates neutrality who is on the side of the police in their endeavor to suppress a street riot. There can be no hesitation in deciding to which course of action moral principle points. Freedom of the seas, that highly important and once most contentious question, disappears likewise. The seas become free as a matter of course and without farther debate when war is renounced as an instrument of policy.

If those nations which are members of the League of Nations or associated as signatories of the Pact of Locarno find themselves under obligation to establish a blockade against an aggressor nation as defined, then nations not members of the League of Nations or signatories of the Pact of Locarno should frankly say that they accept the good faith of the associated nations in establishing such blockade and will not attempt to evade it or to break it down. In other words, since the only limitation on the freedom of the seas would then become such limitation as was imposed upon a pledge-breaking nation by all its fellows acting together, that limitation should be upheld by every signatory of the Pact of Paris. Such act is no longer taking sides in a war between two nations. It is upholding the moral order and those who defend the moral order against any nation, if such there be, which through passion or ambition or greed for gain is ready to violate it.

Moreover, the nations signatory to the Pact of Paris must quickly begin to think in terms of peaceful international association and negotiation and to discard both the terms and the apparatus of international war. The Irish Free State, Canada, Australia, Japan, Germany, Belgium, Czechoslovakia and the Netherlands have all displaced their Ministries of War for government agencies renamed in the new spirit. Every other nation should hasten to follow their example. There is no longer conceivable excuse for competitive programmes of naval construction. The straight-thinking and right-minded taxpayer should quickly call a halt in every

land to the farther imposition upon the people of those burdens which are the result of the constant construction of battleships, destroyers, submarines and the like, all of which are now worse than useless. There is a place in the world for navies of peace, but no place for navies of war.

It is of highest importance speedily to strengthen and to perfect the instrumentalities for the peaceful settlement of international differences. These are well-known and easily recognized as five in number, namely, diplomatic conversations; commissions to determine and establish facts; processes and purposes of international conciliation; international arbitration, for which the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague was established a quarter of a century ago; and judicial settlement, for which the Permanent Court of International Justice at The Hague was brought into being, largely upon American counsel and American initiative. Somewhere and somehow in this list of measures and methods there is hereafter to be sought without armed hostilities the settlement of every international dispute.

The part being played by the people of the United States and their public opinion in the development of instrumentalities of international association and international co-operation is largely lost sight of because so little of it is official or governmental. The rest of the world frequently overlooks the fact, if indeed it was ever aware of it, that in the United States there are two spheres of public conduct and public action, the sphere of Government, which is strictly limited to delegated

and prescribed powers, and the sphere of Liberty, in which the citizenship moves about as it will and steadily offers its truest, finest, most natural and most convincing representation. In the United States a sharp distinction exists—of which the full counterpart is found in no other land—between what is public and what is governmental. Much of the most important public life and action of the American people is carried on by them in the sphere of Liberty. It is to that sphere that the rest of the world should learn to look—even more than to those public expressions and public acts that take place in the sphere of Government—for the revelation and interpretation of the full purpose and ideals of the American people.

The Government of the United States is not signatory to the Treaty of Versailles and because of that fact is not a member of the League of Nations. Notwithstanding this fact, the American people through representation and activities in their sphere of Liberty have co-operated with the League of Nations eagerly and from the time of its establishment for the accomplishment of its high purposes. The first important task undertaken by the Council of the League of Nations following its organization in 1920 was to institute a commission of jurists to draft a statute for the Permanent Court of International Justice. Elihu Root, then President of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, accepted invitation to serve as member of that commission, and associated with him was the Secretary of the Endowment, James Brown Scott. John Bassett

Moore was among the first group to be chosen to membership in that Court, and upon his withdrawal in 1928 his place was taken by Charles Evans Hughes. Mr. Root is at this moment again at Geneva at the invitation of the Council of the League to serve as a member of a second commission which is to propose such revision of the statute for the Court as time and experience have suggested to be advisable. George W. Wickersham is a member of the League's Commission on the Progressive Codification of International Law. When the vitally important question of reparations was given thorough and searching examination in 1924, Charles G. Dawes, Owen D. Young and Henry M. Robinson were genuine representatives of the American people, their interest and their helpfulness. On the commission just now sitting to restudy this same question in the light of later experience, Owen D. Young and J. Pierpont Morgan were true representatives of American knowledge and American public opinion. In conferences on disarmament, on economic subjects, on transit, on health, on social questions, and on intellectual co-operation, the people of the United States are steadily and effectively represented. The fact that this representation usually has its origin in the sphere of Liberty makes it not less important, but rather more so, than had it originated in the sphere of Government without the full and complete co-operation of that public opinion which operates unchecked in the sphere of Liberty.

The judgment of the American people might well be

expressed in the words of the London *Times*, printed on September 27, 1928:

> The League is doing very well. There is really no longer any need to measure its temperature anxiously in order to make sure that it is going to live. It is an established institution, a fully recognized and indispensable instrument of international intercourse; and the session of the Assembly that has just closed has been notable at least for this, that the main interest of the delegates was in details of regular League business, that they were intent on perfecting the instrument. . . . The strain of the early years is passing, and the impulse to justify the League's existence by renewed annual attempts to capture the universe in a formula is dying down since the League now so obviously and sturdily exists.

American public opinion has a new and heavy responsibility to bear. It is itself responsible for the Pact of Paris, since without it that Pact would not have attracted the favorable opinion and support of the civilized world, nor could it have been ratified by the Senate. With that Pact before them, the American people must now both in the sphere of Liberty and in the sphere of Government make those expressions and take those steps which will prove their sincerity and the firmness of their purpose. No pledge-breaker must be aided in pledge-breaking, whether directly or indirectly. All possible instrumentalities for the peaceful settlement or solution of all disputes or conflicts of whatever nature or of whatever origin which arise among the signatories to

that Pact must be upheld and strengthened both in their prestige and in their practical operation.

The sure way to invite destruction of the Pact of Paris is to suspect that some nation will violate it and to frame national policy under the influence of that suspicion. The sure way to uphold the Pact of Paris is to assume that every signatory nation means to abide by it and to frame national policy under the influence of that assumption.

President Coolidge, who has just laid down the burden and responsibility of his great office, used words in speaking to the American Legion at Omaha on October 6, 1925, which may well be taken as the guide and stimulus of the American people in approaching their task of to-morrow:

> We have been attempting to relieve ourselves and the other nations from the old theory of competitive armaments. In spite of all the arguments in favor of great military forces, no nation ever had an army large enough to guarantee it against attack in time of peace or to ensure its victory in time of war. No nation ever will. Peace and security are more likely to result from fair and honorable dealings, and mutual agreements for a limitation of armaments among nations, than by any attempt at competition in squadrons and battalions. . . . I can see no merit in any unnecessary expenditure of money to hire men to build fleets and carry muskets when international relations and agreements permit the turning of such resources into the making of good roads, the building of better homes, the promotion of education and all the other arts of peace which minister to the advancement of human welfare.

The most earnest and sincere conviction of all America finds expression in these words from the Inaugural Address of President Hoover:

> The United States fully accepts the profound truth that our own progress, prosperity and peace are interlocked with the progress, prosperity and peace of all humanity.

XVII

IMPONDERABLES

English version of an address delivered before the Reichstag,
Berlin, Germany, April 30, 1930

IMPONDERABLES

—das ganze Gewicht der Imponderabilien die viel schwerer wiegen als die materiellen Gewichte—

Reichskanzler Fürst von Bismarck im Reichstag, 6 Februar, 1888. (Stenographische Berichte über die Verhandlungen des Reichstags, II Session, 1887–88—S.732).

The invisible and imponderable is the sole fact—

Ralph Waldo Emerson, (1854) in *Letters and Social Aims:—Poetry and Imagination,* (Works, Centenary Edition; Boston and New York, 1904, p. 18).

After all, it is the imponderables that move the world,—heat, electricity, love—

Oliver Wendell Holmes, (1858) in *The Autocrat of the Breakfast Table,* (Boston, Houghton, Mifflin and Company, 1900, pp. 135–36).

On this occasion and in this distinguished presence it is not possible to speak without deep feeling. Memory pictures as vividly as if it were yesterday the first arrival in Berlin more than forty-five years ago of a young and eager American student, hungry to share the scholarship and the inspiration which the University of Berlin in those halcyon days had to offer to the stranger. The experience was one never to be forgotten.

The old and much-loved Emperor, symbol of an order that was one day to pass, seated at the window of his palace, graciously acknowledged the salute each morning of the American student who crossed the Opera Place to pass between the statues of the two Humboldts to his place in the University lecture halls. Bismarck was at the height of his fame and his influence and was

a familiar figure in the life of Berlin. Liebknecht, Windthorst, and Benningsen could be heard in the Reichstag, while the unique and bewitching figure of Mommsen was often to be seen on Unter den Linden. Great minds and great personalities surrounded one on every side. The historian von Ranke was yet alive, but no longer gave university lectures. Curtius and Vahlen, Helmholtz and du Bois-Reymond, Wagner and Schmoller, Delbrück and Diels, Gneist and von Treitschke, Zeller and Paulsen, were each and all objects of eager interest and captivated attention. Much has happened in the long and busy years that have followed, but from that day to this, the gratitude for what German scholarship and German inspiration then so freely gave, and a steadily growing appreciation of what that unique experience meant, remain dominant forces in the life and thought of that young American student. Memory is an intangible.

To-night in this stately hall and in these noble surroundings, his first words must be of thanks and grateful appreciation for those student years in Berlin, now so long ago.

One hundred and twenty-three years ago, there took place in the city of Berlin a really great happening. Following the calamities of the Napoleonic Wars and the resulting disturbance to the life and thought of the Prussian people, it was imperative that a new note should be sounded, a new blow struck, a new call to achievement heard. The philosopher Fichte seemed divinely appointed for the great task. On successive

Sunday evenings from December, 1807, to March, 1808, he delivered before crowded audiences his famous *Reden an die Deutsche Nation.* Surrounded by spies and by enemies, his very life in danger, this great voice was raised in an immortal appeal to the German people to rise to new heights, to seek new means of endeavor, to tread new paths toward national reconstruction, national greatness, national accomplishment. The appeal contained in those *Reden* is one of the masterpieces of modern eloquence, and by them and through them the name of Fichte is written by the side of those of Pericles and Isocrates and Demosthenes, of Cato and Cicero, of Bossuet and Mirabeau, of Milton and Burke and Fox, of Jefferson and Hamilton and Webster and Lincoln, as that of one of the immortal voices of the human race in all that relates to the highest effort of men and nations.

Fichte well understood the fundamental difference between the Nation and the State, and his searching and moving appeal was for the building of a German Nation on spiritual and intellectual foundations so strong that they could not be moved. The effect of those addresses was quick and extraordinary. They had an immense popularity and exercised a prodigious influence. Not since Luther had any German voice been raised to speak so powerfully and so convincingly to the German people. Philosopher and patriot, Fichte insisted that all political differences, geographic divisions and economic antagonisms should yield before the new and unifying spirit of one German nation for the whole German peo-

ple, able and willing to reflect and to express all that was best in that people's history and ideals. It is to Fichte as prophet and to Bismarck as constructive statesman, that we trace the upbuilding of a truly German nation, and finally of a single federal government for that nation. In the case of the Italian people there were similar happenings as to which Mazzini played the part of Fichte and Cavour that of Bismarck.

If the American and French Revolutions, with all that they meant and all that they effected, were the outstanding political events of the eighteenth century, surely the building of a German nation and of an Italian nation were the outstanding political events of the nineteenth century.

As we contemplate these stupendous movements across the pages of history we are witnessing once more the power of ideas. The hearts and the minds of men were gripped and moved by the eloquent appeals of these orators and philosophers, and human happenings were shaped precisely as these philosophers and orators had predicted and urged. The power of oratory and of statesmanship is an intangible.

Given a nation, conscious of itself, proud of its past, rich in power of every kind, abundant in contribution to letters, to the fine arts, to music, to philosophy and to education, eager in the advancement of scientific inquiry, quick in harnessing new scientific truth, new scientific discovery, to the practical needs of men, what shall be its mode of life, what its measures for the greatest satisfaction and happiness of its people, what its relations

with its neighbors and with all the world? We have learned to speak of races as the Teutonic, the Latin, the Slavic, the Mongolian and others. We see mankind separated into groups, some of them of immense size, by differences of language and these groups again divided, regardless of their size or place, by differences of religious faith and worship. Where is to be found the guide to unity and peace through this labyrinth of diversity and conflict? Shall these diversities and conflicts be permitted to go their way unguided, unhampered, to a cataclysm that would mark civilization's end, and leave the planet Earth to the still cold death of a body that has played its part in the heavenly system and could no longer do more than revolve about its central point as a mere makeweight among the stars? Or, on the other hand, shall there be found a path to unity, to companionship, to confidence, to constant consultation, to association in high endeavor, to the end that the supreme human unity which underlies and conditions all human diversities may find its just and beneficent expression?

The answer comes from a German voice and a German pen. It was the immortal essay of Immanuel Kant, *Zum ewigen Frieden*, published at Königsberg in 1795, when the career of Napoleon was at its very beginning, when the government of the United States of America was yet in its cradle, when a united Italy was still undreamt of, and when the policies of Talleyrand and of Metternich that were to carry the spirit of the eighteenth century far over into the nineteenth lay still

in the future, that the commanding intellect and the superb vision of the philosopher of Königsberg pointed with simple directness to that path of progress upon which the civilized peoples of the world have only just now begun to tread. What colossal cost in human life, in human savings, in human suffering, and in the satisfactions and happiness of four generations of men has been the penalty of waiting so long to hear that distant philosopher's voice!

"The practical politician," said Kant, "is accustomed to testifying as much disdain towards the theorist as he has complaisance for himself." This statement which was true in 1795 remains still true in 1930. The practical man who affects to despise thinking and who himself has little or no capacity for it, consistently sneers at those who do think and derides their counsels. All the while this practical man is himself quite unconsciously in the grasp of crooked, superficial, uninformed thinking. The more he supposes himself to be dealing with material things and with what he calls experience, the more he is really under the influence of intangibles, but of a wrong and harmful sort. Looking back across one hundred and thirty-five years, it is perfectly plain that if the so-called practical men who have been governing the nations of the world had been able to understand and to apply the teaching of Kant's great essay, the world would to-day have been much farther onward in its progress than it really is.

It is literally astounding to find how much of the wisest and best philosophy of modern life is set forth

in this essay by Kant so many years ago. He lays down the principle that no treaty of peace shall be esteemed valid on which is tacitly reserved matter for future war. He insists that no state of whatever extent shall ever pass under the dominion of another state, since a state is a society of men over whom that state alone has a right to command and to dispose. "Standing armies [*miles perpetuus*]," says Kant, "shall in time be totally abolished," since, being ever ready for action, these armies incessantly menace other states and excite them to increase without end the number of armed men. Who in this twentieth century has put better or more simply the evil and the danger of competitive armaments whether on land or on sea? "No state shall by force interfere with the constitution or government of another state," is a principle stated by Kant which might almost be regarded as a forerunner of the Monroe Doctrine. If a state of peace is to be established, the civil constitution of every state ought to be republican, and Kant's argument is that the only safe government is one established upon principles that are compatible with the liberty of all members of a society in their equality as men, with the submission of all to a common legislation as its subjects, and with a right of equality which all share as members of one and the same state. While the philosopher of Königsberg was penning these prophetic sentences, the people of the United States of America were learning them from the pen of Thomas Jefferson and the people of France were hearing them expounded with highly emotional emphasis by the architects of the

French Revolution whose uproar was at its height. In Great Britain Pitt was Prime Minister and the career of Canning was still in the making.

Kant taught the very modern doctrine that it should be the citizens themselves who decided whether war shall be declared or not, thereby removing that power from monarchs or executives, from legislative bodies or from specially selected groups which might easily be swept by emotion, by passion, or by ambition.

Nor is the thought of Kant restricted to national policy alone. "The public right," he continues, "ought to be founded upon a federation of free states." There, in a single sentence, is the prophecy of the League of Nations and the function of international law. A society of nations [*civitas gentium*] which would come to embrace all of the nations of the earth was the ideal of the great philosopher toward which our nations of today are steadily marching with increasing confidence and hope.

What shall be the guarantee of this arrangement for establishing and maintaining peace? "Nothing less," answers Kant, "than the great and ingenious artist Nature [*natura daedala rerum*]." Here he sweeps away with one splendid gesture the whole notion that men and nations must be compelled to keep their word through fear of economic reprisals and armed forces. He deals with realities. He looks facts in the face. He notes that unless the pledged word of a man or a nation is kept because it is pledged, there can be no assurance that it will be kept at all.

"Finally," concludes Kant, "since civilization must rest upon and aim at morality, the reign of public right, perpetual peace, which will succeed to those mere suspensions of hostilities which have heretofore been called treaties of peace, is not a chimera but a problem of which time, probably abridged by the uniformity of the progress of the human mind, promises us the solution." What more can be said? This great German voice of 1795 speaks to the world of 1930 in tones of commanding leadership and highest practical sagacity. The voice of Immanuel Kant is an intangible.

For ten years past the civilized world has been marching, now consciously, now unconsciously, toward that happy goal which Immanuel Kant so clearly saw and so clearly defined. In the League of Nations the era of consultation has found an organ of expression and in the Pacts of Locarno the signatory powers have highly and finely resolved upon the peaceful settlement of their international differences, whether these be of long standing or have newly arisen. Finally, in the Pact of Paris the world has renounced war as an instrument of national policy, that policy which von Clausewitz defined as a policy which fights battles instead of writing notes. Hereafter we are to write notes, to confer together and to consult and to leave off fighting battles and preparing to fight battles. Those energies, those efforts and those vast expenditures which have heretofore gone into preparations for war and into the conduct of war are now to be turned toward multiplying the satisfactions and increasing the happiness of

the great mass of the people in every land. Better schools and systems of education, better conditions of labor and larger remuneration for the wageworker, better protection of the public health, better housing for the masses of the people, better roads and other means of communication, better libraries and museums, and, in general, a raising everywhere of the level of life and its conditions. The world is rich enough for all this if it keeps its pledged word to renounce war as an instrument of national policy. This moral obligation is an intangible.

This twentieth century world abounds in problems that will tax the highest capacity of men to solve. Some of these are human problems, some are industrial problems, some are economic problems, some are financial problems, some are political problems, some are religious problems. The point upon which to insist is that they can never be solved by hate, by conflict or by force. These problems may be suppressed in one of those ways but they cannot so be solved. If they are to be solved they must be solved in a spirit of kindly co-operation, of friendly association and of consultation with the fixed purpose of doing justice and establishing liberty among men. These are the true and lasting foundations of peace. Peace, it must never be forgotten, is itself not an ideal at all; it is a state attendant upon the achievement of an ideal. The ideal itself is human liberty, justice, and the honorable conduct of an orderly and humane society. Given this, a durable peace follows naturally as a matter of course. Without this, there is

no peace, but only a rule of force until liberty and justice revolt against it in search of peace. These are the fundamental facts never to be forgotten. It is liberty and justice of which we are instantly and directly in search, and this means that we must be ready with open minds to consider any question which is raised anywhere in the world involving these great principles and ends, and try to settle it fairly and justly that human content may follow and the foundations of peace be thereby rendered more secure.

There are various facts and happenings throughout the world which we must be prepared frankly to face. First, perhaps, is the very obvious fact that not all the organized groups of mankind are by any means on the same level of competence for self-government and for international responsibility. To force upon such people either by weight of numbers and greater capacity or in response to some visionary theory of the equality of men, the political and social institutions which are suitable and satisfactory for peoples that are much farther advanced and much more fully disciplined, is folly of the first order. Such peoples, through no fault of their own, are really to be treated as wards of those who are more advanced and better disciplined. As such they are under no circumstances to be exploited, to be treated as mere hewers of wood and drawers of water, but rather as children in the school of political and social understanding. The whole theory of mandates now being worked out through the League of Nations is a sound and useful theory, and, if generously and broadly in-

terpreted and applied, will through coming generations aid these less advanced peoples to come forward and climb still higher on the ladder of political and social organization. Each of the more advanced and more powerful nations should have its part in applying this system of mandates if it desires so to do. There is room for Great Britain, there is room for France, there is room for Germany, there is room for Italy, there is room for Japan, in caring for and developing less advanced peoples in other parts of the globe.

Nor must it be assumed that all existing geographical, political, racial, religious and economic settlements are final. Each one of these is fair and suitable subject for calm consideration and study in order that if there be ways by which justice can be better done and liberty advanced, those ways may be found. Among the older nations of western Europe, the process of nation-building is completed, but there are doubtless boundaries and discriminations in eastern and southeastern Europe which must in due time be restudied. There are also problems of national ambition and of minorities submerged under and surrounded by majorities of different race and different language. There are problems of religious controversy and there are problems of historic racial jealousies and antagonisms which must be resolved through the years with patience, with frankness, with openmindedness and in a spirit of justice. Nothing is ever really settled until it is settled right. What is now before our world is to make sure that we do not attempt to settle things right by force, by violence, by

war, but that we attempt to settle them right by study, by conference, by consultation. All these are among the intangibles that rule the world.

The peace of the world cannot rest with permanence upon any theory of domination by force whether that domination be military or economic or racial or religious, for such domination is always a temptation to its disturbance and overthrow. Peace can only rest secure upon a liberal, enlightened and convinced public opinion. That public opinion, having itself brought about the renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy, will now proceed to build for its own expression and for its own satisfaction institutions that will regulate and guide the contacts and relations of men organized in nations as a substitute for those suspicions and fears and displays of power which have been so common in years gone by. These institutions, it would seem safe to predict, will be of three kinds, each kind having a moral foundation and a moral purpose.

There will first be the intangible institution of intellectual international penetration, contact and association. Already large progress has been made toward this end. Science is international and literature, though it always speaks with a nation's tongue, is increasingly international. Nowhere is Shakespeare more widely read, better understood, or more effectively presented on the stage than in Germany. The speech of Goethe was German but his thought is familiar the world around. Music has a Russian, a Polish, a Scandinavian, a German, a French, an Italian, a Spanish or an English

cast, but its charm and its power are not stopped by the boundaries of any nation. The richness and the fertility of intellectual and æsthetic diversity are multiplied many times by the power of what these have in common. All that belongs to the intangible.

Then there are already building and well advanced the institutions, legal and semi-legal, that are to be the reliance of nations in settling peaceably and justly those differences of opinion and those clashes of interest which must, of course, arise among them and between them from time to time. The Council and the Assembly of the League of Nations with their growing authority and their steadily increasing prestige, are the symbols of the art and habit of consultation face to face as a substitute for the writing of formal notes, the sending of ultimatums and the mobilization of armed force. Then there are the Permanent Court of Arbitration and the Permanent Court of International Justice. These are honorable and honored bodies which stand before all the world as representative of the principle that disinterested justice and not might must determine which of two contestants is right and which is wrong. Individual nations and groups of nations have, in addition, provided by formal treaty for every sort of commission and tribunal of inquiry, of conciliation and of arbitration. In reply to him who cynically asks, "To what are we to turn as a substitute for armed force?," we point to the League of Nations, to the Permanent Court of Arbitration and to the Permanent Court of International Justice, and we point to them not only with hope

for the future but with pride for what they have already done.

The third type of institution which must come into existence to meet present-day necessities is economic. Man lives by labor, nations thrive by labor, and international relations may be made either more easy or more difficult according to the methods by which the fruits of labor are exchanged between one nation and another. When life was very simple and wants were few, a relatively restricted territory and a substantially uniform climate might perhaps provide what was necessary to satisfy the simple wants of an undeveloped people. Times have changed. What were once the almost unattainable luxuries of life have become not only its comforts but its necessities. For the food supply of any considerable population, an extent of territory that is literally enormous must be drawn upon day by day and almost hour by hour. No industry can be maintained, much less flourish, without metal and rubber and lumber and oil and a dozen other natural resources that usually come from far beyond the boundaries of that nation whose industry it is. In other words, the economic life of any nation, however immense and however rich, has already ceased to be national and independent and has long since become international and dependent. The meaning of this is that the international commerce of the world must be set increasingly free from narrow, petty, prejudiced restrictions and administrative hindrances in order that the population of any nation may most easily and most favorably exchange

their own products for those which they wish to import.

It is at this point that the significance of the principle of federation comes into view and that the experience of the United States of America has a lesson to teach to Europe. The stupendous economic development of the United States and the vast increase in its national wealth during the past two generations have been due to causes which may quickly and shortly be studied. First among these is the fact that by the terms of the Constitution of the United States itself, free and unrestricted trade prevails throughout the territory which that Constitution governs, which territory is so varied in climate and in soil and in product that it is a vast empire in itself. Had it been possible for the constituent states of the American Union to erect barriers against trade, each with its neighbor, the people of the United States would to-day have been economically backward and relatively impoverished. That huge domestic trade, untaxed and untrammeled, is the foundation of American prosperity. The protective tariff policy which owes its origin to the philosophic teachings of Alexander Hamilton and to men cast in the mold of Henry Clay and Abraham Lincoln and James G. Blaine and William McKinley was never intended to destroy or unduly hamper international trade, but merely to give the United States that measure of economic sufficiency and independence that a nation so placed ought to have, and to make sure that the diversification of industry and the rewards of labor were such as to strengthen the foundations of the social and political order. The true tariff for protection, how-

ever, is in no sense a tariff for prohibition. It is not a tariff to destroy international trade or to make impossible the settlement of international balances by shipment of goods, but it is a tariff simply to guard the fundamentals which have just been named. To depart from those principles and to attempt to erect a tariff wall about the United States would be to attack the policy of protection in its citadel and to substitute for it a policy of commercial prohibition which must surely do grave damage to the people of the United States themselves.

There are signs, not yet clear or wholly convincing, but yet signs, that the British Commonwealth of Nations with its world-wide population and its vast variety of climates and soil and product, will in its own way and at its own time construct an economic institution of its own which will, *mutatis mutandis*, reflect and apply to that Commonwealth of Nations the conditions and principles which have done so much for the United States of America.

What of Europe? Has not the time come when the next long step forward in promoting national satisfaction and international comfort is the building of an economic United States of Europe which shall do for these teeming and highly civilized populations what has already been done on the other side of the Atlantic? Victor Hugo foresaw such a happening so long ago as 1848. In framing an answer to that question, one must have in mind both matters of principle and matters of administrative detail. There are national differences,

distinctions and opportunities to be protected and there are international opportunities to be seized and developed. Fortunate it is that the constructive statesmanship of Europe has fixed its mind on the solution of this problem. The deeply lamented and sincerely mourned Dr. Stresemann understood it all and was ready to be a leader in marching toward the new goal. We have a Briand in France, a Masaryk and a Beneš in Czechoslovakia and others of large outlook and fine imagination who are animated by the same spirit. It cannot be long before this spendid ideal, the attainment of which would mean so much for the economic prosperity and satisfaction of the peoples affected by it, will find its way to shape the policies of governments. This ideal is one of the intangibles that rules the world.

But what, we are asked, is to become of all these splendid institutions if some nation signatory to the Pact of Paris breaks its pledged word and begins hostilities against its neighbor? What then is to punish the offender and to protect those against whom the offense is committed? The answer is quick and simple, Public Opinion, than which nothing is more powerful when it rises to heights of condemnation. How will public opinion act, how will it express itself? Precisely as society acts and expresses itself toward the liar, toward him who is guilty of a mean and despicable act, and no condemnation can be more severe or more conclusive.

Do not forget that by its terms the Pact of Paris ushers in a new mode of thought and a new era in everything that relates to international relations. It is by

the mere force of inertia that governments and journalists and admirals and generals are still talking in terms of the discarded past. Some ask for parity among the world's navies. The term is quite meaningless, for if that parity were agreed to on paper to-day and launched in the water to-morrow, it could be destroyed the next day by some new discovery in a chemical laboratory of a distant land or by some new triumph of navigation through the air. When men now talk of national security it means that they are still thinking in terms of war. Learn to think in terms of the Pact of Paris, and national security is on the same plane with municipal security or personal security. It may occasionally need the assistance of armed police, but it can have no use for the old-fashioned protections which science and morals have both united to render not only quite useless but obsolete. There is talk still, particularly in the United States, of neutrality and its implications, but that again is to think in terms of war and not in terms of the Pact of Paris. If a nation signatory to the Pact of Paris breaks its word, no other signatory can possibly be neutral in the old sense, simply because that signatory is one of those concerned directly in the pledge-breaking. Therefore it must, of course, quickly come to be declared the national policy of every nation signatory to the Pact of Paris that it will not help or assist its nationals to aid one which breaks the pledge which that Pact records. This is no violation of neutrality because when the pledge is broken it is broken against and in defiance of every other signatory nation. Once bring

these fundamental facts clearly in view of public opinion and the policies of governments will quickly be shaped accordingly. Nor must we permit it to be forgotten that the limitation of armament imposed upon the German nation by the Treaty of Versailles was not intended to be an exception to the policy of other nations. It was M. Clemenceau himself who wrote that the requirements of that treaty in regard to German armament were also the first steps towards that general reduction and limitation of armaments which the allied and associated powers would seek to bring about as one of the most fruitful preventives of war and which it would be one of the first duties of the League of Nations to promote. It is high time that public opinion called upon the nations other than Germany to keep that promise, to pursue that policy, and to hasten the day when real limitation of armament shall not be characteristic of a few nations but something common to them all.

There are two different ways in which any great question which involves national pride and national interest may be approached. One is in a spirit of confidence and good feeling and hope. The other is in a spirit of suspicion and jealousy and fear. Both are intangibles and the contest for the government of the world and for the heart of mankind is between these. In any case, it will be an intangible that will rule the world and it is for public opinion to determine whether the choice shall be of an intangible which is lofty and fine and noble and helpful to all mankind, or whether it shall be an intan-

gible that is low and mean and jealous and selfish and grasping. To-day the world stands at the crossroads and must quickly choose the road which it will travel toward one or the other of these two intangibles. Which way shall the German people turn? May not one who has drunk deep and long at the well of their scholarship, their learning, their literature, and their science, answer that the German people, mindful of the great signposts which guide and represent them in their Lessing and Herder, in their Goethe and Schiller, in their Hegel and Schleiermacher, will answer in the spirit of the eloquent voice of Fichte and in that of the calm and constructive philosophy of Immanuel Kant,

Deutsches Herz, verzage nicht,
Thu, was dein Gewissen spricht.
German Heart, do not dismay,
But thy Conscience' voice obey.

XVIII

NATION-BUILDING AND BEYOND

THE RICHARD COBDEN LECTURE

The second annual Richard Cobden Lecture delivered at the Royal Society of Arts, Adelphi, London, under the auspices of the Dunford House Cobden Memorial Association, May 7, 1930

NATION-BUILDING AND BEYOND

You will permit me to express high appreciation of the honor and the privilege tendered me by the Dunford House Trustees. For years to come voices from many lands will be raised under these auspices to praise the name and to hail the fame of Richard Cobden. To be numbered among them is no ordinary distinction.

"Let us now praise famous men," wrote the author of *Ecclesiasticus;* but it must not be forgotten that praise, like faith, is subdued to what it works in. It will not be enough merely to praise famous men by extolling their capacity, by lauding their character or by commending their public service. The question to be pressed for answer again and again is what are we doing truly to commemorate them by hearkening to their counsels, by taking heed of their arguments and by carrying into effect their public policies? Action is needed, not words alone.

The notion that experience is a good teacher is one of the most baseless of human obsessions. Were it otherwise, mankind would have reached perfection long ago. "Learning teacheth more in one year than experience in twenty," wrote Roger Ascham in *The Scholemaster* with profound wisdom. The path of civilization through the ages is littered with splendid but wasted ideas. The largest visions, the deepest insights, the most compelling arguments, have been spread before

the minds of men by prophets and by seers, by statesmen and by nation-builders, and then let fall into the darkness of forgetfulness. Nearly everything that man has ever said well was best and most finely said by those ancient Greeks and Romans who after 2500 years still rule the mind of the western world. Material waste is as nothing compared with the intellectual and moral waste which follows upon our not heeding the counsels that have been offered us from generation to generation and from century to century.

He who is in advance of his time is called a prophet and he who is behind his time is known as a laggard, but often the laggard appears to count for as much as the prophet. It takes time, much time, in a democratic society for the public mind to catch up with an idea. The inertia of habit is powerful indeed, and it struggles mightily against change even when that change is demonstrably for good.

Perhaps no man who adorned public life in the 19th century better illustrates all this than does Richard Cobden. At the announcement of his death to the House of Commons, Lord Palmerston, then Prime Minister, Mr. Disraeli and Mr. John Bright expressed in eloquent and deeply moving words their judgment of the character, the ideals and the public service of Richard Cobden, but his own land and other lands where his voice was heard are only just now, when two generations have passed since his death, seriously putting their attention upon the principles and problems that were uppermost in his mind and upon which he never ceased eloquently

to insist. We have had admirable setting out of Cobden's life and speeches and political opinions and acts, first in the classic biography of Lord Morley, then in the volumes from the pen of Thorold Rogers, from Sir Louis Mallet, from Dawson, from Hobson, from Mrs. Schwabe, from Ashworth and from other scores of speeches, articles and expositions which have dealt with the man and his philosophy of life and of government. There can be no excuse for not understanding the dominating thought of Cobden's life and the noble vision which guided all his preaching and all his teaching alike. Early, very early, all things considered, Cobden saw and fully grasped the higher meaning of a nation's life and a nation's purpose. Early, very early, all things considered, Cobden understood that growing trade, commerce and finance might be turned into paths of conflict and disturbance or into paths of peace and quiet. Early, very early, all things considered, Cobden felt the significance of those states of mind which must be brought to pass among men if public opinion is consciously and powerfully to move toward a liberal, a constructive and a just goal. Better than almost any other man who spoke and wrote in the 19th century, he saw the shifting of incidence from political theory to economic interest and he hastened to point out how the two could be reconciled and, being reconciled, how they could be led to contribute to the greater satisfaction and happiness of man and to the peace of the world. It is easy enough to say these things, but what is being done to bring them to pass?

The answer to this question which can truthfully be made to-day abounds in hope. The Great War taught its lesson with a voice so loud and in terms so emphatic that even the most selfish and self-centered of men and of nations can hear and understand. The facts are so familiar and have been burned so indelibly into the public consciousness that they need not be repeated even in briefest form. Remarque's *Im Westen Nichts Neues* and Sherriff's *Journey's End* have told to millions their tragic and convincing story. The era of ultimatums and mobilization has given place to an era of consultation and reduction of armaments and the minds of men are on the march. As we gain Richard Cobden's viewpoint and as we clearly see Richard Cobden's ideals, the march will be the faster and the goal more quickly reached. "We think our civilization nearing its meridian," said Emerson, "but we are yet only at the cock-crowing and the morning star." These are the words of a philosopher who thinks and of a prophet with eyes to see.

The many-sided problems which confront the world, numerous and difficult though they be, may each be written over a common denominator which is nothing more or less than an instructed and alert public opinion bending governments to its will in search of human satisfaction, human betterment and human happiness on that high plane where liberty and justice rule and where peace sits by their side.

There are two possible extremes of misfortune which might conceivably overtake the civilized world of this century and the next. On the one hand, men and na-

tions might settle down into a state of selfish struggle for individual and national enrichment, for power to dominate others less fortunate than themselves and to exploit them, and for force by which to subdue and repel dissatisfaction with the sword, the submarine, the airship and the most poisonous of gases. If that path were really to be chosen, or even drifted into through carelessness and unconcern and ignorance, those historians and philosophers who are busying themselves with the decline of western civilization would quickly find at hand ample material for new volumes of convincing evidence.

On the other hand, there might conceivably spread from a single center over the whole world, like an irresistible glacier, some single form of political, economic and social order and domination. This might be an absolutism, either of one or of the many, or communism or fascism, or some other yet unspoken form of controlling human society. The result could only be a fabric so spread out and so brittle that it must shortly crack and break, throwing the pieces back into their original separateness to begin some long process of organization and integration all over again. Alternative to these is the building the world as we know it on what I ventured to define some twenty years ago as the International Mind. This is nothing other than that habit of thinking of foreign relations and business and that habit of dealing with them, which regard the several nations of the civilized world as friendly and co-operating equals in aiding the progress of civilization, in develop-

ing commerce and industry, and in spreading enlightenment and culture throughout the world.

This definition of the international mind brings us face to face with those powerful convictions and emotions which are known as nationalism, patriotism and loyalty, and which must in turn be seized upon and bent toward those highest of all the purposes which brought them into being. Nations and races do not care to have their differences pointed out and emphasized unless it be for the purpose of praising those which are excellent and worthy. Least of all does a race or a nation care to be classed as backward and in need of tutelage and oversight. Yet precisely these differences between races and nations exist, and must be reckoned with as powerful elements in the problem of securing and guarding the peace and progress of the whole world. The division of nations into great and small is from the point of view of the international mind of no consequence whatever, for a nation of relatively restricted area and one far down in the scale of population may justly hold its head high because of the part it plays in the world and because of the respect in which it is held by all its neighbors. Such are Belgium and Holland, Denmark and Norway and Sweden, whose security is not assured by great navies and stout fortifications, but by fine national character, by steadiness in well-doing and by quick cooperation with their larger and more powerful neighbors in every act that makes for progress.

Those nations and peoples and races that are really and by general agreement backward, are those which are

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most deserving of the careful concern of the more fortunate and more advanced so that without economic exploitation, without being submerged under a despotic bureaucracy, they may be given opportunity to learn the lessons of liberty and of justice, of self-government and of progress, to the end that after the passage of years they too may come to the age of national adolescence and then to full manhood, self-determination and control. Few courses of action could be more cruel than to force upon a backward people those institutions which it has taken hundreds of years for the western world to develop, to understand and to operate, and then to expect those backward peoples to leap at one bound into a position by the side of Great Britain or France or Germany or Italy. Through the League of Nations and its system of mandates a way is now being found to deal with this great question and to prevent recurrence of those happenings which from the 16th century through the 19th, brought misery and distress to millions of human beings and often made unworthy use of the great power which the more advanced nations found to be theirs. If we may assume that the less advanced and less progressive nations and peoples can in this way be cared for to their own advantage and up-building, then the way is clear to develop the international mind among those peoples that are more advanced and to use it as the key to unlock the door of the future.

Self-respect, self-confidence and self-support are as essential to a nation as to an individual. This is the starting point in nation-building. But for what purpose

and to what end shall this self-respect, self-confidence and self-support be used? Shall they be turned merely toward a selfish and unthinking end or shall they be turned in support of comradeship, comity, co-operation and consultation, toward taking a place in the family of nations and there making all these felt for a fine and high purpose?

When a nation has become fully self-conscious, particularly if its economic and social order rests upon a democratic basis, it looks about for ways and means to become economically independent and self-sufficient. We have learned that this is an unattainable goal no matter how vast a nation's area may be, how great its population or how varied its climate and its products. Given all these, yet modern life is so many-sided and so complex that it daily makes insistent demands which only the uttermost parts of the earth can satisfy. There remains, however, within the range of practical political action, the possibility of greatly diversifying industry, of multiplying domestic consumption, and of raising the level of the health, the comfort and the satisfactions of the great mass of the population. The usual and, doubtless, the easiest method of attempting to accomplish these ends is by the imposition of taxes upon imported goods in the form of tariffs. It is at this point that in every land one enters upon a highly contentious field of study and discussion and comes face to face with Richard Cobden's teaching.

It may be premised that if men and nations were ideally constituted, if they were not selfish and gain-

seeking, and if they did not postpone thinking of others until they had fully satisfied themselves—and even then waited a while—there would be no very great difficulty in instituting, modifying and removing tariff taxes as occasion might indicate or suggest without the uproar and high feeling which now always accompany any public proposals of this kind, and without injuriously affecting international trade relations. We are constrained to deal with things as they are, however, and we must try to build a fair-minded, a fair-trading and a peaceful world out of the very imperfect material which human nature has supplied for that purpose.

There is no better illustration of the truth of these reflections than that which is afforded by the history of the government of the United States in its dealing with this vitally important question. As has been frequently pointed out, it is quite certain that had there been no other reason, taxes on imports would have been imposed when the government of the United States was newly established simply because, by the terms of the Constitution, that government was required to look to imposts and excises as its chief sources of revenue. It could not impose direct taxes upon the people save under a limitation which in practical operation came quickly to be regarded as highly unfair and obnoxious. The controlling reason, however, for the policy upon which the new government entered is set out in that classic Report on Manufactures which Alexander Hamilton, Washington's first Secretary of the Treasury, submitted to the House of Representatives in 1791. The argument and

the exposition of that great document have never been and cannot be improved upon. Hamilton was a profound student of the political and economic literature of the 18th century. He had read Adam Smith and Turgot with great care and had reflected long and earnestly upon their writings. Hamilton knew precisely what he was doing. He had in mind, first of all, the diversification of the economic life of this new and distant people in order that they might not be wholly dependent upon agriculture with all its uncertainties and fluctuations. It was never his intention to penalize, much less to prohibit, foreign trade, but merely to endeavor to reach certain definite ends which he clearly stated as desirable in the life of a young people set off by themselves, and at that time much more distant from the rest of the world than is the South Pole to-day. Those definite ends included the division of labor, a more extensive use of machinery, larger employment for those classes of the community not ordinarily engaged in business, the promotion of immigration from other countries, the furnishing of greater scope for the diversity of talents and dispositions among men, the opening up of more ample and varied fields of enterprise and the creating and securing of a more certain and steady demand for the surplus products of the soil.

Hamilton's chief political critic and antagonist, Thomas Jefferson, himself set out in more than one official document the reasons which led him to favor, if less emphatically, a like policy. From that time to this the system of protective tariffs levied on imported goods

has been the substantially uniform policy of the Government of the United States, and the voices which were so powerfully raised against that policy in 1842 and for several years thereafter and again in the ten years following 1887, are no longer heard. A free trader in the United States is what Professor Thorold Rogers years ago called a *caput lupinum*. The desired diversification of industry has long since been accomplished. The new methods of mass production, of installment buying and of workmen's ownership in the great co-operative undertakings by which they are employed, have given a large and steadily increasing measure of satisfaction. If prices are high, wages are still higher, and even if they were not, a high wage and a high price are psychologically more attractive than a low wage and a low price even if the relation between the two be maintained unaltered. But what is so often lost sight of is that behind this barrier of tariff taxation lay a rich, a huge and a highly diversified area throughout which complete freedom of trade was required to prevail by the terms of the Constitution itself. There is no like free trade area anywhere on earth and no like amount or variety of domestic consumption in any other land. Were it not for these facts the fortunate results which have followed the imposition of tariff taxes in the United States could not possibly have been reached.

The other side of the picture is not so agreeable to dwell upon. It shows individuals, corporations, organizations, interests and sections struggling to use the policy of tariff taxation not for the largest public weal,

but for their own interests which they enthusiastically identify with those of the larger public. Exploitation of the tariff, or at least its attempted exploitation, has followed and accompanied every new imposition of tariff taxes for fifty years. Meanwhile, the problem of agriculture has taken on new intensity and new forms and has become doubly pressing. Since American agriculture produces a large exportable surplus to talk of aiding it by imposing a tariff tax upon imports of agricultural products does not rise even to the height of foolishness. If there is to be a policy of tariff taxation and if agriculture nevertheless is in distress, there is but one way in which it can be effectively aided and that is by a direct bounty from the government treasury. Hamilton recognized this fact and said so in 1791. The difficulty, however, with following such a policy as that is that it is just a little too frank and too open. It makes no attempt to conceal the fact that it is the general public, acting through the public treasury, which directly assists an unprofitable industry. That may or may not be a wise thing to do. But the chance of its being done wisely is quite impossible if it is done behind a screen of some sort which conceals from public view the essential simplicity of the whole operation.

There is no way by which human selfishness can be excluded from the formulation of public policies, and that fact may just as well be frankly faced. On the other hand, there are and have been wise and eloquent and high-minded leaders of American public life, each one of them a defender of the policy of tariff taxation

and an exponent of it, who have taught that that policy existed for a public purpose, and that it was a means to an end and that that end should never be lost sight of, and that that end and not selfishness or group interest or sectional interest should always control the shaping of the details of tariff policy. James A. Garfield of Ohio, who became twentieth President of the United States, was a convinced supporter and eloquent exponent of the policy of protection. Yet these are his words spoken in the House of Representatives on July 10, 1866:

"If to be a protectionist is to adopt the practice which characterized the legislation of Great Britain and the leading nations of Europe for more than 200 years, and which is now commended to us by some of our political philosophers and statesmen, then I am no protectionist and shall never be one. . . . That policy, softened down in its outward manifestations, but essentially the same in spirit, is urged upon us now by those who would have us place so high a duty upon foreign merchandise as to prohibit the importation of any article which this country produces or can produce. Besides placing ourselves in an attitude of perpetual hostility to other nations, and greatly reducing our carrying trade, we should make monopolists of all the leading manufacturers of this country, who could fix the price of all their products at their discretion. . . . I hold, therefore, that a properly adjusted competition between home and foreign products is the best gauge by which to regulate international trade. Duties should be so high that our manufacturers can fairly compete with the foreign product, but not so high as to enable them to drive out the foreign article, enjoy a monopoly of the trade, and regulate the price as they please. To this extent I am a protectionist. If our

Government pursues this line of policy steadily we shall year by year approach more nearly to the basis of free trade, because we shall be more nearly able to compete with the other nations on equal terms. I am for a protection which leads to ultimate free trade. I am for that free trade which can only be achieved through protection."

Not very much later James G. Blaine of Maine, who was the Republican candidate for President in 1884, and himself one of the ablest and most persuasive men who ever discussed the policy of protection and presented it to the American people, expressed himself with the utmost vigour when it was proposed in the McKinley Bill of 1890 to take from the free list the item of hides which had been on that list for many years. Mr. Blaine, who was then Secretary of State, wrote to Mr. McKinley, who was Chairman of the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives, that that proposal "is a slap in the face to the South Americans with whom we are trying to enlarge our trade. It will benefit the farmer by adding five to eight percent. to the price of his children's shoes. It will yield a profit to the butcher only—the last man who needs it." Of the McKinley Bill as a whole Mr. Blaine said, "There is not a section or a line in the entire bill that will open a market for another bushel of wheat or another barrel of pork." Plainly then, neither Mr. Garfield nor Mr. Blaine looked upon the policy of protection as an end in itself, but with broad statesmanlike outlook they proposed to use it as a ladder by which to climb to a higher and freer plane of international trade

relationship. President McKinley himself only eleven years after he drafted the McKinley Bill, in a truly noteworthy speech which he delivered in the city of Buffalo on the day before an assassin took his life, used language which even to-day has not reached the ears of a considerable proportion of the American people. He said this:

"Modern inventions have brought into close relation widely separated peoples and made them better acquainted. Geographic and political divisions will continue to exist, but distances have been effaced. The world's products are exchanged as never before, and with increasing transportation facilities come increasing knowledge and larger trade. Prices are fixed with mathematical precision by supply and demand. The world's selling prices are regulated by market and crop reports. . . . Isolation is no longer possible or desirable. . . .

"The period of exclusiveness is past. The expansion of our trade and commerce is the pressing problem. Commercial wars are unprofitable. A policy of good will and friendly trade relations will prevent reprisals. Reciprocity treaties are in harmony with the spirit of the times; measures of retaliation are not. If, perchance, some of our tariffs are no longer needed for revenue or to encourage and protect our industries at home, why should they not be employed to extend and promote our markets abroad. . . .?

"Let us ever remember that our interest is in concord, not conflict; and that our real eminence rests in the victories of peace, not in those of war. . . ."

These words are those of true statesmen whose personal power, foresight and courage made them in their

day leaders of a dominant American political party. They, more than any other three men, shaped the thought and the public policy of the American people on this question for nearly a third of a century. The lesson which their words teach is that the purpose of upbuilding and diversifying a nation's industries and the aim of strengthening the interdependence between agriculture and manufactures is that the nation may find itself on a higher plane of economic, social and political civilization. Obviously, this policy passes from the moral to the immoral and from wisdom to wickedness if it is to be persisted in as an end in itself and without reference to its effect upon other peoples and their relation with the people of the United States. Such persistence would contradict not only Hamilton and Jefferson, but Garfield, Blaine and McKinley as well. The time has long gone by, if it ever existed, when the policy of tariff protection is a matter of purely domestic concern for any nation. It has long since become one of international incidence, international influence and international comity or the contrary. This is the point at which the world now stands. It will be but a partial victory over the forces of unreason if, as military and naval armaments are limited or done away with, tariff walls and trade barriers are multiplied in length, in breadth and in thickness.

Not every nation could follow the example of the United States or should attempt to do so, but the lesson which the experience of the United States has to teach is so clear that it may be read by him who runs. That

lesson is that the area of free and unrestricted trade behind any existing tariff wall should be as wide and as diversified as possible, to the end that the material may be at hand for the achievement of precisely those ends which Hamilton so forcefully described in his Report of 1791.

When the Great War was but a few weeks old I ventured the suggestion that what would be in substance a United States of Europe, a more or less formal federation of the self-governing countries of Europe, might be the outcome of the demonstrated failure of the existing national system to adjust government to the growth of civilization.[1] Victor Hugo had used the same phrase and had pointed to the analogy of the United States of America when he took the chair at the Peace Congress at Paris in 1848.

During the fifteen years since those words were written, public opinion has moved unmistakably in the direction of the organization of a United States of Europe, not in order that the nations constituent of such a federation may be lessened in authority or in influence, but for the purpose of establishing free, helpful and profitable economic co-operation with their neighbors. This aim is offered as a substitute for economic friction and antagonism in order that the several co-operating nations may increase their wealth, increase their peace of mind and increase the satisfactions of their entire populations. In other words, it is at this point that we

[1]Butler, Nicholas Murray—*A World in Ferment: Interpretations of the War for a New World.* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1917, p. 27.)

get beyond nation-building as an end in itself and catch a glimpse of nation-building for the high purpose of effective international co-operation and steadily increasing international service.

It is so much easier to be prosperous than it is to be civilized. If a nation is to be truly civilized it must be much more than prosperous; it must use its prosperity to a high international and human end as a member of the family of nations. The odd notion that such a use of national power and national prosperity is in some wise a restriction upon national freedom or a diminution of national authority is quite as grotesque as it would be to insist that Robinson Crusoe on his lonely and isolated island was doing more for himself than would be the case if his talents and his capacities were at work among his neighbors as a member of organized society in his home-land. If the heated advocate of national isolation and exclusiveness were to catch a true sight of himself he would see an ostrich which, with its head buried in the sand, was exposing the whole of its large body to the amused gaze of the passerby. His printed books and newspapers, his trade statistics, his systems of transportation and communication, his science, his literature, his schools, his churches, his music, his art, are all hopelessly intertwined and intermingled with those of peoples of other climes and other tongues. His very trade statistics annihilate the notion of isolation. It is worth noting what has happened in the economic history of the United States of America during the time that policies of isolation have been so much in evidence and

so heatedly supported in the press and on the floor of the American Congress. In 1908 the total value of goods imported into the United States was, in round numbers, $1,183,000,000. In 1928 the value of the imported goods had risen to $4,078,000,000. Moreover, even under the working of a protective tariff system, the percentage in value of dutiable imports which was 55.57% in 1908 had fallen in 1928 to 34.32%. Meanwhile, the value of exports of merchandise from the United States rose from $1,834,786,000 in 1908 to $5,030,099,000 in 1928. The percentage of foodstuffs, both crude and manufactured, and of crude materials which was 59.10% of the exports in 1908 was only 40.83% in 1928. The percentage of partially manufactured goods remained substantially unchanged, being 14.23% in 1908 and 14.24% in 1928, but that of finished manufactures rose sharply from 26.67% in 1908 to 44.93% in 1928. Still more impressive are the figures for the United States which record the sources of the revenue of the federal government. In 1908 the total gross income of the federal government was $601,862,000, of which nearly ½ or 47.5% came from custom duties. In 1928 the total gross income of the federal government had risen to $3,863,929,000, of which only about 1-7 or 14.7% was derived from customs duties. Ratification in 1913 of the Sixteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States introduced the federal income tax, and a host of so-called war taxes quickly followed, so that customs revenues, while about doubled in value measured by dollars, have

fallen from nearly ½ to a little more than 1-7 of the total annual revenue of the federal government. These facts and figures are full of significance. Taken in connection with recent discussions in the Congress of the United States and with a number of recent votes in that Congress, it would appear that the doctrines of Garfield and Blaine and McKinley are beginning to prevail and that public opinion is on the march toward a larger, a freer and a fairer view of all that relates to international trade and international relations.

Speaking at Manchester on January 15, 1846, Mr. Cobden used these words: "I believe that if you abolish the Corn-law unanimously and adopt free trade in its simplicity there will not be a tariff in Europe that will not be changed in less than five years to follow your example. . . . Therefore, for the farmers' sakes, I plead for the immediate abolition of this law." He was too hopeful. National policies do not change so quickly as that and rarely indeed do the facts justify such sudden changes. Time is of the essence of any problem with which public opinion has to deal and the facts must be clear and indisputable before any radical change in national policy can be expected to take place.

Since Cobden's day great progress has everywhere been made, and in the United States particularly, in improving the condition of the hand-worker and the wage-earner and in solving the so-called labor problem, not by political methods, whether ordinary or extraordinary, but by taking out from under that problem the foundations of lack of understanding, of lack of hu-

man sympathy and of exploitation and class selfishness upon which it rested and out of which it grew.

There are other long standing enmities of other kinds that have to be dealt with beside the traditional antagonism between labor and capital. It was no less ancient a writer than Hesiod who said that the potter is at enmity with the potter. There is an enormous amount of work to be done in the better organization both of agriculture and of manufactures for co-operative marketing, for the removal of technical, meticulous and bureaucratic limitations and restrictions upon the movement of goods, and for the wider adoption of a single system of weights and measures and of a standardized monetary system to make transportation and trade simpler and less heavily burdened than is now the case. We English-speaking people hold fast to our traditional system of weights and measures when all men of science everywhere and a large portion of the world other than ourselves have long since adopted the simple and easily understood metric system. It has long been recognized that few questions concern the human race more directly and more universally than this very subject of weights and measures. If these are not to be uniform everywhere, then the different systems which remain in use should be easily and quickly translated into each other through an agreed plan of standardized, non-fractional units. The Latin Monetary Union, disturbed as it was from time to time by fluctuations in the ratio between gold and silver, nevertheless served an excellent purpose while it lasted. It is worth while con-

sidering whether that whole question might not now be profitably restudied and, with the co-operation of the new International Bank and possibly under its leadership, some progress made toward greatly simplifying the whole question of foreign exchange. Then the sources of friction, ill-feeling and loss that are found in the lack of uniformity in the classification of exchangeable goods, as well as in meticulous, bureaucratic and burdensome administration at the frontiers, must not be overlooked. The hand of reform and of progress should reach out to deal with these, each and all.

Behind each and every one of these questions and suggestions lies our mode of thinking. It we insist upon thinking in terms of nations as ends in themselves simply aiming to grow richer, more powerful, more proud, surrounded by armies and fleets and tariff walls, then we have one outlook upon life and public policy. If, on the other hand, we accustom ourselves to thinking in terms of a nation as a moral personality with a duty to its neighbors as well as to itself, whose riches and power and pride are not simply to be objects of contemplation but also of service, then we have an outlook upon life and public policy which is one of liberal, constructive and peaceful progress.

Were the spirit of Richard Cobden in the flesh today, his eloquent, courageous and convincing voice would be raised wherever men would listen, in support of the League of Nations, in support of the Permanent Court of Arbitration, in support of the Permanent Court of International Justice, in support of the declarations

of the Pact of Locarno, in support and in fullest exposition of the principles of the Pact of Paris whereby war is renounced as an instrument of national policy and peaceful methods of resolving international differences are universally acclaimed. It would be raised in support of those principles and practices in international relations and international trade which would hasten the coming of that day whose sun has just now so gloriously risen on the horizon of the future and of which Tennyson sang in his "Parliament of Man and Federation of the World."

XIX

DR. CURTIUS'S APPEAL TO AMERICA

A Letter Written to the New York *Times*
June 26, 1930

DR. CURTIUS'S APPEAL TO AMERICA

The appeal made to the people of the United States by Dr. Curtius, the broad-minded and progressive statesman who has succeeded Dr. Stresemann as German Foreign Minister, which appeal was so fully reported in *The Times* of June 22, is the most important happening in the field of international relations since M. Briand proposed to us his now famous appeal of April 6, 1927, which resulted in the Pact of Paris to renounce war as an instrument of national policy.

Dr. Curtius speaks for the New Germany, which is committed to peace, to economic development, to scientific and intellectual progress and to increasingly close international relations not only with her neighbors in Europe but with the world. Germany may be counted on with perfect confidence to be one of the strongest and most eager supporters of M. Briand's plan for a closer union of the peoples and governments of Europe.

In his address to the people of the United States, Dr. Curtius committed Germany to "a peace secured not by military armaments but by justice, good-will and reciprocal, sincere, understanding. We desire such a peace," he said, "not as a nation unfit or loath to bear arms. We desire it as men who know how to fight—I myself served at the front for more than four years—but who have come to understand that there are other ways for settling international controversies than by letting an inferno loose over humanity."

These are splendid and epoch-marking words. Dr. Curtius gives them new strength and new application by adding: "We stand unreservedly for the peaceful settlement of every kind of conflict between states. And having ourselves, in spite of all rumors to the contrary, completely disarmed, following the Treaty of Versailles, we strongly insist upon an all-around reduction to the minimum of all military establishments and preparations for war, which are always a potential danger to the peace of the world."

Not only so, but Dr. Curtius proposes to prepare for a peaceful world by studying the bases of peace, the methods of peace, the institutions of peace. To this end there will be founded in Berlin as a memorial to the late Dr. Stresemann an Academy of Peace, the like of which has not heretofore been seen in this world. This Academy will have the three-fold task of publishing international research work in various languages, of making scientific investigation into the ways and means of organizing a just and peaceful order of international politics, and the education of public opinion through the press, the universities and other institutions of learning.

In this great enterprise Dr. Curtius invites the cooperation of the American people, and that he should have it quickly and generously goes without saying. It is understood that M. Briand in France and Prime Minister Ramsay Macdonald in Great Britain have given their cordial approval to this new undertaking in Berlin, which will start under the best possible auspices and at a most fortunate moment in the history of the

modern world. It is no small pleasure and satisfaction to commend this undertaking most earnestly to the American people and to ask for it their cordial sympathy and support.

France spoke her intention to walk the path of peace by the voice of M. Briand on April 6, 1927, and now Germany adds her potent and significant voice to the same end and for the same high purpose on June 21, 1930. Surely the world is moving on toward a new and higher plane of international morals and international co-operation.

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LA DOTATION CARNEGIE POUR LA PAIX INTERNATIONALE

French version of a speech made at the dinner in honor of the American Ambassador given by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace at the Hotel Plaza-Athénée, Paris, July 2, 1925

LA DOTATION CARNEGIE POUR LA PAIX INTERNATIONALE

Il y a quinze ans que M. Andrew Carnegie écrivit une lettre tout à fait extraordinaire et offrit à un groupe de 27 amis soigneusement choisis, une somme de 10.000.000 de dollars dont les arrérages devaient être employés, à leur discrétion, en faveur de la cause de la Paix Internationale et pour supprimer la guerre. C'était là un très noble rêve d'un esprit supérieur qui voulait faire ce qu'il pouvait pour aider son prochain et améliorer la civilisation du monde. C'était si bien un rêve que, dans cette lettre, M. Carnegie déclarait que si le but espéré était atteint, et que la guerre fut supprimée, les Trustees devraient alors examiner les autres maux qui attireraient leur attention. C'est là une alternative devant laquelle, je le crains, les Trustees n'ont pas grande chance de se trouver. Il est assez curieux de constater que M. Carnegie, qui était un homme pratique, fut convaincu qu'il n'y aurait plus de grande guerre; il pouvait encore y avoir, à son sens, des conflits entre quelques petits états voisins ou leurs dépendants, mais il était persuadé que la civilisation du monde ne verrait plus les grandes guerres du passé. Or, le Conseil d'Administration de la Dotation Carnegie avait à peine eu le temps de s'organiser et de trouver les formules nécessaires pour résoudre les problèmes posés devant lui, qu'éclatait la plus grande guerre que l'histoire ait jamais connue, sans le moindre avertissement, du moins, pour le grand public.

Une triste circonstance, généralement peu connue, c'est que M. Andrew Carnegie fut une des premières victimes de la guerre. La nouvelle des hostilités lui brisa le cœur et porta un coup mortel à son rêve le plus cher. Il perdit tout intérêt à la vie et il est mort victime de cette formidable déception.

Ses Trustees, qui jouissaient de sa confiance, avaient été choisis au nombre des hommes mêlés aux grandes affaires: des juristes, diplomates, fonctionnaires publics, savants. Ils abordèrent leur tâche aussi bien avec un sentiment de dévouement absolu qu'avec l'esprit le plus pratique. Ils en vinrent bientôt à la conclusion unanime que la forme d'activité qui serait la plus futile serait de poursuivre ce que l'on appelait la campagne pacifique. Il existait un certain nombre de sociétés qui luttaient contre la loi ordinaire de la nature humaine, contre les nécessités de la vie économique et sociale: c'était là imposer des limites aux aspects les plus élevés du patriotisme et non pas s'intéresser suffisamment aux grandes questions nationales. Une agitation de ce genre ne pouvait que multiplier les chances de guerre, au lieu de les empêcher.

C'est alors que les Trustees résolurent de se proposer deux objectifs principaux:

1° Instruire l'opinion publique du monde civilisé, renseigner chaque Nation sur le caractère, l'histoire, les intérêts, le tempérament et les ambitions des autres, tâcher de provoquer une sorte de pénétration internationale, de promouvoir les échanges intellectuels, les visites d'études des professeurs et des étudiants, de rapprocher les hommes de science, les juristes et les

hommes d'affaires, de veiller à ce que les petites nations soient aussi bien représentées que les grandes, qu'on fasse appel à leur sentiment d'amour-propre et qu'elles se sentent membres, à titre égal, de la famille des nations.

On devait mesurer les nations non pas au chiffre de leur population, mais tenir compte de leurs traditions et de leur unité. C'est ainsi qu'on fut amené à créer un département des relations intellectuelles et de l'éducation.

2° Les Trustees se rendirent compte que si quelque chose pouvait remplacer la force dans le règlement des difficultés internationales, c'était dans la justice qu'on le trouverait, et la justice formulée en loi. Ainsi fut créée la section de droit international, à la tête de laquelle fut placé mon distingué ami, le Dr James Brown Scott. Cet organisme devait coopérer de toutes les manières possibles avec les nations d'Europe et d'Amérique, par l'intermédiaire des juristes qui seraient chargés de formuler des règles internationales et de créer des tribunaux pour les appliquer.

3° En troisième lieu fut créé le département des sciences historiques et économiques, qui se propose, par la collaboration des savants et des écrivains, de faire des recherches sur les leçons historiques et économiques à tirer des guerres du passé.

Ces différents départements s'organisèrent du mieux qu'ils purent; celui du droit international se mit étroitement en rapports avec l'Institut International de Droit et l'Institut Américain, et il a joué un rôle primordial dans la publication d'œuvres de référence de biblio-

thèques de droit international, de publications sur les conventions de La Haye, sur les tribunaux d'arbitrage et sur différentes décisions juridiques que les savants avaient intérêt à connaître. C'est aussi par ses soins que furent rendues possibles les réunions annuelles, en été, de l'Académie de Droit International de La Haye. Les cours, qui durent pendant huit semaines, sont suivis par deux cents à trois cents étudiants et professeurs de tous les pays, qui peuvent ainsi retourner chez eux après avoir rafraîchi et augmenté leurs connaissances.

Le département des relations intellectuelles et de l'éducation avait eu la bonne fortune d'avoir à sa tête en Europe feu le baron d'Estournelles de Constant qui, avec Léon Bourgeois, était le délégué principal de la France aux Conférences de La Haye. C'était un ami qui jouissait de la confiance de M. Andrew Carnegie. Il devait organiser l'œuvre de la Fondation en Europe, et il y avait réussi dans une certaine mesure, lorsque la guerre éclata. Une guerre qui a duré cinq ans ne permettait plus de parler de paix sans victoire: cela aurait été un outrage aux peuples libres. Mais vint la paix avec la victoire: ce fut aussi le triomphe de la Justice qui doit être à la base de la véritable paix. Depuis, les cinq années qui ont suivi l'armistice ont été remplies de telles complications, de difficultés économiques et politiques, qu'il a été, en fait, impossible d'élaborer quoi que ce soit de précis; et notre ami a quitté cette terre, laissant derrière lui les regrets de ses amis et la mémoire des services rendus.

Au mois de février dernier, une Commission des Trustees fut nommée pour étudier la situation d'en-

sembie, voir ce qu'il restait à faire, et examiner s'il était nécessaire d'avoir recours à de nouvelles méthodes. Cette Commission s'est mise sincèrement à l'œuvre. Elle travaille, mais il faudra du temps. Elle se propose d'envoyer un de ses membres pour expliquer ses buts à la Chine, au Japon et à l'Australie, d'en envoyer un autre visiter les états de l'Amérique du Sud et de se mettre en rapports avec les hommes d'affaires, les principaux journalistes, pour leur dire ce que nous faisons et leur demander ce qui, à leur sens, reste à faire. De même, un représentant des Trustees se rendra dans l'Europe Orientale et Méridionale, à Vienne, en Autriche-Hongrie, dans les Balkans, à Angora, pour obtenir des éclaircissements et recueillir des avis.

Ce sont ces mêmes objectifs que je me suis proposés en venant en France, en Suisse et en Angleterre pour consulter les principales personnalités des trois pays.

En d'autres termes, nous prenons le problème très au sérieux, mais vous remarquerez que certaines limites nous sont imposées. Nous sommes une organisation privée; nous n'avons aucune des responsabilités ou des obligations des gouvernants, mais nous avons nos devoirs propres.—Nous ne devons pas intervenir dans l'œuvre des gouvernements, nous devons nous tenir à l'écart des discussions diplomatiques entre les nations, y compris la nôtre, ainsi que de leurs débats sur la politique intérieure. Si on nous invite à entrer dans la controverse, nous refuserons en faisant remarquer que notre œuvre consiste à enseigner aux mondes civilisés toutes ces choses qui peuvent nous aider l'un et l'autre, et à habituer l'opinion publique à faire reposer ses re-

vendications sur le droit, au lieu de s'en remettre à la force. Nous n'entrons dans aucune discussion, nous ne prenons part à aucun différend, nous n'avons aucun système à mettre en avant, nous n'avons rien à faire avec les discussions internationales, ni la sécurité de telle ou telle nation particulière. Nous laissons de côté ces discussions platoniques, et nous voulons être d'énergiques réalistes. Notre œuvre est sans doute exposée à deux sortes de critiques:

1° D'abord celle qui vient de tous les sceptiques, qui n'ont aucune confiance dans les bons éléments de la nature humaine, et s'attendent ou continuent toujours à se livrer bataille. Ces gens-là nous appellent des rêveurs, des théoriciens, des idéalistes. Cela ne nous effraie pas; nous aimons nos rêves et nous sommes épris d'idéal.

2° Nous sommes l'objet de critiques assez vives de la part de ceux qui croient à l'efficacité des vœux et des résolutions destinés à finir toutes les guerres. Nous regrettons de ne pas croire à cette méthode, et de ne pouvoir accorder de larges subventions à des gens qui se réunissent simplement pour voter la suppression de la guerre.—Je remarque d'ailleurs qu'il n'y a pas en Europe grand enthousiasme pour cette méthode, après l'expérience qu'on vient d'en faire aux États-Unis avec d'autres problèmes d'ordre social.

Nous entendons dire aussi quelquefois que nous gaspillons notre argent à publier des ouvrages de droit, d'instruction civique, etc. . . . Ces reproches ne nous paraissent pas justifiés. Ce que nous cherchons à obtenir, c'est l'intelligente sympathie et l'appui de ceux

qui sont à la tête de l'opinion publique en France, en Allemagne, en Italie, en Grande-Bretagne, en Amérique et en Asie, et il est bien entendu que nous leur sommes reconnaissants de leurs suggestions et de leurs critiques.

A Paris notre organisation est déjà forte grâce à la prévoyance du baron d'Estournelles de Constant, qui avait pu acheter un très bel hôtel qui est pour nous un excellent quartier général.—Nous venons de terminer la réorganisation de notre personnel. Le Dr. Earle B. Babcock, de New-York, devient le directeur-adjoint pour l'Europe; près de lui se trouvera un conseil de douze ou treize membres: quatre Français, deux Anglais, un Suisse, un Belge, un Allemand, un Autrichien, un Italien, et un ou deux qui restent encore à désigner. Ce Conseil jouira de la plus grande autorité et aura une importante responsabilité; rien ne sera fait en Europe sans son avis. Nous mettons le plus grand espoir dans leur collaboration.—La Présidence de ce Comité sera confiée à M. Appell, recteur de l'Université de Paris.

Telle est, Messieurs, la situation actuelle. Tous nos efforts seront consacrés à développer cette œuvre édifiée près de la ligne de front, où nos frères et nos fils ont donné leur vie pour la cause de la civilisation et de la justice.

Nous ferons de notre mieux malgré les difficultés qu'on rencontre encore dans une Europe et dans un univers qui n'ont pas retrouvé leur entier équilibre, après les troubles profonds qui les ont compromis. Si ardus que soient ces problèmes, nous sommes en route vers une solution, et cette solution nous ne l'atteindrons que par l'assistance et la bonne volonté de tous. Nous

le ferons par nos propres forces, en faisant appel au dévouement des individus et sans essayer de superposer notre œuvre à celle des gouvernements. Nous le ferons sans chercher à imposer des limites aux nationalités, sans chercher à tout fusionner en un seul organisme, mais au contraire nous laisserons s'exprimer la fleur du caractère individuel. Il me revient à l'esprit un mot fameux d'Aristote:

« L'homme est un animal politique ».

Le philosophe voulait dire qu'il faut à l'homme des institutions pour vivre au milieu de ses compagnons, et il ajoute qu'une nation, elle, est une entité politique, qu'elle ne peut pas vivre seule, qu'elle dépend d'une série de relations morales et sociales avec tous ses voisins. Par conséquent, la seule route qui nous soit ouverte, si nous voulons être sages et patriotiques, c'est de faire comprendre aux nations qu'elles dépendent les unes des autres. Et pour cela nous nous adresserons aux jeunes générations. La route est longue encore; il se peut qu'un siècle s'écoule avant que les membres du conseil d'administration aient à envisager l'alternative que leur offrait M. Andrew Carnegie. Mais après tout, une période d'un siècle ne compte guère dans la vie civilisée; elle ne nous paraîtra pas trop longue si nous nous rappelons les premières luttes et les désastres qu'a dû traverser l'humanité, avant de réussir à élever le niveau de la pensée et de la vie pour la masse des hommes.

Pour approcher du but, il suffit de supposer que, par

exemple, l'Amérique du Nord et l'Amérique du Sud se mettent d'accord sur la solution des difficultés qui peuvent se poser entre elles. Imaginons que les grandes nations suivent cet exemple: les perspectives de guerre se trouveraient refoulées, et les chances d'hostilités grandement diminuées. Quand nous aurons appris ainis à résoudre ces problèmes en faisant appel à ce qu'il y a de meilleur et de plus élevé dans la nature humaine, alors nous ne serons pas loin d'avoir atteint notre but.

Je vous remercie, Messieurs, de la courtoisie avec laquelle vous m'avez écouté et de l'honneur que vous m'avez fait de vous joindre à moi pour recevoir notre Ambassadeur.

XXI

LE PACTE FRANCO-AMÉRICAIN

French version of an Address before the American Club in Paris, June 16, 1927, published in *L'Esprit International*, Paris, July, 1927

LE PACTE FRANCO-AMÉRICAIN

Tous ici—et combien de milliers de personnes ailleurs ! —nous sommes encore dans l'enthousiasme causé par une grande expérience humaine et sous le coup de la noble émotion que cette expérience a fait naître dans son sillage. Ce fut la bonne fortune de notre temps et de notre génération d'accueillir le Christophe Colomb des airs, de ce Lindbergh qui a créé, avec sa jeunesse, avec son habileté, avec son courage, un lien nouveau, solide et à l'épreuve du temps entre la France et les États-Unis.

Dans son exploit, si remarquable à tous les points de vue, et aussi bien dans notre tristesse et notre sympathie pour ces autres vaillants jeunes gens, qui ont entrepris un voyage semblable et qui peut-être sont maintenant parvenus à cette terre au delà des limites de laquelle tout voyage est sans retour, nous nous trouvons réunis dans des voies et par des moyens qui marquent hautement dans la vie des hommes et des nations. Des mois et des années de discussion et d'exhortation n'auraient pu atteindre à pareil résultat. La puissance inéluctable du sentiment, l'influence exaltante de l'émotion commune n'ont jamais été plus clairement et exactement révélées dans toute notre histoire qu'elles ne viennent de l'être par cet événement inoubliable. Je ne puis y faire allusion et passer ensuite à ce que j'ai dessein de vous dire d'une façon plus détaillée sans exprimer une fois de plus la profonde satisfaction que

tout Américain ressent à constater que, dans un moment comme celui-ci, et quand il aurait fallu si peu de chose pour que tous les plans fussent bouleversés, ce fut la clairvoyance, la sympathie humaine et la connaissance de la France de l'ambassadeur Herrick qui ont conduit ces événements à la plus heureuse des conclusions.

Il y a deux sujets que j'ai toujours soin d'éviter lorsqu'il m'arrive de parler dans un autre pays que le mien; le premier est la politique américaine, le second la politique du pays où je me trouve. Vous conviendrez que ces limites que je me suis librement imposées ont leurs avantages. Elles peuvent aussi peut-être avoir leurs tentations et leurs dangers. Mais le sujet dont je veux parler très brièvement aujourd'hui, touche à des problèmes qui affectent sérieusement et profondément à la fois la France et les État-Unis et, à travers ces deux nations, le monde d'aujourd'hui et de demain. Car, Messieurs, que nous le veuillons ou non, la génération à laquelle nous appartenons est en train d'écrire une des plus importantes pages dans l'histoire de la civilisation moderne. Le monde a traversé ce que j'appellerai la «ligne de partage des eaux» dans son histoire aux environs de l'année 1890. Ce fut à ce moment que des forces, des tendances et des mouvements, qui avaient existé depuis longtemps, semblèrent avoir atteint leur point culminant et avoir donné naissance à de nouvelles forces, de nouvelles tendances, de nouveaux mouvements, produits de la pensée et des changements économiques, sociaux et politiques de la dernière partie du XIX^e^ siècle. Nous nous trouvons donc, avant tout,

confrontés par une série de problèmes qui sont si nombreux, si complexes, si pleins de difficultés qu'ils se présentent comme une épreuve pour la capacité des hommes d'État les plus avertis du monde. Plus clairement que cela n'a jamais eu lieu auparavant dans l'histoire, nous assistons aujourd'hui à une mixture des éléments économiques, financiers, industriels, sociaux et politiques telle qu'il est tout à fait impossible de commencer l'étude des problèmes d'intérêt public d'aujourd'hui sans donner quelque attention à chacune de ces forces en mouvement.

Le monde se trouva, après la grande guerre, lancé dans une expérience entièrement nouvelle. Ce monde découvrit que la guerre était devenue maintenant une entreprise de si grande envergure et pouvant avoir tant de répercussions qu'elle n'était plus seulement une affaire de soldats et de marins, de canons et de bateaux, mais qu'elle était un concours d'intelligences armées avec toutes les ressources économiques, industrielles et sociales des temps modernes. En d'autres termes, nous avons découvert que, dans la guerre d'aujourd'hui, il n'y a plus de non-combattants au sens strict du mot, car chaque être humain doit participer directement ou indirectement au combat.

Nous avons tous, tant que nous sommes, intérêt à faire tout ce qui est pratiquement et patriotiquement au pouvoir de l'homme de faire pour écarter à tout jamais, s'il est possible, et, en tout cas, pour une aussi longue période de temps qu'il se pourra, toute répétition de cette calamité, ou tout ce qui pourrait ressembler à la destruction dont nous avons été témoins au

cours de ces horribles années. Le monde s'est organisé lui-même pour la paix: et nous donnons—sûrement chacun de nous donne—la plus grande attention au développement lent mais sûr de l'habitude de la coopération internationale en vue de résoudre les problèmes délicats dans des discussions amicales, habitude qui caractérise les débats de la Société des Nations à Genève. Puisse cette méthode devenir plus forte, apporter plus d'aide et avoir plus de succès dans ses conclusions à mesure que les années passeront. Mais en addition à cette entreprise formelle de Genève, il s'est produit un grand fait, celui que le monde a salué comme la naissance de «L'Esprit de Locarno». Ce terme est devenu une formule habituelle: et le problème de demain est de savoir, comment et par quel moyen nous pourrons étendre l'esprit de Locarno de telle façon qu'il puisse embrasser des champs d'influence plus vastes et plus éloignés. Cet esprit sera toujours associé au nom du grand Français, Aristide Briand, qui lui restera à jamais uni dans l'histoire des relations internationales.

Quel rôle peut jouer l'Amérique pour étendre l'esprit de Locarno? L'opinion publique américaine a décidé que nous n'entrerions pas formellement dans la Société des Nations: mais chaque semaine qui passe montre mieux que la coopération entre la Société des Nations et ses divers ressorts, d'un côté, et les organes et les agents du gouvernement américain et de l'opinion américaine, de l'autre côté, se multiplie aussi heureusement et aussi efficacement qu'on pouvait l'espérer.

Que peut l'Amérique pour faire apprécier au loin l'esprit de Locarno? Nous voyons d'excellentes per-

sonnes, douées, à n'en pas douter, des meilleures intentions du monde, et qui souhaitent de voir le Congrès américain adopter une résolution qui mettra la guerre hors la loi. Monsieur le Président, nous pourrions tout aussi bien, n'est-il pas vrai, voter une résolution qui mettrait hors la loi l'orgueil, la vaine gloire et l'hypocrisie, ainsi que le commande le manuel des prières.

On ne pourra se débarrasser de la guerre par une résolution. On ne pourra se débarrasser de la guerre que par l'habitude de vivre et de progresser sans elle; et cette habitude sera prise d'abord par les nations qui voient plus loin dans l'avenir et auxquelles les leçons du passé ont enseigné davantage.

C'est sans doute avec une telle pensée dans l'esprit que M. Briand a adressé, à l'occasion du dixième anniversaire de l'entrée des États-Unis dans la grande guerre, sa proposition, d'une si rare importance, à l'opinion publique américaine. Cette proposition a été très favorablement reçue aux États-Unis. Tous les organes de l'opinion publique dirigés, si l'on peut dire, par le grand journal présidé par mon honorable ami M. Ochs, tous les organes de l'opinion publique, en Nouvelle-Angleterre, dans le Moyen-Ouest, dans le Sud-Ouest, dans le Sud et sur la côte du Pacifique et, tout de même, de nombreuses associations d'hommes et de femmes intelligents, ont accueilli cette proposition avec enthousiasme; et ce fut à ce moment—coïncidence des plus heureuses—que se produisit le voyage ailé du capitaine Lindbergh qui vint en quelque sorte mettre un cadre au tableau.

Qu'aurions-nous pu faire en réponse à la proposition

de M. Briand? Quelque chose, si je puis dire, très simple, très court, très clair, et tel que n'importe quel homme ou femme intelligents en pourraient saisir nettement le sens. Nous devrions être prêts à faire trois choses:

D'abord à déclarer que la France et les États-Unis s'engagent *hic et nunc* à renoncer finalement à la guerre comme instrument de politique publique entre eux. Voici ce que cela signifie: que la France et les États-Unis poursuivront désormais leurs affaires internationales, leurs discussions internationales, leurs négociations internationales en dehors de toute pensée qu'une guerre entre eux pourrait jamais intervenir comme moyen de solution dans n'importe laquelle de ces occurrences.

En second lieu, il est important que les États-Unis reconnaissent le progrès notable accompli par les accords de Locarno quand pour la première fois ceux-ci ont défini la guerre agressive. Dans le passé toute guerre a toujours été une guerre défensive—du moins du point de vue de ceux qui l'avaient commencée. Mais les accords de Locarno définissent l'agression: et ils dénoncent également la nation qui, après s'être engagée selon le pacte de Locarno à soumettre tous les différends à la justice arbitrale ou à les porter devant les Cour Permanente de Justice Internationale, attaque néanmoins une autre nation sans avoir accompli ces formalités. C'est là une définition que personne ne peut mal comprendre. Elle s'adresse au sens moral du monde. Désormais aucune nation ne pourra s'ériger elle-même en juge et dire «si je ne vous fais pas la guerre, c'est vous qui me ferez la guerre demain.»

En troisième lieu, nous devons être prêts à dire—et ceci est un nouveau pas en avant dans le droit international—que, dans le cas d'une guerre agressive, aucun de nous ne viendra en aide à l'agresseur sous le couvert de la neutralité.

C'est tout, Monsieur le Président. Trois brefs paragraphes de cinq lignes chacun qui pourraient être appris par cœur par les enfants des écoles et reproduits chaque jour en tête d'une colonne de journal.

Mais pourquoi un traité à ce sujet entre la France et les États-Unis? Il n'y a aucun danger de guerre entre eux.—C'est là précisément la raison. Un tel traité est aussi inutile qu'une résolution pour mettre la guerre hors la loi s'il n'est pas fondé sur la conviction publique que son but et son dessein sont approuvés par l'opinion publique. L'opinion publique d'abord, et la loi ensuite; et vous éviterez ainsi de vous révolter contre la loi. La loi d'abord et l'opinion publique ensuite; et vous vivrez sous un règne de banditisme.

La guerre fut mise hors la loi entre l'Allemagne et la Belgique par le traité de 1831, mais ce traité resta lettre morte en août 1914 parce que l'opinion publique en Allemagne n'était pas derrière ses clauses. Le moment propice pour établir un nouveau statut légal chez une nation ou entre des nations est quand l'opinion publique est parvenue au point qu'une nouvelle déclaration ne fait plus que refléter et exprimer le sentiment de ces nations. La France et les États-Unis auront, par leur accord, établi un standard auquel les meilleures et les plus sages parmi les nations devront ensuite se référer. Dès que la prochaine nation sera prête à ac-

cepter ces vues, qu'elle se joigne à nous! Quand la suivante sera prête, qu'elle vienne aussi! Mais que l'on s'assure d'abord que l'opinion publique est avec elle; car c'est seulement dans ce cas que l'acte sera durable. Si nous pouvons faire cela, Messieurs, nous offrirons une interprétation des résultats de la grande guerre que tout le monde pourra aisément comprendre. Nous donnerons un exemple qui pourra être imité et suivi par les autres; et nous rendrons ceux qui ne sont pas encore prêts à le suivre honteux d'eux-mêmes et inquiets de leur retard.

En parlant des relations de la France et des États-Unis aujourd'hui et demain, j'ai plaisir à saisir maintenant l'occasion qui nous a été si heureusement offerte par M. Briand d'étendre l'esprit de Locarno dans une déclaration qui se résume dans ces trois points: la renonciation à la guerre entre nous comme instrument de politique, l'acceptation de la définition de l'agression telle qu'elle a été donnée à Locarno, et la déclaration publique qu'aucun de nous ne donnera son aide à l'agresseur.

Il y maintenant une autre question dont j'aimerais à vous entretenir très brièvement. La France, la Grande-Bretagne et les États-Unis, et les autres nations qui ont suivi leur sillage, mais particulièrement, la France, la Grande-Bretagne et les États-Unis, reposent sur une fondation commune de principes politiques. Nos gouvernements, notre ordre social et politique sont tous le produit d'une seule et même philosophie de la vie et du gouvernement. C'est ce que nous appelons le libéralisme démocratique. Nous avons vécu, tous

tant que nous sommes, pendant près de deux cents ans, sur l'idée que les principes fondamentaux de cette philosophie étaient solides, que tout ce que nous avions à faire était de les perfectionner dans leur application et d'enseigner aux nouvelles générations à pratiquer les idéaux que nous professons: nous avons cru que, par là, le gouvernement deviendrait peu à peu plus facile et plus simple, la vie plus satisfaisante, plus heureuse, plus saine et offrant plus d'opportunités de travail: nous avons toujours admis que les occasions se multiplieraient de donner libre cours à ces expressions et à ces perfections de l'esprit qui sont la littérature, la science, l'art, la philosophie et la théologie. Nous avons tenu tout cela pour une fois acquis; nous l'avons écrit dans nos constitutions; nous l'avons inscrit dans nos statuts. Maintenant cependant, alors que le XX^e^ siècle est depuis longtemps en marche, nous trouvons toute notre théorie fondamentale attaquée dans des termes nullement vagues, attaquée non seulement en théorie, mais attaquée en pratique. On nous dit que tout ce que nous avons fait depuis deux cents ou deux cent cinquante ans est faux, sans importance, et que tout cela doit être balayé au loin, afin de faire place à une nouvelle, étrange et contradictoire philosophie de la vie et du gouvernement. Voici quelque cent ans qu'on a commencé à nous parler de cela. La littérature s'est amusée à présenter ces rêveries d' une façon attrayante pendant toute cette période. Aujourd'hui pourtant, et depuis les quinze dernières années elles se sont emparées de l'intelligence et de l'activité d'un assez grand nombre de gens pour déterminer un mouvement

que nous ne pouvons plus ignorer dans notre vie moderne. C'est ce mouvement que, faute d'un meilleur nom, nous appelons le communisme. Ce qu'il y a de curieux au sujet du communisme, c'est que ce que son nom suggère est précisément ce qu'il ne donne pas. Il n'est pas dans l'intérêt général ou commun. C'est au contraire une forme du contrôle de classe fondée sur la théorie que, pour ce contrôle de classe, il doit y avoir restriction ou abolition de l'initiative individuelle, de la propriété privée, des droits individuels, dans un intérêt plus haut et plus général.

Nous avons cru à la théorie d'après laquelle le seul vrai moyen de servir le public était de donner à chaque homme une chance, une chance égale devant la loi, et de le protéger dans son activité, dans ses justes gains, puis de l'élever à un esprit et à un idéal qui le rendent capable de plus hauts et de plus féconds services à sa génération et à l'humanité.

On nous dit maintenant que c'est là une théorie erronnée. Nous devons être tous enchaînés, nous devons apprendre de quelqu'un d'autre ce que nous devons faire et quelles limites doivent être mises à notre activité: il paraît que c'est de cette manière seulement que le monde progressera plus heureusement et selon une plus grande justice.

Je ne voudrais pas paraître extravagant; mais si je considère l'histoire et la connaissance de la nature humaine, je ne puis m'empêcher de croire que tout ceci est pure absurdité. Cela en effet ne signifierait rien de moins que le retour en arrière de l'humanité jusqu'au tout début de la civilisation. Le genre humain s'est

échappé du communisme voici quelque cinq à six mille ans parce qu'il n'y avait pour lui aucun progrès possible s'il ne s'en échappait, aucune grande œuvre, aucune satisfaction, aucun bonheur, aucun développement, aucune découverte, aucun nouveau mouvement de vie ou de pensée. C'est un sujet trop vaste et trop compliqué pour que je puisse le traiter maintenant, mais ce sur quoi je veux insister est ceci: ceux d'entre nous—particulièrement ces grands états démocratiques occidentaux, la France, la Grande-Bretagne, les États-Unis—qui ont un fondement politique commun, se présentent comme les chefs responsables, devant le genre humain et devant l'histoire, de la civilisation que nous avons héritée: et la question qui se pose à nous est la suivante: Devons-nous protéger notre gouvernement et notre responsabilité de gouvernants, et rendre clair, si clair que le plus ignorant devra le comprendre, que la route que nous avons choisie est la vraie voie du progrès, la voie de la justice, la voie du service et la voie de l'opportunité? En d'autres termes, nous devons rendre clair que la liberté, si durement gagnée, n'a pas encore accompli tout son travail et ne l'accomplira jamais, mais qu'elle ne peut pas et qu'elle ne doit pas se soumettre à aucune théorie de la vie ou du gouvernement qui enchaînerait d'une façon quelconque le corps humain, l'énergie humaine ou l'esprit humain.

Mais, Messieurs, si l'Angleterre, la France et l'Amérique s'unissent et font leur devoir de chefs, ainsi que ces temps le réclament, nous devons imposer au monde la conviction que nous sommes entièrement loyaux à nos idéaux propres et à nos propres principes, que nous

ne permettrons pas qu'on les oublie, ou qu'on en abuse, et que nous serons toujours en éveil et prêts à les défendre. Rien n'augmente autant un mal parmi les hommes que la persécution. Ne persécutez pas; lancez un appel et persuadez.

Un terrain d'entente commun s'offre ici à la France et aux États-Unis, dans leurs divers territoires et dans leurs diverses sphères de gouvernement. L'occasion est venue pour nous et pour notre génération de montrer une communauté d'intérêt, une communauté de connaissances, une communauté de buts, une méthode commune, effective et capable de rendre la démocratie si efficace, si persuasive, si juste et si abondante en occasions de toutes sortes qu'elle dira sa propre histoire et écartera les attaques portées contre elle, de quelque source qu'elles viennent.

J'ai plaisir à rappeler qu'il y a eu deux hommes qui connaissaient bien ce qui se passait en France aux jours où la France moderne était en train de se faire. J'ai plaisir à rappeler que, lorsque l'Assemblée nationale se réunit à Versailles, un homme de non moindre autorité que Thomas Jefferson se trouvait dans une tribune. J'imagine qu'il se prit à sourire quand il entendit prononcer à cette assemblée les phrases même qu'il avait écrites dans la déclaration de l'Indépendance. C'était les deux faces d'une seule et même médaille, les deux interprétations d'une seule et même théorie de gouvernement et de vie: et c'est assurément une coïncidence intéressante que Jefferson, dont la plume a écrit la déclaration de l'Indépendance, put se trouver là et écouter les débats de l'Assemblée Nationale qui donnait

son appui à ces mêmes doctrines. Enfin, ce que beaucoup d'entre nous oublient souvent c'est que la formule familière «Liberté, Égalité, Fraternité» gravée sur tous les monuments publics en France, ne fut pas découverte accidentellement. Elle fut employée d'abord par Voltaire dans un message au peuple Américain, et dont il chargea Benjamin Franklin.

Ainsi, Monsieur le Président, les liens historiques sont là. L'expérience commune, les arrière-plans communs, les sentiments communs, la compréhension commune—tout cela est là.

Et maintenant, si nous tournons nos yeux vers l'avenir, il nous paraîtra que c'est à la France et aux États-Unis, conscients de leur place dans le monde du XX^e^ siècle, conscients de leur responsabilité envers l'histoire et envers l'avenir, amis et camarades à l'épreuve, c'est à ces deux grandes nations qu'il appartient aujourd'hui d'accomplir tels progrès et de promouvoir tels standards qui pourront faire régner la paix et le bonheur dans le monde en même temps qu'ils rendront plus pure et plus riche la démocratie, fruit de notre effort commun et de notre foi commune.

XXII

IMPONDERABILIEN

Eine Rede gehalten vor dem Deutschen Reichstage in Berlin
am 30. April 1930

IMPONDERABILIEN

"— — das ganze Gewicht der Imponderabilien, die viel schwerer wiegen als die materiellen Gewichte — —"

Reichskanzler Fürst von Bismarck im Reichstag, 6. Februar 1888. (Stenographische Berichte über die Verhandlungen des Reichstags, II. Session, 1887–88—S.732.)

The invisible and imponderable is the sole fact—
("Das Unsichtbare und Unwägbare ist das einzige Tatsächliche")

Ralph Waldo Emerson (1854) in *Letters and Social Aims:—Poetry and Imagination* (Works, Centenary Edition; Boston and New York, 1904, p. 18).

After all, it is the imponderables that move the world,—heat, electricity, love—
("Es sind schliesslich die Imponderabilien, die die Welt bewegen,—Wärme, Elektrizität, Liebe")

Oliver Wendell Holmes (1858) in *The Autocrat of the Breakfast Table* (Boston, Houghton, Mifflin and Company, 1900, pp. 135–36).

In dieser Stunde und in so erlauchter Gegenwart ist es unmöglich anders zu sprechen als tief bewegt. Die Erinnerung malt so lebendig als wäre es gestern gewesen, den Tag, an dem vor nun mehr als fünfundvierzig Jahren ein junger amerikanischer Student zuerst in Berlin eintraf, wissensdurstig und beflissen, seinen Anteil

zu empfangen von dem Gelehrtentume und der inspirierenden Kraft, die in jenen halkyonischen Tagen die Berliner Universität dem Fremden bot. Und dieses, sein Erlebnis ist ihm unvergesslich geblieben.

Der greise, vielgeliebte Kaiser, das leibhaftige Symbol einer Ordnung, die eines Tages dahingehen sollte, erwiderte huldvoll von seinem Sitz am Schlossfenster den Gruss des amerikanischen Studenten, der allmorgendlich quer über den Schlossplatz und zwischen den Statuen der beiden Humboldts hindurch seiner Bank im Hörsaal zuwanderte. Bismarck stand auf der Höhe seines Ruhmes und seines Einflusses, und war eine vertraute Gestalt im Leben der Hauptstadt. Liebknecht, Windthorst und Benningsen waren im Reichstag zu hören, und gar manches Mal sah man Unter den Linden die faszinierende Erscheinung des einzigen Mommsen. Geistige Grössen und grosse Persönlichkeiten allüberall. Leopold von Ranke war noch am Leben, wenn er auch nicht mehr las. Curtius und Vahlen, Helmholtz und Du Bois-Reymond, Wagner und Schmoller, Delbrück und Diels, Gneist und Heinrich von Treitschke, Zeller und Paulsen, standen alle und jeder im Brennpunkt des Interesses und hielten die Aufmerksamkeit gefangen. Vieles hat sich begeben in den langen, geschäftigen Jahren, die inzwischen gefolgt sind, aber von damals bis auf den heutigen Tag sind die Dankbarkeit für Alles, was deutsches Gelehrtentum und deutsche Kraft der Inspiration so freigebig gespendet haben, und eine ständig wachsende Wertschatzung all dessen, was diese einzigartige Erfahrung bedeutet hat, dominierende

Kräfte in dem Leben und Denken jenes jungen amerikanischen Studenten geblieben. Die Macht der Erinnerung ist ungreifbar.

Heute in diesem würdigen Saale und dieser hohen Umgebung seien darum die ersten Worte Worte des Dankes und dankerfüllter Wertschätzung für jene Studentenjahre hier in Berlin vor nun so langer, langer Zeit.

Hundertunddreiundzwanzig Jahre sind es her, dass sich hier in Berlin ein wahrhaft grosses Ereignis zugetragen hat. Nach den Nöten der napoleonischen Kriege und ihrem störenden Einfluss auf das Leben und die Gedankenwelt des Preussenvolkes musste unabwendlich eine neue Melodie ertönen, ein neuer Hieb geschlagen werden, ein Ruf zu neuer Tat sich erheben. Der Philosoph Fichte schien von der Vorsehung ausersehen für die grosse Aufgabe. An jedem Sonntag Abend vom Dezember 1807 bis zum März 1808 hielt er im gedrängten Auditorium seine berühmten Reden an die deutsche Nation. Umgeben von Feinden und ihren Spähern, das Leben selbst in Gefahr, erhob er seine mächtige Stimme zum Appell an das deutsche Volk, dass es sich erhebe zu neuer Höhe, neue Wege suche zu neuem Ziel und neue Pfade beschreite zu nationalem Wiederaufbau, nationaler Grösse und nationaler Vollendung. Diese aufrufenden Reden sind Meisterwerke moderner Beredtsamkeit. Um ihretwillen steht der Träger des Namens Johann Gottlieb Fichte ebenbürtig neben einem Perikles, Isokrates und Demosthenes, einem Cato und Cicero, Bossuet und Mirabeau, einem

Milton, Burke und Fox, einem Jefferson, Hamilton, Webster und Lincoln, als einer der unsterblichen Stimmenträger der Menschheit.

Fichte hat sehr wohl den grundlegenden Unterschied zwischen Nation und Staat verstanden. Sein erschütternder Appell suchte den Bau einer deutschen Nation auf geistigen und intellektuellen Fundamenten, stark genug, dass nichts sie zu erschüttern vermöchte. Die Wirkung dieser Reden war rasch und ungewöhnlich. Sie gewannen eine ungeheure Popularität und übten einen staunenswerten Einfluss aus. Seit Martin Luther hatte keine deutsche Stimme so mächtig und so überzeugend zu seinem Volke gesprochen. Als Philosoph und als Patriot bestand Fichte darauf, dass alle politischen Unterschiede, alle geographischen Scheidungen und wirtschaftlichen Gegensätze weichen müssten vor dem neuen Geist der Einigung des gesamten deutschen Volkes zur deutschen Nation, die bereit und willig sein sollte, all das Beste von dieses Volkes Geschichte und seinen Idealen wiederzuspiegeln und zum Ausdruck zu bringen. Auf Fichte als ihren Propheten und auf Bismarck als den konstruktiven Staatsmann führen wir den Aufbau einer warhaft deutschen Nation und schliesslich der geeinten Bundes- und Reichsregierung zurück. Eine ähnliche Entwicklung vollzog sich in Italien, wo Mazzini die Rolle eines Fichte, und Cavour die eines Bismarck spielte.

Wenn die amerikanische und die französische Revolution mit all dem, was sie bedeuteten und erwirkten, die hervorragenden politischen Ereignisse des acht-

zehnten Jahrhunderts gewesen sind, so waren gewisslich der Aufbau der deutschen und der Aufbau der italienischen Nation die beiden hervorragenden politischen Ereignisse des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts.

Die Blätter der Geschichte, auf denen diese gewaltigen Bewegungen verzeichnet stehen, legen Zeugnis ab von der Macht der Ideen. Die Herzen und Hirne der Menschheit waren ergriffen und bewegt von dem beredten Appell jener Redner und Philosophen, und die menschlichen Geschicke wurden haarscharf so geformt und gefügt, wie es eben diese Redner und Philosophen beschworen und vorausgesagt hatten. Die Macht der Beredtsamkeit und der Staatskunst ist ungreifbar.

Eine solche Nation, einmal geschaffen, selbstbewusst, stolz auf ihre Geschichte, reich an Kräften aller Art, in üppiger Fülle Wissenschaft und Schönen Künsten, Literatur und Musik, Philosophie und Pädagogik ihre Spenden reichend,—eine solche Nation, eifrig bedacht auf den Fortschritt der Forschung und rasch bei der Hand, neu entdeckte wissenschaftliche Wahrheiten und Erfindungen ins praktische Geschirr zu nehmen, welche Form des Lebens sollte sie sich zu eigen machen, welche Massnahmen sollte sie ergreifen zum Gewinn der grössten Glückseligkeit für ihr Volk, und wie sollte sie ihre Beziehungen gestalten zu den Nachbarn und der Welt überhaupt? Wir haben es gelernt von Rassen zu sprechen, von einer teutonischen Rasse, einer lateinischen, einer slavischen, einer monoglischen und wie vielen anderen noch. Wir sehen die Menschheit ge-

trennt in Gruppen von verschiedener Sprache, manche davon ungeheuerlich gross, und diese Gruppen wiederum aufgeteilt ohne Rücksicht auf Grösse oder geographische Lage je nach den unterschieden von Religion oder Kultus. Wo findet sich in diesem Labyrinth voll Mannigfaltigkeit und Zwiespalt ein Führer zu Einheit und Frieden? Oder sollen diese Mannigfaltigkeiten und Zwiespalte ungeleitet ihres Weges ziehen dürfen, ungehemmt, bis eines Tages die Wasser irgend einer neuen Sintflut steigen und alle Zivilisation hinwegschwemmen, bis dieser Planet erkaltet und erstarrt zu einer leblosen Erde, die ihr Dasein ausgespielt hat unter den Himmelskörpern und nur noch um ihre eigene Achse wirbelt, nichts weiter mehr als ein totes Gewicht zwischen den Sternen? Oder findet sich ein Pfad zur Einheit, zur Kameradschaft, zum Vertrauen, zu einem ständig gemeinsamen Rat, zu einem hochstrebenden Verbande, auf dass jene höchste Einheit der Menschen, die alle menschlichen Mannigfaltigkeiten grundlegend bestimmt, ihren gerechten und wohltätigen Ausdruck gewinnt?

Die Antwort darauf gibt eine deutsche Stimme und eine deutsche Feder. Die Antwort gibt Immanuel Kants unsterbliche Schrift *Zum ewigen Frieden*, erschienen zu Königsberg anno Siebzehnhundertfünfundneunzig, als Napoleon noch ganz am Anfang seiner Laufbahn stand, als das Amerika der Vereinigten Staaten noch in der Wiege lag, als niemand noch von einem einigen Italien träumte, als die Politik Talleyrands und Metternichs, die den Geist des achtzehnten

EVANGELICAL
SCHOOL OF THEOLOGY

Jahrhunderts weit in das neunzehnte hineintragen sollte, noch Zukunftspolitik war. Der gebieterische Intellekt und die hohe Sehergabe des Philosophen von Königsberg haben mit einfacher Bestimmtheit und ohne Umschweife auf den Pfad des Fortschritts gewiesen, den die zivilisierten Völker der Welt jetzt, und eben jetzt erst, zu betreten sich angeschickt haben. Welch ungeheuerlicher Zoll an Menschenleben und menschlichen Gütern, an menschlichem Leid, an Glück und Glückseligkeit von vier Generationen hat dafür gezahlt werden müssen, dass die ferne Stimme des Philosophen so lange ungehört blieb.

Kant sagt vom praktischen Politiker, dass er auf den theoretischen "mit grosser Selbstgefälligkeit als einen Schulweisen herabzusehen" sich befleissige. Dieser Ausspruch, wahr im Jahre 1795, ist noch genau so wahr im Jahre 1930. Der Praktiker, der vorgibt, den Denker zu verachten und selbst wenig oder gar keine Fähigkeit zum philosophischen Denken besitzt, sieht ständig mit scheelem Blick auf die Denkenden und macht sich über ihre Ratgeber lustig. Und bei alledem ist solcher Mann der Praxis doch stets, ganz ohne sich dessen bewusst zu werden, in den Fängen eines unsauberen, oberflächlichen, fehlerhaften Denkens. Je mehr er glaubt, es mit den greifbaren Dingen den Praxis und mit dem, was er praktische Erfahrung nennt, zu tun zu haben, um so mehr steht er in Wirklichkeit unter dem Einfluss ungreifbarer Gewalten, in diesem Falle von übler und schädlicher Art. Wenn man die letzten hundertundfünfunddreissig Jahre zu-

rückblickt, muss man gestehen, dass die Welt heute viel weiter gegangen wäre in ihrem Fortschritt, wenn die sogenannten politischen Praktiker, die die Geschicke der Nationen geleitet haben, fähig gewesen wären, die Lehren von Kants grosser Schrift zu verstehen und anzuwenden.

Es ist buchstäblich überraschend, wieviel von der tiefsten und wahrhaft besten Philosophie des modernen Völkerlebens bereits von Kant vor so langen Jahren in dieser Schrift aufgebracht worden ist. Er legt den Grundsatz fest, dass kein Friedensvertrag giltig erachtet werden soll, der "mit dem geheimen Vorbehalt des Stoffs zu einem Künftigen Kriege gemacht" worden sei. Er dringt darauf, dass kein Staat, klein oder gross, jemals unter die Oberherrschaft eines anderen Staates gezwungen werde, denn der Staat sei eine Gesellschaft von Menschen, über die niemand anders als er selbst zu gebieten und zu disponieren habe. "Stehende Heere (*miles perpetuus*)," sagt Kant, "sollen mit der Zeit ganz aufhören." Denn dank ihrer immerwährenden Angriffsbereitschaft bedrohen diese Armeen unaufhörlich andere Staaten und reizen sie dazu, die Zahl der gerüsteten Mannschaften ohne Ende zu vermehren. Wer hat im zwanzigsten Jahrhundert das Uebel und die Gefahr des Wettrüstens zu Wasser und zu Lande in bessere oder klarere Worte gebracht? "Kein Staat soll sich in die Verfassung und Regierung eines anderen Staates gewalttätig einmischen," ist ein anderer Grundsatz, den Kant aufgestellt hat, und der beinahe als ein Vorläufer der Monroe Doktrin betrachtet werden darf.

Wenn ein Zustand des Friedens hergestellt werden soll, damn muss die bürgerliche Verfassung eines jeden Staates republikanisch sein, und es ist Kants Argument, dass die einzig sichere Regierung diejenige ist, die gegründet ist "erstlich nach Prinzipien der Freiheit der Glieder einer Gesellschaft als Menschen, zweitens nach Grundsätzen der Abhängigkeit Aller von einer einzigen gemeinsamen Gesetzgebung als Untertanen, und drittens nach dem Gesetz der Gleichheit as Staatsbürger." Als der Philosoph von Königsberg diese prophetischen Satzungen niederschrieb, lernte das Volk der Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika Sätze gleichen Inhaltes von der Feder Thomas Jeffersons, und Frankreichs Volk hörte ihre Auslegung in höchster Emphase von den Bildnern der französischen Revolution in einer Periode stärksten Aufruhrs. In England war der jüngere Pitt Premierminister, und George Cannings Laufbahn bereitete sich vor.

Kant lehtre die wahrhaft moderne Doktrin, dass es die Staatsbürger selbst sein sollten, die darüber zu beschliessen hätten, ob Krieg sein solle oder nicht, womit jene Macht allen anderen Kräften entzogen wurde, den Monarchen sowohl wie anderen Staatslenkern, den gesetzgebenden Körperschaften sowohl wie auserwählten Gruppen, die sich leicht von Gefühlsüberschwang, Leidenschaft oder Ehrgeiz hinreissen lassen.

Aber Kants Gedanken beschränkten sich nicht auf die Politik einer Nation allein. "Das Völkerrecht," fährt er fort, "soll auf einem Föderalism gegründet sein." In diesem einen Satz steht die Prophezeiung des Völk-

erbundes und der Anwendung eines internationalen Rechtes. Ein Völkerstaat (*civitas gentium*), der zuletzt alle Völker der Erde befassen würde, war das ideale Ziel des grossen Philosophen, dem die Nationen unserer Tage mit wachsendem Vertrauen und wachsender Hoffnung stetigen Schrittes entgegenmarschieren.

Was aber soll die Gewähr für eine solche Abmachung leisten, Frieden herzustellen und zu erhalten? "Nichts Geringeres," antwortet Kant, "als die grosse Künstlerin Natur (*natura daedala rerum*)." Mit einer einzigen, erhabenen Geste stösst Kant den Gedanken beiseite, dass Individuen oder Nationen durch die Furcht vor wirtschaftlichen Repressalien oder Waffengewalt gezwungen werden müssen. Kant hat es mit der Wirklichkeit zu tun. Er sieht den Tatsachen ins Auge. Er weiss, dass wenn Männer oder Nationen ihr gegebenes Wort nicht darum halten, weil sie es gegeben haben, keinerlei Versicherung bestehen kann, dass sie es je halten werden.

Da Moral die Grundlage und das Ziel aller Zivilisation ist, kommt Kant zu dem Schluss, dass der "Zustand eines öffentlichen Rechtes," dass "der ewige Friede, der auf die bisher fälschlich sogenannten Friedensschlüsse, eigentlich Waffenstillstände, folgt, keine leere Idee ist, sondern eine Aufgabe, die nach und nach aufgelöst ihrem Ziele (weil die Zeiten, in denen gleiche Fortschritte geschehen, hoffentlich immer kürzer werden) beständig näher kommt." Kann mehr als das gesagt werden? Diese grosse deutsche Stimme aus dem Jahre 1795 spricht zu der Welt von 1930 in Worten

gebietender Führerschaft und höchster praktischer Weisheit. Die Stimme Immanuel Kants ist eine ungreifbare Macht.

Zehn Jahre marschiert die zivilisierte Welt, bald bewusst bald unbewusst, dem glücklichen Ziele entgegen, das Immanuel Kant so klar vor sich gesehen und geschildert hat. Im Völkerbund hat das Zeitalter gemeinsamen politischen Rats sein ausdrucksvolles Organ gefunden, und in den Verträgen von Locarno haben die Signatarmächte den hohen und edlen Beschluss gefasst, ihre internationalen Streitigkeiten auf friedlichem Wege beizulegen, gleichgiltig ob sie von älterer Dauer oder neueren Ursprunges sind. Und schliesslich hat die Welt in dem Pariser Kriegsächtungspakt den Krieg als ein Instrument nationaler Politik abgeschworen, jener Politik, von der von Clausewitz gesagt hat, dass sie Schlachten schlägt anstatt diplomatische Noten zu schreiben. Von jetzt an gilt es Noten zu schreiben, in Konferenzen mit einander zu Rate zu gehen, und das Schlachtenschlagen und Rüsten beiseite zu lassen. All die Kräfte, all die Anstrengungen, und all die unendlichen Kosten, die bisher in das Rüsten zum Kriege und seine Führung hineingesteckt worden sind, gilt es jetzt vervielfachter Zufriendenheit und wachsendem Glück der grossen Masse aller Völker jeglicher Nation zuzuwenden. Bessere Schulen und Erziehungssysteme, bessere Lebensbedingungen für den Arbeiter und höhere Entlohnung für den Angestellten, besseren Schutz der Volksgesundheit, bessere Wohnverhältnisse für die Massen der Bevölkerung, bessere

Strassen und sonstige Verkehrsmittel, bessere Bibliotheken und Museen, mit einem Worte, eine höhere Stufe des Lebens allerwärts. Die Welt ist reich genug für all dies, wenn sie ihr gegebenes Wort hält, den Krieg als ein Instrument nationaler Politik in Acht und Bann zu tun. Diese moralische Verpflichtung ist ungreifbar in ihrer Macht.

Die Welt des zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts steht vor einer Ueberfülle von Problemen, deren Lösung die menschliche Tragfähigkeit aufs höchste belastet. Es handelt sich um rein menschliche Probleme, allgemein wirtschaftliche, industrielle und finanzielle Probleme, um politische und religiöse. Der Punkt, der nicht dringlich genug gemacht werden kann, ist der, dass diese Probleme sich niemals werden durch Hass, Streit oder Gewalt lösen lassen. Auf einem dieser Wege können sie vielleicht unterdrückt, aber nicht gelöst werden. Wenn sie gelöst werden sollen, so kann es nur geschehen in dem Geiste freundwilliger Zusammenarbeit, freundschaftlichen Verbandes und gemeinsamen Rates, mit dem endgiltigen Vorsatz Gerechtigkeit walten zu lassen und Freiheit zu schaffen unter den Menschen. Denn dies sind die wahrhaftigen und dauernden Grundlagen des Friedens. Frieden, und das sollte nimmer vergessen werden, ist durchaus nicht das Ideal an sich. Frieden ist ein Zustand, den das Ideal, wenn es verwirklicht wird, mit sich bringt. Das Ideal selbst aber ist menschlichte Freiheit, Gerechtigkeit und ehrenhafte Führung einer geordneten menschlichen Gesellschaft. Auf dieser Grundlage ist dauernder Friede

nur eine natürliche Folgeerscheinung. Ohne sie gibt es keinen Frieden, sondern lediglich ein Regiment der Gewalt, bis Freiheit und Gerechtigkeit friedesuchend dagegen revoltieren. Diese fundamentalen Dinge müssen im Auge behalten werden. Freiheit und Gerechtigkeit sind es, auf deren unmittelbarer Suche wir uns gegenwärtig befinden, und das heisst, dass wir bereit sein müssen, offenen Sinnes an jede Frage heranzutreten, die irgendwo in der Welt erhoben wird, solange sie diese grossen Prinzipien und Ziele angeht. Wir müssen versuchen, solche Fragen ehrlich und gerecht zu entscheiden, damit sich keine menschliche Unzufriedenheit ergibt und die Fundamente für den Frieden um so fester werden.

Es gibt mancherlei Erscheinungen und Vorgänge in der Welt, denen freimütig ins Gesicht zu sehen wir bereit sein müssen. In erster Linie vielleicht ist es die mehr als augenfällige Tatsache, dass sich ganz gewiss nicht alle organisierten Gruppen der Menschheit auf derselben Stufe der Tauglichkeit für Selbstregierung und internationale Verantwortlichkeit befinden. Einem solchen Volke entweder durch zahlenmässige Uebermacht und grössere staatliche Qualifikationen oder aber in der Verfolgung irgend einer theoretischen Vision von der Gleichheit aller Menschen dieselben politischen und sozialen Institutionen aufzuzwingen, die für weit fortgeschrittenere und weit diszipliniertere Völker angemessen und zufriedenstellend sind, wäre ein Wahnsinn allerersten Ranges. Solche Völker müssen, ohne dass sie selbst schuld daran wären, als Mündel der

fortgeschritteneren und besser disciplinierten behandelt werden. Das heisst unter keinen Umständen, dass sie ausgebeutet und lediglich als Lastträger und Zugtiere behandelt werden sollen, sondern vielmehr als Kinder in der Schule politischer und sozialer Einsicht. Die Mandatstheorie, wie sie durch den Völkerbund ausgearbeitet wird, ist durchaus gesund und brauchbar, und wird, wenn sie nicht zu eng ausgelegt und angewendet wird, generationenlang den weniger fortgeschrittenen Völkern helfen vorwärts zu kommen und immer höher auf der Stufenleiter der politischen und sozialen Organisation emporzusteigen. Jede einzelne der fortgeschritteneren und mächtigeren Nationen sollte ihren Anteil haben an der Anwendung dieses Mandatssystems, wenn sie es wünscht. Es ist Raum genug für England, Raum genug für Frankreich, Raum genug für Deutschland, Raum genug für Italien, Raum genug für Japan, sich weniger fortgeschrittener Völker in anderen Erdteilen anzunehmen und sie zu entwickeln.

Man nehme nun aber ja nicht an, dass alle zur Zeit bestehenden geographischen, politischen, völkischen, religiösen und wirtschaftlichen Regelungen endgiltig seien. Jede einzelne ist durchaus gerechterweise ein geeigneter Gegenstand für ruhige Erwägung und tieferes Studium, und wenn es Mittel und Wege gibt, Gerechtigkeit besser auszuüben und Freiheit zu fördern, dann sollen diese Wege gesucht und gefunden werden. Bei den älteren Nationen Westeuropas ist der nationale Bauprozess vollendet, im östlichen und südöstlichen Europa dagegen gibt es zweifellos Grenz-

fragen und andere Fragen der Unterscheidung, deren Studium zu gegebener Stunde wieder aufgenommen werden muss. Ausserdem handelt es sich um Probleme nationalen Ehrgeizes und das besondere Problem von Minoritäten, die untergetaucht sind in Majoritäten fremden Stammes und fremder Sprache oder doch wenigstens von ihnen umgeben sind. Es erheben sich Probleme religiösen Zwistes und historisch gewordener völkischer Eifersüchteleien und Gegengesetzlichkeiten, die im Laufe der Jahre mit Geduld, Freimut, Freisinn und Gerechtigkeitsgefühl behoben werden müssen. Nichts ist jemals endgiltig geregelt, solange es nicht recht geregelt ist. Die Aufgabe, die der Welt bevorsteht, ist es, sich zu versichern, dass wir nicht den Versuch machen, Dinge durch Zwang, Gewalt und Krieg zu regeln, sondern durch Studium, Besprechung und gemeinsamen Rat. Diese Kräft alle gehören zu den ungreifbaren Mächten, von denen diese Welt regiert wird.

Ein Weltfrieden kann nicht dauern auf der Grundlage irgendeiner Theorie der Gewaltherrschaft, weder einer militärischen noch einer wirtschaftlichen, rassenmässigen oder religiösen, denn solche Herrschaft trägt stets die Versuchung zu Störung und Umsturz in sich selbst. Ein sicherer Frieden ruht einzig und allein auf einer liberalen, einsichtigen und von Ueberzeugung getragenen Oeffentlichen Meinung. Die selbe Oeffentliche Meinung, die die Aechtung des Krieges als Instrument nationaler Politik herbeigeführt hat, geht jetzt daran, sich einen neuen befriedigenden Ausdruck

in der Errichtung gewisser Institutionen zu schaffen, die die Wechselbeziehungen der Menschheit als Nationen regulieren und leiten sollen, und zwar zum Ersatz all des in verflossenen Jahren so üblichen Argwohns, all der Furcht und all der Schaustellung äusserer Macht. Diese Institutionen,—das darf man wohl getrost voraussagen,—werden von dreierlei Art sein, und jede Art wird ein moralisches Fundament und einen moralischen Zweck haben.

Die ungreifbare Institution der geistigen internationalen Durchdringung, des internationalen Kontaktes und der internationalen Vereinigung ist die erste. Grosser Fortschritt ist bereits auf diesem Wege gemacht worden. Die Wissenschaft ist international, und die Literatur, obgleich sie stets mit nationaler Zunge redet, wird immer internationaler. Nirgends ist Shakespeare in weiteren Kreisen gelesen, tiefer verstanden und wirksamer auf die Bühne gebracht worden als in Deutschland. Die Sprache Goethes ist deutsch, aber seine Gedanken sind der ganzen, weiten Welt vertraut. Die Musik mag ein russisches, polnisches oder skandinavisches, ein deutsches oder französisches, ein italienisches, spanisches oder englisches Gewand tragen, ihrem Zauber und ihrer Macht wird darum nicht an den Grenzen der Nation, der sie entstammt, Halt geboten. Bei allen Unterschieden werden geistiger und ästhetischer Reichtum und Fruchtbarkeit nur um so mehr vervielfacht durch die Macht dessen, was ihnen gemeinsam ist. Und diese Macht wiederum ist ungreifbar.

Wohl gefördert ist ferner bereits der Aufbau jener rechtlichen und halb-rechtlichen Institutionen, auf die sich die Nationen zur friedfertigen und gerechten Beilegung all der Meinungsverschiedenheiten und Interessengegensätze verlassen sollen, die natürlicherweise von Zeit zu Zeit auftauchen werden. Die Satzungen und Sitzungen des Völkerbundes mit seiner wachsenden Autorität und seinem sich beständig steigernden Prestige sind symbolisch für die neue Staatskunst und Gewohnheit, mit einander Angesicht zu Angesicht zu beraten, statt formelle Noten zu schreiben, Ultimaten zu senden und Armeen zu mobilisieren. Nehmen wir den Ständigen Internationalen Gerichtshof und den Ständigen Schiedshof im Haag. Beide sind würdige und aufs höchste gewürdigte Körperschaften, die vor aller Welt den Grundsatz vertreten, dass unparteiische Gerechtigkeit und nicht Gewalt entscheiden sollen, wer von zwei Streitenden im Recht oder im Unrecht ist. Ausserdem haben einzelne Nationen sowohl wie Gruppen von Nationen durch Vertrag gewisse Kommissionen und Tribunale zum Zweck der Untersuchung, des Ausgleichs und des Schiedsspruchs vorgesehen. Dem Zyniker, der da fragt: "Wo ist der Ersatz für Waffengewalt?" weisen wir den Völkerbund, den Internationalen Gerichtshof, und den Ständigen Schiedshof, und wir verweisen darauf nicht nur in der Hoffnung auf die Zukunft, sondern voller Stolz auf das, was dort bereits geleistet worden ist.

Die dritte Art von Institutionen, die in die Erscheinung treten müssen, um den Notwendigkeiten des heuti-

gen Tages zu begegnen, ist wirtschaftlicher Natur. Der Mensch lebt von Arbeit, Nationen gedeihen durch Arbeit, und internationale Beziehungen werden entweder erleichtert oder erschwert je nach den Methoden, die den Austausch der Arbeitsfrüchte von Volk zu Volk bedingen. Als die allgemeinen Lebensbedingungen noch ziemlich einfach und die Lebensbedürfnisse noch ziemlich geringe waren, konnte ein verhältnismässig begrenztes Territorium und ein im wesentlichen einheitliches Klima vielleicht all das liefern, was zur Befriedigung der mehr oder minder primitiven Ansprüche einer Bevölkerung nötig sein mochte. Aber die Zeiten haben sich geändert. Was einst fast unerreichbarer Luxus gewesen ist, gehört heute nicht nur zu den Bequemlichkeiten, sondern zu den absoluten Notwendigkeiten des alltäglichen Lebens. Schon der Nahrungsmittelbezug für ein Volk von irgendwie beträchtlicher Grösse bedingt die tägliche, beinahe stündliche Inanspruchnahme eines in Wahrheit ungeheuren Gebietes. Die Industrie könnte nicht bestehen, geschweige denn blühen, ohne Metall und Gummi, Holz und Oel und noch mehr als ein Dutzend anderer Naturprodukte, die meist weit jenseits der Grenzen des Verwertungsstaates ihren Ursprung haben. Mit anderen Worten, das wirtschaftliche Leben jeglicher Nation, so gross und reich sie auch immer sein mag, hat längst aufgehört, national unabhängig zu sein, sondern ist im Gegenteil international abhängig geworden. Und das heisst nichts anderes, als dass der internationale Welthandel immer mehr frei gehalten werden muss von engen, kleinlichen

und vorurteilsvollen Beschränkungen und hindernden Verwaltungsmassnahmen, damit die Bevölkerung aller Nationen möglichst leicht und vorteilhaft ihre eigenen Produkte gegen importierte Güter eintauschen kann.

Hier tritt die grosse Bedeutung des föderativen Prinzips in die Erscheinung, und hier darf wohl die Erfahrung der Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika Europa eine gute Lehre sein. Die gewaltige wirtschaftliche Entwicklung der Vereinigten Staaten und das ungeheure Wachstum ihres Nationalreichtums während der letzten beiden Generationen hat Gründe, die sich in aller Kürze deutlich erkennen lassen. Die vornehmlichste Ursache liegt in den Bestimmungen der Verfassung der Vereinigten Staaten, nach denen in ihrem gesamten Staatsgebiete unbeschränkte Handelsfreiheit herrscht, in einem Gebiete so mannigfaltig in seinem Klima, seiner Bodenbeschaffenheit und seinen Produkten, dass es gewiss ein weites Reich für sich ist. Und dennoch, wäre den Einzelstaaten der Union die Möglichkeit belassen geblieben, Zollschranken gegen den nächsten Nachbar aufzurichten, die Bevölkerung der Vereinigten Staaten wäre heutzutage wirtschaftlich weit zurück und verhältnismässig sogar verarmt. In der Tatsache, dass sich der einheimische Handel frei von Zöllen und anderen Fesselungen abwickelt, ist die Grundlage der amerikanischen Prosperität zu suchen. Die Schutzzollpolitik, die ihren Ursprung den philosophischen Lehren Alexander Hamiltons und Männern vom Schlage Henry Clays, Abraham Lincolns, James Gillespie Blaines und William McKinleys ver-

dankt, hat niemals beabsichtigt, den internationalen Handel zu zerstören oder ungebührlich zu hindern, sondern wollte lediglich den Vereinigten Staaten das notwendige Maass wirtschaftlicher Selbstständigkeit und Unabhängigkeit vermitteln, damit sich die verschiedenen Industrieen entwickeln und sich die politischen und sozialen Fundamente der geleisteten Arbeit entsprechend festigen konnten. Ein wahrer Schutzzolltarif hat under keinen Umständen die Bedeutung eines prohibitiven Zolltarifs. Es ist nicht ein Tarif, der den internationalen Handel vernichten oder den Ausgleich internationaler Handelsbilanzen durch ein praktisches Importverbot unmöglich machen soll, sondern hat einfach den Sinn, die eben genannten Grundprinzipien zu behüten. Davon abzuweichen und die Errichtung eines Zollwalles um die Vereinigten Staaten zu versuchen, hiesse nichts anderes, als die Schutzzollpolitik in ihrer eigenen Zitadelle anzugreifen und sie durch eine Politik des Handelsverbots zu ersetzen, die dem amerikanischen Volke zum allereigensten, schwersten Schaden gereichen würde.

Es bestehen gewisse Anzeichen, noch etwas unklare und nicht völlig überzeugende, aber doch immerhin Anzeichen dafür, dass der Staatenbund der britischen Nationen mit seiner über die ganze Welt verbreiteten Bevölkerung und in seiner unendlichen Mannigfaltigkeit des Klimas, der Bodenverhältnisse und der Produkte, auf seine eigene Weise und zu seiner Stunde eine Institution eigener Art aufrichten wird, in der sich,—*mutatis mutandis*,—praktisch die Grundprinzi-

pien wiederspiegeln werden, der die Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika so viel zu verdanken haben.

Wie steht es mit Europa? Ist noch immer nicht die Stunde gekommen, den nächsten grossen Schritt vorwärts zu tun zur Förderung nationaler Befriedigung und internationalen Behagens, indem man herangeht an den Aufbau der wirtschaftlichen Vereinigten Staaten von Europa, die für die in ihrer Fülle strotzenden und hochzivilisierten Völker dieses Erdteils das tun würden, was auf der anderen Seite des atlantischen Ozeans bereits getan worden ist? Victor Hugo hat eine solche Entwicklung bereits im Jahre 1848 vorausgesehen. Wenn man eine fügliche Antwort auf diese Frage geben will, muss man die prinzipielle Seite der Dinge sowohl wie die ins Einzelne gehende Verwaltungsseite im Auge behalten. Nationale Scheidungen, Unterschiede und Vorteile wollen geschützt, und internationale Vorteile wollen ergriffen und zur Entwicklung gebracht werden. Es ist ein Glück, dass die konstruktiven Politiker Europas ihre Gedanken auf die Lösung dieses Problems gerichtet haben. Der tief beklagte und aufrichtig betrauerte Dr. Stresemann hatte ein volles Verständis dafür und war bereit, als Führer auf dem Weg zum neuen Ziel voranzumarschieren. Aber Briand in Frankreich, Masaryk und Beneš in der Czechoslowakei und mancher andere Staatsmann von gleichem Weitblick und gleicher visionärer Stärke sind von demselben Geiste beseelt. Es kann nicht mehr lange dauern, bis dieses schöne Ideal, dessen Erreichen so viel für die wirtschaftliche Prosperität und Befriedigung der in

Betracht kommenden Völker bedeutet, den Weg zur Kontrolle der Politik der verschiedenen Regierungen finden wird. Und dieses Ideal wiederum ist eine der ungreifbaren Mächte, von denen die Welt regiert wird.

Was aber, so fragt man, wird aus all den schönen Institutionen werden, wenn eine der Nationen, die den Kriegsächtungspakt unterzeichnet haben, ihr gegebenes Wort bricht und Feindseligkeiten gegen den Nachbarstaat eröffnet? Wer soll den Rechtsverletzer bestrafen und den Verletzten schützen? Die sehr einfache Antwort ist rasch gegeben: die Oeffentliche Meinung, die umso mächtiger ist, wenn sie sich erhebt zur wahren Höhe ehrlicher Verdammung. Aber wie soll die Oeffentliche Meinung praktisch handeln, worin wird sie die Mittel zu ihrem Ausdruck finden? Ganz genau so wie die Gesellschaft handelt und ihren Gefühlen Ausdruck verleiht gegen den notorischen Lügner und jeden anderen, der sich einer niedrigen und verächtlichen Handlungsweise schuldig macht. Keine Verdammung vermag härter und entscheidender zu sein als diese.

Man vergesse nicht, dass der Kriegsächtungspakt mit seinen Bestimmungen eine neue Denkweise und eine neue Aera für alles, was mit internationalen Beziehungen zu tun hat, einleitet. Es ist die Macht des Beharrungsvermögens, dank dessen sich Regierungen, Journalisten, Admiräle und Generäle noch immer in den Phrasen einer abgetanen Vergangenheit unterhalten. Manche stellen die Frage nach der Parität der Kriegsflotten. Diese Phrase ist beinahe bedeutungslos,

denn wenn solche Parität heute auf dem Papier bestimmt und morgen vom Stapel gelassen würde, dann könnte sie übermorgen bereits durch eine neue Entdeckung im Fabrikslaboratorium irgend eines fernen Landes oder durch einen neuen Triumph der Luftschiffahrt zunichte gemacht werden. Wenn die Menschheit noch immer von nationaler Sicherheit redet, so heisst das nichts anderes, als dass sie sich noch immer in den Phrasen des Krieges unterhält. Man lerne in der Phraseologie des Kriegsächtungspaktes denken und erkennen, dass sich die nationale Sicherheit auf ganz der gleichen Stufe befindet wie städtische Sicherheit oder die Sicherheit des Individuums. Gelegentlich wird man des Beistandes einer bewaffneten Polizei bedürfen, aber die altmodischen Schutzmittel, die Wissenschaft und Moral vereint zum nutzlosen Plunder gestempelt haben, werden ohne Nutzen bleiben. Es ist, und zwar besonders in den Vereinigten Staaten, noch viel die Rede von der Neutralität und ihren Bedingtheiten, aber das ist wiederum nichts anderes als ein Denken in der Phraseologie des Krieges statt in der des Kriegsächtungspaktes. Wenn eine Nation, die diesen Pakt gezeichnet hat, ihr Wort bricht, dann kann keine andere Signatarmacht in des Wortes alter Bedeutung neutral bleiben, und zwar aus dem einfachen Grunde nicht, weil sie der Wortbruch als Signatarmacht unmittelbar angeht. Folgerichtig müsste jede Nation, die den Kriegsächtungspakt unterzeichnet hat, es unverzüglich als ihre nationale Politik erklären, dass sie ihren Staatsangehörigen weder helfen noch beistehen

wird zur Unterstützung irgend einer Macht, die ihr im Pariser Pakt gegebenes Wort bricht. Das ist keine Verletzung der Neutralität, denn wenn das vertragliche Wort gebrochen ist, dann ist es gebrochen worden gegenüber jeder anderen Signatarmacht und ihr zum Trotze. Man rücke diese fundamentalen Tatsachen klar vor die Augen der Oeffentlichen Meinung, und die Politik der Regierungen wird sehr rasch entsprechend umgeformt werden. Man vergesse bei alledem nicht, dass die Rüstungsbeschränkung, die im Versailler Vertrage der deutschen Nation auferlegt worden ist, durchaus nicht als Ausnahme von der Politik anderer Nationen beabsichtigt war. Es ist Clemenceau selbst gewesen, der geschrieben hat, dass die Forderungen dieses Vertrages in Bezug auf die deutschen Rüstungen gleichzeitig den ersten Schritt zu einer allgemeinen Verminderung und Beschränkung von Rüstungen bedeuteten, die die Allierten als eine der fruchtbarsten Vorbeugungsmittel gegen den Krieg herbeiführen sollten, und deren Förderung der Völkerbund als eine seiner ersten Pflichten betrachten müsste. Es ist höchste Zeit, dass die Oeffentliche Meinung die ausserdeutschen Nationen anruft, dies Versprechen zu halten, diese Politik zu verfolgen, und somit das Kommen des Tages zu beschleunigen, an dem die Rüstungsbeschränkung nicht mehr nur das Charakteristikum weniger, sondern aller Nationen ist.

Es gibt zweierlei Wege, auf denen man sich jeder grossen Frage, die den Nationalstolz und das Nationalinteresse berührt, zu nähern vermag. Der eine ist der

Weg im Geiste des Vertrauens, des Wohlwollens und der Zuversicht. Der andere ist der Weg im Geiste des Argwohns, der Eifersucht und der Furcht. Beide Wege sind im tieferen Sinne ungreifbar, und zwischen ihnen läuft der Weg des Wettstreites um die Weltherrschaft und um Herz und Blut der Menschheit. Es wird eine ungreifbare Macht sein, die unsere Welt regiert, und es ist Sache der Oeffentlichen Meinung, zu bestimmen, ob die Wahl auf eine Macht fallen soll, die erhaben, gross und edel ist und die der ganzen Menschheit hilft, oder auf eine niedere, gemeine, eifersüchtige, selbstische Macht voller Habgier. Die Welt von heute steht am Scheidewege und muss sich rasch entscheiden, welcher der beiden ungreifbaren Mächte sie entgegenwandern will.

Welchen Weg wird das deutsche Volk einschlagen? Lassen Sie einen Mann, der lange und tief getrunken hat vom Born deutscher Gelehrsamheit, deutscher Weisheit, Wissenschaft und Literatur, die Antwort geben und sagen, dass das deutsche Volk, eingedenk der ragenden Wegweiser seines Lessing und Herder, seines Goethe und Schiller, seines Hegel und Schleiermacher, die Antwort weiss, im Geiste der beredten Stimme Fichtes und der abgeklärten, aufbauenden Philosophie Immanuel Kants:

Deutsches Herz, verzage nicht,
Thu, was dein Gewissen spricht!

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